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This thesis explores the emergence of functional collusion in groups and 
communities. Collusion is often taken up as synonymous with conspiracy, as a 
negative aspect of people seeking to get an advantage by nefarious means. In contrast, 
the thesis points to how a form of collusion might have a function for supporting 
people in their ongoing relating and in doing so suggests that there are two important 
factors in functional collusion. The first is that contextual history is key to 
understanding how, without planning or discussion, collusion emerges and is 
maintained in groups and communities. The second is that an absence of discussion is 
key because bringing collusive patterns of relating into our conversations disables 
their continuation. This thesis argues that collusion arises as people avoid the 
discomfort of emotions such as shame as well as maintaining familiar patterns of 
power relating. As collusive patterns of relating tend to emerge undiscussed between 
people, the thesis suggests that deciding whether to uncover and discuss them is a 
matter of contextual practical judgement or phronesis as it will inevitably require the 
navigation of ethical dilemmas which the author argues cannot be solved simply 
through the application of universal rules. This thesis offers a challenge to the way 
people working as organisational development practitioners think about their practice, 
especially those working in the not-for-profit sector.  
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This thesis is the culmination of the three years I spent on the Doctor of Management 
Programme (DMan) at the University of Hertfordshire. As a research programme the 
DMan has emerged from the work of a group of researchers at the Business School 
who have developed a multidisciplinary theory to understand organisations. Within 
the theory of complex responsive processes of relating these scholars argue that the 
future is fundamentally unknowable and emerges from the interaction of many people 
in local situations (Stacey, 2007, pp259-261). As another aspect of this theory these 
authors also claim that knowledge emerges unpredictably from the patterning of 
conscious and self-conscious human bodies relating with each other through language 
and discourse understood as social processes. The way of working on the DMan 
programme takes these ideas seriously and therefore the process of research is 
understood as an unpredictable and emergent inquiry that is both individual (in the 
sense that the work is that of the individual researcher) and social at the same time 
because the work involves being reflexive about one’s relationships with others. The 
social nature of inquiry is taken up through working with a community of researchers 
and a smaller learning set (which includes one’s supervisor), sharing one’s work and 
inviting responses from others throughout the programme. The research involves 
writing numerous iterations of each project as one’s work progresses and emerges 
from one’s involvement in the social processes that go on in one’s workplace. In my 
case this has involved me exploring my practice as an employee facilitator in an 
international NGO.  
 
As a consequence of the work emerging in this way the structure of this thesis differs 
from that of the more common format for a professional doctorate. As the reader 
moves on from this introduction and into the main body of the thesis they will 
encounter a series of four projects, each with different narratives at their heart drawn 
from my work. Each project represents an exploration of those narratives. The 
movement of my thinking is demonstrated over all four projects as I have reflexively 
responded to my research in terms of changes to my practice. To be able to see my 
movement of thought over time, the projects that form the main body of this thesis 
remain unchanged from the time they were completed. In the final synopsis at the end 
of this thesis I review the four projects (which is intended to give a further reflexive 
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turn on my research), and I go on to set out my arguments, my contributions to 
knowledge and practice, and an exploration of method and ethics.  
 
At the time when I started the DMan programme I was working in an international 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in the UK and the narratives that I have 
used as data have been drawn from my work in that organisation. I started out on my 
research thinking about how organisational change comes about but became 
increasingly interested in why some relationships and processes seemed to stay 
stubbornly the same. In this thesis I will be discussing how people interact in 
everyday circumstances and describing collusive processes, which often remain 
hidden or that go unnoticed, that represent the maintenance and continuity of social 
relating. The well-known Hans Christian Andersen story of the Emperor’s New 
Clothes (Andersen, 2018) is an example of the kind of phenomenon that I have been 
interested in. What is happening for the Emperor to think, and for people to agree, 
that he is fully clothed when in fact it is clear that he is completely naked? I think it is 
telling that in the final paragraph of the story we are told that even though the 
Emperor thought to himself that he might be naked, he carried on with his procession 
as if nothing was wrong. I interpret the Emperor carrying on as if he is still fully 
clothed as an attempt to avoid the shame that would likely ensue if he didn’t do so.  
 
This story represents an allegorical example of what I have noticed going on in 
organisations and have called processes of functional collusion which people engage 
in to avoid uncomfortable emotions such as shame. However, as a way of 
understanding how global patterns of relating emerge from local interaction, I am 
proposing there are no rogues deliberately setting out to fool everyone, as in the story 
of the Emperor. Instead, I am arguing that we all participate in the maintenance of 
patterns of relating that themselves emerge, unbidden and undiscussed, from ongoing 
relating between interdependent people. In the story of the Emperor I had previously 
understood it to be about how foolhardy the Emperor was to be taken in by the 
rogues. However, I now understand it as an example of how assumptions can arise 
over time in a group or community with which people then feel the need to collude to 
be seen as competent. It is important to the story that it took a child to point out that 
the Emperor was naked. We all find this believable because we understand that 
children often lack the understanding of the tacit social rules that govern how we 
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respond to each other. From the perspective of Bourdieu (1991, pp12-13), the child 
has yet to be formed by the habitus that involves taking up the silent traditions that 
have emerged in the history of that community. Through my research the idea of 
habitus has had a considerable influence on my thinking. 
 
To begin the reflexive process of understanding how I have come to think the way I 
do, project one is intended as an exploration of how my intellectual history has 
unfolded and so the narratives in that project are drawn from my work history before I 
commenced the DMan. In project one I discuss how I learned to take for granted 
assumptions about power and control mostly based on systems thinking and formative 
teleology, as explained by Stacey et al. (2000). I learned what to think through my 
interactions with others as my practice developed, as an immigration officer in my 
early career, then as a manager and latterly as an organisational development (OD) 
practitioner.  At the end of project one the history of how my thinking had developed 
was becoming apparent to me. I was also being challenged by ideas related to the 
perspective of complex responsive processes of relating with particular attention to 
the paradox entailed in how we are individually formed by our social experience as 
we form others. The idea that my identity is both individual and social at the same 
time challenged my thinking of myself as somehow independent of my social 
experience. I moved from an interest in power and control, to being interested in how 
undiscussed traditions seem to arise in groups and communities. 
 
In project two I go on to explore my practice as a facilitator because I was interested 
in how the assumptions I described in project one were at play in my practice. 
Through my research in project two I describe how I facilitated a strategy away day 
involving familiar activities to encourage participation and discussion. Reflecting on 
that experience I realised that aspects of facilitative processes could be seen as 
infantilising as the participants looked to me as the facilitator to tell them what to do. 
My unwitting involvement made me think about how collusion, seen as a social 
process, may emerge in groups in the avoidance of shame.  As I moved into project 
three I went through a job interview process at work and having taken up the idea of 
collusion, I went on to explore what might be at play in job interviews and what 
function the collusion I had been discussing may have. Finally, in project four I 
explore what it might mean for people if they do not collude with the prevailing 
 9 
patterns of relating, leading to an understanding of reflexive practical judgement as a 
form of practice. Aristotle’s phronesis, (practical judgement) is the contextual and 
moral judgement making in which we understand the history of our practice and the 
general rules that pertain to a situation but are not necessarily limited by them. In this 
sense practice is understood as an ongoing reflexive process that is paradoxically both 
individual and social at the same time. Coming from the pragmatist tradition, Dewey 
(1916) emphasises practical judgment as being characterized by our thinking coming 
to bear on things to do or to be done in a given situation and in making such 
judgements paying attention to the means we employ in striving for our desired ends. 
Other DMan graduates have dealt extensively with issues of power relating (Solso, 
2017; Rogers, 2013) and whilst I recognise the maintenance of patterns of power in 
the emergence of collusion, I have emphasised and explored the emotional processes 
involved, especially shame, as it has a particular relevance to my experience. 
 
I have taken a multidisciplinary approach to developing my critique and to give 
examples of some of the literature I discuss; I have taken up the work of authors on 
complex responsive processes such as Ralph Stacey, Doug Griffin and Chris Mowles; 
concepts of a social self from George Herbert Mead and Norbert Elias; the 
sociological ideas of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault; understanding emotions 
from the work of Antonio Damasio; and emotion as social process from Ian Burkitt. 
As I have said, this thesis has emerged from my reflexive response to my practice 
over four projects in which I take up literature to help me to understand my 
experience. As a consequence, there is not a literature review in any one section or 
chapter. Instead I will relate my arguments to relevant literature throughout the thesis. 
 
The history of my practice has been that of an organisational development practitioner 
and, as this thesis is an exploration of my practice, it represents a contribution to both 
the knowledge and practice of the community of people working in organisational 
development in UK NGOs.  This is important because my discussion of collusion 
challenges traditional ideas about organisational development and change. In this 
thesis I recognise moves towards understanding the importance of narrative and 
dialogue by writers on contemporary organisational development (OD) such as Bushe 
and Marshak (2009), whilst taking issue with their systemic and individualistic 
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assumptions as well as those of other writers on organisational development such as 
Senge (1990) and Schon (1983).   
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At the time of embarking on this Dman programme I was working for a large 
international aid charity. This involved directly supporting the main fundraising 
department, through conversations with the departmental director as well as other 
senior managers with the aim of helping them to decide how they can improve the 
effectiveness of their work and the work of their teams. Most of the time this involved 
taking a coaching approach to encourage them to find solutions for themselves and 
occasionally it involved me offering potential solutions and sometimes directly 
offering help to bring about desired improvements or changes. In addition to this I had 
corporate responsibility for developing management and leadership competence 
across the organisation that operated across the world in three geographic areas which 
are Latin and Central America, Asia and the Middle East, and Africa. In my career I 
have previously been a manager in the UK public sector and, for a short time, an 
independent consultant. I have also completed a Masters degree in people and 
organisational development that expanded and embedded how I have come to think 
about organisations and management.  
 
Through that Masters programme I became interested in power and control in 
organisations especially in relation to my own response to authority. I explored this 
through a first person subjective research inquiry into my experience at work and 
explored how my upbringing and early experiences may have influenced my 
expectations of managers and leaders at work. When I was young, around two years 
old, my mother and father divorced having had a violent relationship. My mother then 
met my stepfather who was a heavy drinker and rarely at home. My main stable father 
figure was my grandfather who died when I was around 11 years old. In my 
exploration on that Masters programme I concluded that this lack of a nurturing father 
figure led me to unconsciously seek nurturing paternal relationships from men in 
authority at work. In that research work I also came to a writing style and a way of 
thinking that was subjective and I have struggled to change that style and reach for a 
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balance between the subjective and objective stance that has been asked of me from 
my supervisors on this DMan programme. 
 
Through my experiences I have formed assumptions about management and 
leadership that have informed my approach to my practice at work. These 
assumptions include taken for granted ideas about power and control as well as 
systems thinking and changeable mental models. In this paper I will explain more 
about how I came to believe those things and how they are being challenged through 
the critique that comes from the ideas within complex responsive processes of relating 
with which I have come into contact both when studying for a Masters as well as 
within my study in this DMan programme. 
 
Experience of being managed and becoming a manager 
 
At the age of twenty-one I got my first real job as an immigration officer at Heathrow 
Airport where I worked for four years. How I carried out my work was set out by 
many processes and policies that gave instruction on how to carry out the duties of an 
immigration officer. There was little requirement for independent thinking which led 
to most of us working there doing just what was required. Sickness rates were high 
and stories of shirking were plentiful. One colleague became famed for wandering 
around with a pink file (these files were used to hold information relating to 
immigration cases under review and investigation) under his arm looking busy to 
avoid further work. Regardless of whether or not this was true, it indicates the sort of 
stories that formed a work environment whereby most of us put a lot of energy in 
getting one over the managers to whom the task fell to ensure the immigration control 
ran smoothly. I can see that my assumption here is that it was the manager’s job to 
ensure the smooth running of the immigration control. That was how it seemed. This 
meant that as immigration officers we did not perceive ourselves as responsible for it 
in the same way.  F. W. Taylor is often quoted as the forefather of how we currently 
think about modern management. Taylor was writing at a time of industrial revolution 
when there were big changes in understanding the natural sciences. In setting out his 
principles of scientific management (1911) he proposed a scientific method of 
management. In taking up a scientific method and applying it to work situations he 
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suggested that working men, through lack of education or insufficient mental 
capacity, were not able to understand how best to do their work and needed guidance 
and oversight from their managers. The manager’s role was to examine individual 
tasks in detail and specify the skills and actions required to carry out those tasks to 
standardise the most efficient and effective way of doing them. It is testament to the 
popularity of Taylor’s ideas and their taken for granted nature that this expectation 
also existed in the British public sector in the 1990s. Taylor firmly places the 
authority to make decisions in the hands of the manager. This then creates the 
expectation that when such decisions have been made, workers will follow the 
manager’s instructions. 
 
After four years in London I took an opportunity to transfer to Newcastle Airport. The 
work environment was still characterised by the same processes and policies I had 
come to know at Heathrow Airport and there was an attitude amongst immigration 
officers of getting one over the management. The managers there seemed to take one 
of two approaches, either they attempted to employ increasingly complicated ways of 
catching the immigration officers shirking, a phenomenon that Taylor (1911) called 
‘soldiering’, which usually resulted in immigration officers finding increasingly 
complicated ways of avoiding them or undermining their efforts. Alternatively, some 
managers took the route of leaving the immigration officers to it and attended the 
office very infrequently.  
 
I think we would have all agreed at the time that it was a manager’s job to manage us 
as the staff members but the dynamics of how we related to each other created a kind 
of cat and mouse game and a feeling that there was an ‘us’ as the workers and a 
‘them’ as the managers. The differences in power and authority in this situation can 
be seen to have created dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. To be a manager 
excludes one from being a worker. Being a worker excludes one from being a 
manager. 
 
I have written the last two paragraphs to introduce some of my early experiences of 
being managed and to illustrate how taken for granted the role of manager and the 
manager’s responsibility to exercise authority was and how I took up from that 
experience the idea that it was the managers role to oversee the work of staff and to 
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ensure that things run smoothly. I have also expressed how that role was often 
problematic as I and the people I worked with sought to avoid oversight. I took these 
ideas of what it was to be managed into my first experiences of management. This led 
me to feel a sense of accountability for the actions of those I was asked to manage 
whilst all the while feeling that I had little control or authority over what they did.  
 
Over time I was promoted to a senior role as a regional manager in the immigration 
department. During my time in that job two major incidents occurred in which I was 
involved. These two incidents are indicative of how ideas of disciplinary power 
(Stacey, 2012, pp66-78), control and authority, leading managers to feel the need to 
be in charge, were taken for granted and embedded in the policies and processes, to 
which, I and others were expected to adhere.  
 
Senior managers in the immigration department had taken up ideas of incident 
management from the police. This involved the separation of layers of management 
into gold, silver and bronze. The gold level was formed from senior managers and 
those working at this level were expected to form strategy which would then be 
operationally planned and managed by the managers at the silver level, after which, 
the bronze layer of people would carry out the work. This separation was to be strictly 
adhered to and instructions from gold, silver and bronze passed down through this 
structure were to be followed without question. It is easy to see how the ideas of 
Taylor (1911) are embedded into this structure with the thinking and strategizing 
being done at senior levels only and the implementation of those strategies being 
carried out by people who theoretically had little or no say in how it should be done.  
 
One morning, I was on my way to work in Manchester Airport when I got a call on 
my mobile phone. It was someone from Lancashire police. There had been an incident 
in Morecambe Bay and a number of Chinese people had drowned. I was asked to join 
the gold command team as a representative of the immigration department. I was 
asked because all of the other officers senior to me were together the night before 
having a residential meeting and they were un-contactable that morning. I went 
immediately to Lancashire Police Headquarters and spent the next three days working 
closely with the Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) who was in overall command of the 
incident and other senior officers from Customs and the Coastguard as the events 
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unfolded. I attended press briefings and acted as a go between for the ACC and the 
immigration department.  
 
The immigration department had recently invested in an innovative piece of 
technology that could identify asylum seekers from their fingerprints in real time. The 
police were aware of this equipment and asked if I would authorise its use to help 
identify the bodies of those that had died. The equipment was routinely used to 
identify immigration offenders in police stations when they were suspected of having 
given false details of their identity after they were arrested in the hope of avoiding 
deportation. The action requested by the police was against departmental policy 
because the machines were not supposed to be used on dead bodies.  
 
I remember a number of conversations that took place between me and the senior 
police officers as well as with other of my staff members both on the phone and in 
person. On reflection, my decision-making did not follow from a separation of the 
strategic and the operational as laid out in the gold, silver, bronze prescription. Rather, 
it emerged from a growing understanding of what seemed like the right thing to do at 
the time given the conversations I was having. Through these conversations I 
recognised the importance of the situation and given that I could not seek guidance 
from my senior officers as they were still out of contact, I over rode the policy and 
authorised the use of the equipment. Sometime after the incident I was challenged on 
this decision and threatened with disciplinary action as the machines had to be 
decommissioned. I remember feeling a mixture of fear, anger and frustration during 
the time that I faced that threat (which never came to be acted upon).  
 
As events unfolded over the three days that I was involved in the incident I took 
numerous calls from senior managers in the immigration department who wanted to 
discuss my decision-making. It felt to me that they were nervous of having a 
relatively junior and inexperienced manager involved at the gold command level as 
gold command work would normally be carried out at director level and I was two 
levels below that in the hierarchy. This narrative points to how I, and those around 
me, were responding to each other as we felt responsible for each other and the 
outcomes that were unfolding. As a result of my own expectations of the managers 
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above me taking responsibility for looking after me, I felt let down by those managers 
and vulnerable without their support.  
 
Stacey (2007, pp36-38) points to how ideas of Tayloristic scientific management 
identify only the manager as being able to exercise freedom of choice in designing the 
rules that members of the organisation are to follow. In this case although I was a 
manager, according to policy, I did not have the authority to change the rules for the 
use of the fingerprint equipment and therefore I was the member of the organisation 
who was expected to follow the rules. I found myself in the position of being both a 
manager and a member of staff at the same time. Such was the nature of these taken 
for granted ideas of scientific management in my work environment I found myself in 
a contradictory position of either following the departmental rules or following the 
request of the police gold commander. As the police gold commander was outside of 
the immigration department she did not feel bound by its departmental policies on the 
use of equipment and she was purely interested in how to further the objective of 
identifying the dead bodies.  
 
This then makes me wonder who, if anyone, was actually in charge of this situation. 
At one point during this incident I was riding in a police car with the ACC. We were 
on the way to a press conference and she was on the telephone to the press office of 
the immigration department, who were refusing to allow me or anyone else from the 
immigration department to appear with her in front of the media. Whilst it was not 
explained to me why they were refusing to allow anyone to appear I assumed that it 
was better to say nothing than to risk the uncertainty of a live press conference in such 
difficult circumstances. I remember clearly that the ACC used the phrase that she felt 
‘very lonely’ as the only person going in front of the media. This phrase struck me at 
the time and I have often thought about it since. Whilst I recognise that her use of this 
phrase was a plea to the press office for support, I also think it is indicative of the 
burden of personal responsibility she was feeling. The gold, silver, bronze process is 
designed to give the illusion that gold officers are in control and are able to manage 
successful outcomes in such incidents. As a senior manager she seemed to also place 
this expectation upon herself with the resulting feelings of being exposed and 
vulnerable. This seems similar to the feelings of vulnerability that I felt in response to 
what I perceived as a lack of support from my senior managers. 
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The expectation of order and control within the command structure was not how I, or 
others, experienced the unfolding events during that incident. In fact, there was more 
a sense for me that we were muddling through, making judgements together as we 
went along, with the information we had available. This leads me to wonder if in fact 
anyone was in charge or maybe no one and everyone at the same time was responsible 
for what was happening as we interacted. 
 
The second major incident was also managed through the gold, silver and bronze 
command structure. Even though this incident did not directly involve police 
commanders, at the time of the incident, the immigration department had fully 
adopted police methods of managing critical incidents. I was working in my office in 
Manchester when I received a call from my boss. A significant problem had arisen for 
our department in that a large number of foreign national prisoners had been released 
from prison without subsequently being deported, even though part of their court 
sentence was that they be deported at the end of their sentence. The national press had 
become aware of this and there was a lot of pressure being put on Ministers who were 
now putting pressure on the immigration department.  
 
I was asked to put together and manage a national team to actively seek those that had 
been released and to apprehend them for their deportation to proceed. I contacted 
colleagues around the country and arranged for teams to begin to search for these 
foreign national prisoners. Over the coming days and weeks the pressure to apprehend 
these people increased as it became apparent that a large number of them had not 
stayed in the addresses they had given. The national press was increasing pressure on 
the Ministers because it had become known that a number of these foreign national 
prisoners who had been released had committed serious crimes such as murder and 
rape.  
 
I was managing a twenty-four-hour operation looking for these ex-offenders and I 
was having daily phone meetings with colleagues around the country. All of us were 
feeling a lot of pressure and these daily phone meetings became increasingly tense as 
we kept failing to find these prisoners.  On one call I remember a growing complaint 
amongst my colleagues that senior managers were making unreasonable demands on 
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them and that the expectations of apprehending the ex-offenders was impossible. I 
remember reflecting with them that their feelings of frustration, and feeling under 
pressure, were understandable and that I recognized that senior managers were also 
under considerable pressure, perhaps even more than those of us further down the 
chain given their proximity to Ministers. There was a great demand for information 
from senior managers and Ministers relating to which offenders had been 
apprehended and we were attempting to provide this information in a very dynamic 
situation in which the information was often partial or sometimes just wrong. 
Spreadsheets of this information were being relayed hourly between the teams that I 
was managing and others until they reached the Minister. The Minister and senior 
managers were then using this information to decide how we should proceed and 
inform Parliament and the press. 
 
Eventually the situation ended when the Minister mistakenly gave false information in 
the House of Commons. This left the Minister in a very difficult position. It seemed 
that either he deliberately gave false information to Parliament, in which case he was 
a liar, or he made a mistake and was not in control of his department and therefore 
incompetent. It is this notion of control by the Minister that everyone seemed to take 
for granted. In fact, in other situations where I have seen Ministers in similar 
circumstances, any attempt from them to explain their lack of control is deemed as 
being dishonourable or attempting to pass the buck. It seems then that there was no 
opportunity to discuss what was really going on in our attempts to apply control to 
outcomes in this situation. As a consequence, I question whether it is the expectations 
that emanate from our ways of thinking about authority and control that might be 
faulty, rather than individuals being to blame for events playing out differently to how 
they had been planned. 
 
Outside of these incidents I was also taking for granted this notion of managerial 
control in that as a team leader I invested a great deal of time and effort into trying to 
develop a strong performing team. This consisted of a number of facilitated team-
building events and subsequent one to one meetings. Although the events themselves 
seemed to be successful I was frustrated that the behaviour of my direct reports did 
not change. They often argued openly about the performance of their respective units 
and would try to influence me to endorse their own point of view. Within my one to 
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one meetings with them I tried regularly but unsuccessfully to persuade them to talk 
together privately about agreeing a way forward.  
 
The models that I was being introduced to about leadership and management all 
seemed to put me in the position of power and choice as the manager and leader, 
where I should have been able to choose my actions and predict the outcomes and the 
actions of others. However, through my experience I was consistently finding that not 
to be the case. As I took such notions of power and choice for granted I assumed that 
my failure to exercise control was down to how I was performing as a manager rather 
than the models being faulty in any way. A combination of my acceptance of these 
notions of control, and my upbringing, gave me the idea that, as a man I must be 
tough and capable. As a consequence, I felt a great shame about what I considered my 
underperformance and I started to look for a different job. 
 
Becoming an organisational development practitioner 
 
A short time after these incidents I got a new job as an internal change consultant in 
the same department. I struggled with the new work. I was expected to develop 
relationships with business colleagues and to support change initiatives across the 
department. I started to look at how I might learn more and came across an MSc 
programme in People and Organisational Development being run at Roffey Park that 
offered a Masters course of study. Embedded within the foundations of the MSc, and 
in Organisational Development as a practice are biological and therapeutic ideas of 
humanistic psychology (Miettinen, 2000). I experienced the process of studying for 
the MSc as being quite deeply therapeutic. It gave me sense of understanding of what 
I had been through in my life. Through my research in the MSc I was connecting 
patterns of relating emanating from my early experiences as a child to how I was 
relating to people at work, especially male authority figures. I started to identify 
myself as an OD practitioner and took on, with little critique, the humanistic and 
systems principles that are embedded in how OD has developed. 
 
Warner Burke (1994) suggests that OD developed from three major innovations. 
These are T-groups or sensitivity training, Sociotechnical systems and survey 
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feedback. T-groups, the (T stands for training), were developed by Kurt Lewin in 
1946. When working with groups, Lewin, would, with his trainer colleagues, discuss 
individual and group performance afterwards. An individual trainee asked to sit in on 
these discussions and Lewin was struck by the extra insight and learning this 
provided. Discussions of group process between trainers and trainees was extended to 
all and the T-group was born. The aim then in T-groups was to develop the individual 
trainee’s self-awareness and by doing so develop their personal effectiveness. This 
idea of developing personal self-awareness can be seen in a number of writers’ work 
since T-groups were developed: from Steven Covey (2004), with his seven habits of 
personal effectiveness including its emphasis on developing a principle centred self, 
to Peter Senge’s (1990) work on learning organisations with his similar idea of 
personal mastery. They all take a humanistic, behavioural and individualistic 
approach to developing people.  Lewin’s personal history is interesting. Lewin, living 
as a Jew in Germany through the early 1900s, was clearly influenced by his social 
position. While at the University of Munich, Lewin became involved in the socialist 
movement with a particular interest in the combating of anti-Semitism, the 
democratization of German institutions, and the need to improve the position of 
women. Throughout the 1940s Lewin was in demand as a speaker on minority issues 
(Smith, 2001). It is possible then that Lewin’s motivation in trying to increase 
people’s awareness of their impact on others came from his background as a member 
of an oppressed minority in the early to mid 1900s, which formed in him a deeply 
democratic and humanistic view of the world. 
 
The idea of sociotechnical systems was developed at the Tavistock Institute by Trist 
and Bamforth, (Warner Burke, 2006) and refers to the idea that organisations are both 
technical systems in that they deliver a product or service through the application of 
physical technology and that they are social systems in that they employ people to 
apply these technologies. Both the social and technical systems are subsystems of the 
whole organisation and the interaction between them needs to be considered in any 
change effort. I note here the taken for granted position on the existence of human 
systems upon which one can act to enact planned change. Trist and Bamforth (1951) 
developed their ideas through working with coalminers in South Yorkshire in 1949. 
They discovered that after the introduction of new technologies, previously existing 
social groups or teams were disbanded and workers were asked to work different 
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shifts. Productivity then fell despite the introduction of the new technology. The 
workers, with the support of their unions, asked to reorganise their work to 
reintroduce their previous team working whilst still integrating the new technology. 
This was done and productivity was then increased. It is useful to understand the 
history of Trist and Bamforth as individuals. Ken Bamforth was a post-graduate 
fellow at the Tavistock Institute but had previously been a coal miner and trade 
unionist. Eric Trist, a founder of the Tavistock Institute, had a history of critically 
analysing deskilling and managerial control. Clearly Trist and Bamforth would have a 
particular social viewpoint in their work and because of the union background of 
Bamforth would be more likely to privilege the individual workers’ needs.  
 
Survey feedback (Likert, 1932) was a method of intervention developed by Rensis 
Likert at the Institute of Michigan building on the work of Kurt Lewin. The basic 
premise is that a survey of staff on organisational issues is conducted and the results 
are shared systematically throughout the organisation from the top down. Within this 
methodology, practitioners will attempt to take a position either outside of the 
organisation and observing behaviour or by engaging with the organisation and 
accepting that they will impact on the results personally. Within survey feedback 
then, the practitioner takes the position of both observer and participant. We can see 
here the impact of systems thinking with the practitioner being expected to be able to 
choose whether they are inside or outside of the system. The use of survey feedback 
in organisations can also be seen as an attempt to democratize the decision-making 
processes. 
 
We can see then how the people behind these developments, with their personal 
histories and interests being essentially democratic and humanistic, have instilled 
those ideologies within the roots of OD and its practice. This was in response to how 
the use of direct authoritarian control had been perceived to have resulted in human 
suffering.  
 
Ideas of systems thinking, democratic and humanistic approaches to organisational 
development still retained the idea of an individual being in control. Whether it is the 
manager or the developer of people and organisations, there is the expectation that 
they can stand outside of an organisational system and act upon it with control over 
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the people involved and the outcomes of their actions. Even when others such as 
Reason (1988) developed more participatory approaches to organisational 
development there was an expectation that it is possible to choose whether one stood 
inside the system as a participant or outside the system as a reflective manager or 
practitioner. The work of Ralph Stacey and others looking at the challenges of 
complexity were introduced to the MSc community but it seems to me now that they 
were introduced by way of offering no more than another set of tools to consider as a 
practitioner, rather than a challenge to prevailing orthodox ways of thinking about 
change.  
 
Andy Smith, a senior manager at Roffey Park, has recently written on ideas of 
complexity and how they might be useful to practitioners of organisational 
development (Smith, 2014). He also argues that the roots of organisational 
development are in a humanistic tradition. He attempts to explain how concepts of 
complex responsive processes offer a challenge to the dominant management 
discourse and uses his own experience to illuminate how a practitioner might use 
ideas of complexity in practice. He ends with suggesting the use of a model 
describing the edge of chaos and how practitioners and managers might act in 
situations depending on how near or far away from certainty they are, as set out in 
Stacey (1995). Smith argues the use of this model to ensure that as practitioners we 
don’t “throw the baby out with the bathwater”. He acknowledges that Stacey has 
since rejected his own model but does not elaborate as to why. Smith argues for using 
his model to support a different kind of conversation with clients that embodies an 
either/and approach. 
 
I think the suggestion of an either/and approach is interesting. This sounds close to 
the both/and method adopted by Kant resulting in the split between a formative 
teleology and causative rational choice, meaning that managers and developers are 
still expected to be in control (Stacey et al, 2000, pp19-29). I think Andy Smith’s 
description of an either/and approach is how I have been attempting to place my own 
OD practice. I have been comfortable holding both systems thinking and complex 
responsive processes as if they were tools that I could call upon depending upon the 
kind of situation I was facing. I recognise now that thinking in this way allowed me 
to continue to see myself as if I was outside of any given situation and in a position of 
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control. I have also continued with the idea that we are able, through internal 
reflective processes, to become aware of our internal mental models and then choose 
to change them, to be in control of ourselves. The idea that complex responsive 
processes of relating, systems thinking, and ideas of individuals choosing their mental 
models were contradictory had not occurred to me. 
 
Until very recently then I have been holding ideas of complex responsive 
processes of relating, and other ideas of systems thinking and changeable 
mental models, as if they were tools that were available to me to effect change 
and improvement in people and organisations or even myself. In an earlier 
iteration of this project I proposed that my belief was that good managers are 
those who are good developers of people and organisations. I can see that this 
belief is dependent upon the idea that the development of the individual and the 
organisation is predictable and it is therefore possible for someone to manage 
and develop someone else. As I have learned more about complex processes of 
relating, and the significant challenge offered to how I have been thinking, I am 
able to start to understand that the platform I have been using to support my 
thinking may be significantly and fundamentally flawed.  
 
The challenge of complex responsive processes and an example of how my practice 
is changing as a result 
 
Stacey (2012) describes models such as the Burke-Litwin model, an often quoted 
model in the practice of organisational development (Burke and Litwin, 1992), as 
tools and techniques of instrumental rationality. He suggests that the key features of 
these tools are: 
 Efficient causality in that they offer the idea that if used they will yield 
specified positive results bringing to bear the possibility of prediction of 
outcomes.  
 Second order abstractions in that they seek to simplify, categorise, standardise 
and measure, bringing clarity and uniformity making it easier to control the 
actions of others from a distance. 
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 That they take the form of having rules and steps in offering a form of 
prescription for managers and organisational developers to follow. 
 
Stacey then goes on to say that, in what are inevitably uncertain and ambiguous 
processes of interaction between people, efficient causality does not apply and 
therefore claims that such models will enable any of us to choose and control future 
outcomes cannot be sustained due to the complex nature of the many micro 
interactions between people leading to fundamentally unpredictable patterning of 
outcomes. The idea of choosing and controlling future outcomes as managers or 
development practitioners is founded on ideas of formative teleology and causative 
rationality. Stacey et al (2000) instead point to a causal framework of transformative 
teleology in which human intentions, choices and plans are themselves interactions 
between people. 
 
To illustrate this, the following narrative is an explication of a time when I used the 
Burke-Litwin model in a presentation. I presented to the board of an organisation the 
outcomes of a review I had conducted into the work of a division in the organisation. I 
presented the Burke Litwin model as the basis upon which I had understood my 
findings in the review. I drew attention to the suggested positive strategic impact that 
aligned leadership, organisational culture, and mission and strategy can have on an 
organisation. I then went on to explain how these factors were misaligned in the 
division under review and gave suggestions as to how changes in leadership would be 
likely to lead to improved performance. If what Stacey suggests is true then my 
assumptions and propositions were clearly flawed as a description of what was really 
going on. And yet, the presentation and my review were well received and indeed did 
result in changes to how the leadership within that division was shaped. What then 
might have been going on in my work and the resulting receipt of my presentation? I 
remember feeling very nervous about how my presentation would be received. As I 
was drawing my conclusions I was looking for something to use to support my 
findings that would draw a favourable response from those who had commissioned 
the work. I saw the Burke-Litwin model as the ideal choice because I knew it was 
well known and widely used by people working in organisational development. My 
previous interactions with some of the more senior participants in the meeting 
suggested that they took for granted the need for rationalist planning and ideas of 
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management control. I remember a moment in my presentation as I explained the 
model, when the chair of the meeting started nodding and smiling, whilst looking 
around at others in the meeting. I remember feelings of relief and confidence as she 
did this as it indicated to me that the model had had the effect of gaining some support 
for my thinking. It is clear then that I was using the model to manage my own anxiety 
about the impact of my work and to call upon some form of professional power in this 
meeting where I could be experienced as knowledgeable and therefore right in my 
assessment and proposals for change. Rather than the model being responsible for any 
change that was coming about I was clearly using the model to support me politically 
and practically in my work in a situation where ideas of management control and 
systems thinking were taken for granted. 
 
Taking up the work of Stacey (2012) and thinking in a complex responsive processes 
way, I can see that as I have been describing my life I have been taking the position of 
myself as an individual, and the social field as the background to my actions.  Griffin 
(2002) describes this as being from the viewpoint of systemic self-organisation where 
we understand the individual and the social as being separate. This is described as the 
collapsing of the paradox of human actions through a “both/and” way of thinking. 
Griffin (ibid, pp4-6) further suggests that this way of thinking has become pervasive 
and taken for granted through the general adoption of the scientific method. Griffin 
uses the work of American pragmatist George Herbert Mead to suggest an alternative 
to this way of thinking, which is to think in terms of participative self-organisation 
where we can hold the paradox that the individual and the social are the singular and 
the plural of the same process of human relating. This way of thinking suggests that 
we as people come to know ourselves only in relation to others and we are in a 
constant state of construction in a living present through the paradox of being 
constrained and enabled at the same time in those relationships. This idea of 
participative self-organizing and the causal framework of transformative teleology 
(Stacey et al, 2000) then calls into question how I have come to think about my 
practice so far through my MSc and my experiences of the application of authority, 
power and control. 
 
By way of showing how this thinking is already shifting how I think about my work, I 
will describe how I have responded to a recently commissioned piece of work with 
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the international aid charity with which I currently work. Over recent months a 
process of distilling organisational values has been going on. This has culminated in a 
set of five words that have been described as the organisation’s values. The process 
which culminated in these values was a relatively wide ranging set of discussions that 
sought to bring together people’s views on the history of the organisation and what it 
stands for. I have now been asked to lead a process that seeks to ‘embed’ these values 
across the organisation. Approaches I have seen and experienced in other 
organisations to such a task have involved a communication process that sought to 
inform those working in the organisation as to what they are and an appeal, or even an 
instruction, for people to take account of these values in their work.  
 
Stacey (2012) and Griffin (2002) both use the work of George Herbert Mead in 
describing how the tendency to imagine that an organisation exists as an entity which 
has overriding motives and values runs the risk of such a collective becoming a cult. 
They suggest that members of such a collective forget the ‘as if’ nature of the 
organisation. My experience of working in this international aid charity in which 
people regularly talk about what it does and what it stands for suggests that the 
forgetting of the ‘as if’ nature of the organisation often takes place. I have been left 
wondering how to take forward this work. Rather than attempt to embed the values 
from a single management perspective I have sought a way of using the idea of 
‘embedding’ the values in a way that pays attention to how people make sense of their 
experience in their local context. I have therefore proposed that we take forward a 
series of conversations, led by local managers, to discuss these values with their teams 
and seek to make sense of them in their local context. The outcome of these 
conversations is unknown and no previously designed outcome has been included. I 
have yet to see how this work will progress. 
 
I am also aware that in most of my interactions with managers at work I am 
encountering the manifestations of taken for granted notions of disciplinary power 
and expectations of management control (Stacey, 2012). This is noticeable in how we 
have developed our performance management framework with its emphasis on 
managers holding individuals to account for their performance against pre-set 
objectives and the annual planning process that requires organisational departments to 
plan outcomes for the coming twelve months (and even in some cases for three years) 
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and to set their budgets accordingly. As I become increasingly aware of the challenge 
of complex responsive processes to ways of thinking, and to realize what might be 
going on in my use of the tools of my OD practice, I find myself in something of a 
quandary. I am tasked with developing management capability in the institution in 
which I work. Not only is the very idea of my improving other managers’ capability 
obviously problematic, it also leads to questions such as, who decides what capability 
is and what it looks like?  At the moment this management development takes the 
form of a number of strands of work. One of the strands is a large-scale organisational 
wide management development programme. The leadership of the organisation have 
invested large sums of money in supporting managers in their development and the 
programme, supported by external consultants, is already underway. In addition to 
this I work with a number of individual managers and their teams in support of their 
planning and team development. As I pay attention to what we are really doing in 
these interactions I am beset with uncertainty as to how to act into these relationships 
and situations and yet I continue to do so. As I learn more about complex responsive 
processes of relating it may be that how I am acting will change in response to others. 
Through this programme I am keen to reflect upon that process. 
 
In the iterative process of writing this paper I am noticing how in each iteration, with 
the ensuing feedback, I am paying more attention to the detail in my narrative and 
how the processes of relating are creating outcomes. I am also noticing how early 
drafts were indicative of my foundational assumptions, of the split between the 
individual and the social and the idea of a formative teleology for my own life story. 
Outside of my awareness it is possible that my writing is still displaying these 
assumptions but hopefully I am demonstrating how I am becoming more aware of 
how I am forming others and being formed by them in my participation in 
organisational life and in this DMan programme. 
 
As I turn my attention to what I might write about in project two, I have become 
interested in how ideas of power and control are manifested in my work with the 
international aid charity. More specifically, how I as a facilitator work with others in 
the organisations. I have been asked by the CEO of this organisation to facilitate a full 
day meeting between her and her team of executive directors. This meeting, which 
they call the Directors Away Day, is to be used to discuss how they respond 
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individually and as a team to the challenges of the future. A number of pieces of work 
have been undertaken recently with the intention of understanding what future 
challenges might await the organisation. In recent conversations with the directors I 
get a growing sense that they think the organisation needs to be more globally 
networked in which people move from assumptions of using paper based systems and 
processes to an assumption of creating and using digitally based systems and 
processes. There is not yet much detail as to what is meant by a globally networked 
organisation or what people would be doing if they were creating and using digitally 
based systems and processes. A large meeting of senior managers is being convened 
to discuss this and the outputs of that large meeting will be used to inform the 
Directors Away Day (DAD) discussions. The CEO has asked me to undertake 
training in the use of a psychometric tool called the Myers Briggs Type Indicator 
(MBTI step II) to be able to support my facilitation of the DAD with each director 
understanding their MBTI step II profile ahead of the meeting. This is intended to 
enable them to gain insight into how they respond individually and as a team to what 
they are perceiving as a large scale change to the organisation. These insights will 
then be used to explore and decide how the directors will create a strategy for 
responding to the challenge of creating a globally networked digital organisation. As I 
write this I note that it is assumed that it is the directors’ role to create a strategy for 
the future of the organisation. They often describe this as the creation of a vision for 
the future. In project two, through an exploration of a narrative of the events of this 
upcoming DAD meeting, I want to explore further the assumptions that are held by 
this group of directors as to what they think they are doing in the creation of a vision 
or strategy. I also want to explore what may really be going on in the meeting in terms 
of how dynamics of power and contested ideas that may emerge in the conversations 
between me, the CEO and the directors. 
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Project two: Facilitation and Shame: working together to avoid challenges to our 




Since 2009 I have been working in organisations as a facilitator. I have developed my 
practice through a mixture of academic learning, watching and experiencing the 
practice of others as well as learning through reflecting on my own actions as I 
worked as a facilitator. My current job involves working with the senior team of 
directors at an international aid charity. In project one I have discussed how in my 
experience of managing and being managed, assumptions about power and control are 
made in organisations based on systems thinking and formative teleology as described 
by Stacey et al, (2000) and how these assumptions were taken up by me and others. I 
also pointed to how my thinking is being challenged by reflecting on my practice, and 
reading and discussing ideas related to complex responsive processes of relating.  
 
The narrative that follows this introduction relates a series of events leading up to and 
including an away-day with a team of directors in my organisation that I was asked to 
facilitate by the CEO. My experience is that the managers I work with, and who ask 
me to work with their teams, take the nature of the work of a facilitator for granted. 
People often talk about the need for someone outside of their team to come and help 
them think together. Sometimes this involves them coming together to create 
strategies and plans and sometimes it involves them thinking and talking about how 
they are relating together. In this case I was asked to help by the CEO to support her 
and her team of directors in exploring the way they were relating to each other, 
especially when there are disagreements and misunderstandings. In telling and 
analysing this narrative I will inquire into how people cope with and seek to manage 
the inherent uncertainty involved in situations where there is the potential for 
transformation, by which I mean the potential for change in people’s sense of identity 
and the patterns of how people relate to each other in groups. I am interested in how 
people in groups work with each other as they act into the future, with a focus on my 
role as a facilitator. 
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What is Facilitation? 
 
In considering what we mean by facilitation, the work of Heron (1977; 1989), Reason 
& Rowan (1981) and Reason (1988) suggests that the concept of the role of facilitator 
emerged from the work of Carl Rogers and person centred therapy. In his work on 
client centred therapy, Rogers gives examples of group therapy through which he 
suggests that groups, through the experience of group therapy, grow a “remarkable 
cohesiveness that parallels the unity evident in individual therapy” (1951, p288). 
Rogers seems to be pointing at the potential for a group in sharing their feelings to 
come together as a single entity whereby individuals transcend their own sense of self 
to become part of a supra-individual. He suggests that early hurtful experiences limit 
our ability as individuals to come closer to others and through engaging with a group 
people can experience themselves differently. Rogers suggests that the therapist is 
attempting to “reconstruct the perceptual field of the individual at the moment of 
expression and to communicate this understanding with skill and sensitivity” (ibid, 
p289). The therapist does this through clarifying feelings, reflecting feelings and 
restating what someone has said. Rogers (ibid, p290) suggests that people develop 
sophisticated ways of preventing intimacy when physical proximity is forced upon 
them and that group therapy is a way of overcoming these defences and allowing 
people to experience others differently, learning to give and receive emotional support 
and thereby being able to redefine themselves in relation to others. I think Rogers, 
from a humanistic and individualistic perspective, is giving a useful indication of the 
potentially unconscious, psychodynamic nature of group behaviour and the role of the 
facilitator. 
 
As a typical example of the discourse on facilitation that has previously influenced 
my practice, Harvey et al (2002) suggest that the role of the facilitator refers to an 
individual who engages with others in a process of enabling them as individuals and 
groups to understand the processes they have to go through to change aspects of their 
behaviour or attitudes to themselves, their work or other individuals. They conclude 
that a facilitator is likely to need a set of core skills involving communication and 
interpersonal skills.  
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In another example Wardale (2008) suggests that effective facilitation is predicated on 
four clear stages that are considered important. These stages are: 
  
 Planning  
 Intervention  
 Immediate Outcomes  
 Implementation  
 
Wardale (ibid) also discusses the choice of whether to engage an internal or external 
facilitator and suggests that in organisations generally there is a preference for an 
external facilitator who may be seen to be more impartial, objective, and more 
confident to take greater risks by virtue of their independence, whereas internal 
facilitators may find these things challenging as an employee. However, the internal 
facilitator is recognised as potentially having more knowledge of the situation, history 
and culture of the organisation and groups involved.  
 
I propose that the work of Harvey and Wardale is indicative of much of the literature 
on facilitation in which the authors hold the assumption that an individual facilitator is 
making independent rational choices including when to be more or less objective, 
towards a pre-planned outcome when working with groups. In this way the facilitator 
is instrumentalised and seen as separate from and acting upon a group.  
 
Bens, (2005), Schwarz, (2002), Hogan, (2003), McCain and Tobey, (2004), Unger et 
al, (2013), Bee and Bee, (1998) and Mann, (2007) are all examples of literature that 
describes facilitation in this way. Wardale (2013) conducted research with both 
internal and external facilitators as well as managers who were the commissioners of 
the facilitators’ services. This research involved carrying out interviews across 
various work sectors such as arts, law and the public sector. This research found that 
facilitation was conducted over four stages; pre-planning; facilitated event; immediate 
outcome of the event; and transfer or implementation of the outcome of the event. In 
the preparation stage, thoroughness of preparation was deemed to be very important 
by research participants. It was seen as important for facilitators to properly 
understand the participant group, agree appropriate target outcomes, negotiate process 
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and discuss personality differences. Clarity of expected outcome was deemed to be of 
significant importance. In facilitating events facilitators felt that ineffective use of 
processes and not having a deep enough bag of tools and tricks was quoted as being 
the reasons for ineffective facilitation. Context was identified as being relevant to 
successful facilitation, although the authors merely suggested that further research 
was required on the impact of context on effective facilitation. It is clear to me that 
this research supports my earlier contention that, across organisational sectors it is 
more or less taken for granted.  
 
That a successful facilitation process is one where an individual facilitator, engaging 
with a group as a separate entity, prepares pre-planned outcomes and applies tools and 
techniques to achieve those pre-planned outcomes. The effectiveness of the facilitated 
event is predicated on the achievement of those outcomes. Any failure to do so is seen 
as a failure of the individual facilitator. 
 
Alternatively, facilitation could be said to be what George Herbert Mead describes as 
a social object (Mead, 1938). Mead distinguished between physical objects as things 
existing in nature, and therefore the objects of study by the natural sciences, and 
social objects that exist only in human experience and are therefore the proper objects 
of study in social science. Mead uses the example of markets to demonstrate what he 
means by social objects. When someone offers to buy food this involves a range of 
responses from those offering to sell food. In this interaction those making the offer to 
buy food can only do so if they are able to know how to make that offer by taking the 
attitude of those who are selling the food, and likewise someone offering to sell food 
can only make that offer if they are able to take up the attitude, or the tendency to act, 
of the person offering to buy the food.  
 
To understand this in terms of facilitation, the facilitator can only facilitate if he or 
she is able to take the attitude or the tendency to act of those who he or she is seeking 
to facilitate. Those being facilitated can only participate in being facilitated if they are 
able to take the attitude or the tendency to act of the facilitator. We can only do this 
through having experienced such events in the past and learned to play the game of 
participating in a facilitated group meeting. As I have described earlier, in the social 
object of facilitation we take much for granted in the existence of an agenda that is 
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often set out by the facilitator. This agenda will often have pre-existing objectives or 
outcomes that are desired for the meeting. These facilitated meetings will very often 
involve tools such as feedback mechanisms and personality profiling instruments such 
as MBTI (MBTI stands for Myers Briggs Type Indicator), which is one of many such 
tools. However, according to Mead, we can only make sense of the social object 
through the particularization in each specific situation, in the case of this narrative, the 
away-day with the directors. The thinking of Mead represents a very different way of 
thinking about facilitation to that which is set out in the descriptions of facilitation by 
the other authors referenced above which suggest a generalizable and 
decontextualized process. In their descriptions of facilitation they describe a method 
that considers interaction between people as individuals in a sender-receiver model of 
communication in which individuals work in a rational way with each other towards a 
pre-determined outcome. In their case, facilitation is a practice learned and applied by 
individuals, whereas facilitation when viewed as a social object is a shared set of 
expectations that constrain and enable participants in groups which then shapes their 
social interaction through gestures and responses. Thinking of facilitation as a social 
object helps me understand myself as a participant in the process of interaction within 
a group rather than being tempted to think of myself as somehow being outside of the 
group and acting upon it. 
 
In reading and responding to the narrative that follows, a number of colleagues in my 
organisation and in my learning group on this doctorate programme have said that 
they recognised it as a description of many such meetings that they have attended in 
the past. My practice as a facilitator is drawn from many such meetings I have 
attended and engaged in over recent years. It is clear that ideas of coming together in 
groups or teams needing to be facilitated by an individual who would not normally be 
part of that group, often using psychometric tools and processes, have become 
accepted and unchallenged in organisational contexts. In this sense, the facilitated 
team away-day is a normal everyday occurrence in organisational life.  
 
In engaging with the CEO in planning and facilitating the away-day with the 
directors, I was making unconscious assumptions based on the descriptions of 
facilitation in the literature typified by Wardale (2008), Wardale (2013) and Harvey et 
al (2002), about what it means to facilitate such away-days and from my previous 
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experience of such events in which I had both participated and facilitated. My 
intention in exploring this narrative was to reflexively inquire into my work with a 
group of directors as a facilitator and to think about the social processes of facilitation 
in a different way from that most commonly assumed in both the literature and 
common practice. 
 
A narrative account of the planning and implementation of a facilitated away-day 
with a group of Directors 
 
I have been having conversations with Barbara, the Chief Executive, about how she is 
working with her team. In one of these conversations she mentioned that she was 
planning to have an away-day with her team of directors and wanted to focus on the 
process of how the team were working together. She said that she would normally 
seek to have such a day facilitated by an external facilitator. She has until now used a 
facilitator that has been known to her for some years. She expressed some reticence 
about asking me to facilitate as an internal member of staff. However, she wanted to 
explore the possibility and we agreed to continue to discuss what an agenda for the 
away-day might look like. She also said that she wanted to check that Michael, the 
HR Director, would be comfortable with me facilitating the day as he is also my line 
manager. In this conversation I got a sense that Barbara was setting out her stall, that 
she was testing me out as to how we might work together. This seemed like a process 
in which she was demonstrating her ability to choose or not to choose me as a 
facilitator and through doing so she was asserting her dominant position in our 
relationship. I hadn’t worked with the group before and I very much wanted to do so. 
Not just to be able to work with a new group of senior managers, I also felt that a 
certain amount of kudos came with working with the CEO and directors. This led me 
to be both excited and nervous about the work. The excitement and nervousness came 
from my sense of putting myself and my practice as a facilitator on the line with the 
possibility that I might be found wanting by this influential group, and an anticipation 
of working with a new group of people, not knowing how this might unfold.  
 
In several meetings leading up to the away-day Barbara and I discussed and shaped 
the agenda. She was keen to develop a deeper sense of trust in her team. She said that 
 35 
she had previously used a psychological assessment tool called MBTI step II and was 
keen to use it again with the team to explore how their preferences and behaviours 
might be supporting or getting in the way of them working well together. I expressed 
some doubts about the tool and that I wasn’t trained to use it (the use of the tool is 
licensed by a company named OPP and one must be trained by them before they will 
allow its use). MBTI step II is built on another tool, MBTI step I. My experience of 
being trained in MBTI step I had been difficult.  
 
In that training I participated with others in learning about the tool and how to use it. 
The training was delivered in a way that instructed me in the purpose of the tool, how 
it was to be used in detail, and which questions might best illicit understanding for the 
individuals undergoing the assessment as to which personality type they might be. 
The assessment consists of a self-assessment, where the individual assesses 
themselves against a set of expected behaviours within each of the four dichotomies, 
which comprise an individual’s type. They then see the results of a self-completed 
questionnaire, which also gives an assessment of their type. Through a discussion of 
the self assessed type and the questionnaire assessment, an individual comes to 
understand their ‘best-fit’ type. During the training I occasionally digressed in 
conversation with the person who was being assessed and when I did this I was 
instructed not to do so as it could result in my not passing the course. At the end of 
the training programme I was watched and assessed by the trainers delivering the 
programme as to how well I had adhered to the process by performing a mock 
assessment with another individual who was undergoing the training.  I found the 
training to be restrictive and formulaic and the experience of it to be frustrating and 
annoying. I was loathe to engage with the training and the MBTI tool again. 
Nevertheless, Barbara wanted to use it so I undertook to do the training to allow me to 
do so.  
 
Again, I experienced Barbara’s insistence on using the tool about which I had some 
reservations, as a reinforcement of her dominance both as a manager senior to me in 
the organisation and as a client in receipt of my services as a facilitator. This 
interaction seems to support Wardale’s (2008) contention that an internal facilitator 
might be less likely to take risks, in this case by resisting the choices of the Chief 
Executive, although it is entirely possible or even likely that external facilitators 
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would feel an emotional or commercial pressure to comply in the same way. 
However, my sense was that the power dynamics of this situation were the result of 
the emerging relationship between Barbara and me and the roots of how the dynamic 
was emerging was much more complex than simply being about me making rational 
choices about how much to resist or challenge. 
 
In a later meeting we discussed the away-day again and we started to discuss the 
dynamics of how her discussions with directors were interpreted and how they 
resulted in changes in how they made decisions. We discussed how Barbara often felt 
that the conversations between directors resulted in a defensive pattern emerging 
where directors would defend their actions to other directors which she felt disabled 
the group in having productive conversations. I agreed that I had also seen that pattern 
and that it seemed to me like a tennis match whereby the issue would be knocked 
between the directors like a tennis ball in order to win points. I suggested that I bring 
a tennis ball with me to the away-day to illustrate what we might experience. She said 
that she was terrible at catching things and it would have to be a big ball that wouldn’t 
hurt anyone. She suggested a blow up globe would be good. We eventually settled on 
a brief agenda for the away-day which I wrote up and sent to her. That evening I 
scoured the local shops for a blow up globe without success. I eventually bought some 
balloons that I hoped would suffice. 
 
In the following weeks running up to the away-day Barbara and I exchanged several 
emails in which she made some small tweaks to the agenda. The final change that she 
instigated led to us agreeing to use a video of a TED talk given by Brene Brown on 
her research into shame. During our planning of the away-day Barbara had discussed 
how important it was for the directors to feel able to be vulnerable enough with each 
other to share how they were feeling about how they were getting on more openly. 
We eventually settled on the following agenda for the day: 
 
08:45 Tea and Coffee 
09:15 Reflection (Darren, fundraising director) 
09.30 360 Feedback 
What sense can we make of the 360 feedback? What are our strengths and 
weaknesses individually and as a team? How will we respond to them? 
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11.00 Break for coffee 
11:15  MBTI Step II: Understanding our impact on each other and the wider 
organisation in times of change. 
We will share our reflections and learning from our Step II profile and how 
our preferences show up in our work. How do we enable and constrain each 
other, especially in our response to decision-making and change?  
13:00 Lunch Discussions: Following up on SMG: Next Steps 
14:00 How do we use our authority individually and collectively? Can we be 
different together? 
15:30 Our Commitments for the Future 
In order to become a digital and global organisation what will we need to do to 
lead the organisation well? 
What do we need to do differently now, individually and collectively to give 
us the best possible chance of success in the future? 
How will we hold each other accountable for the change? 
17:00  Close 
 
It is my experience that this agenda is typical of the outcome of the planning of such 
away-days. It represents a series of planned sessions with pre-determined outcomes 
that minimize the potential for novelty. This gives the participants some comfort 
about what to expect on the day. In a final exchange of emails Barbara signed it off 
with an acknowledgement that the agenda was now ready and that she planned to 
send it to the directors only a couple of days ahead of the away-day to avoid them 
becoming anxious about it. My assumption was that Barbara was imagining the 
Directors having a sense of anxiety about what they might be expected to do together 
on the day and wanted to limit the time that they might experience such anxiety. She 
also made reference to feelings of vulnerability as she was feeling a little trepidatious 
ahead of the away-day. I replied with my thanks and that I too was feeling a little 
anxious in my anticipation of it too. This was in response to a previous conversation 
where we had discussed what it meant to be confidently vulnerable. 
 
Facilitating the Away-day 
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On the day of the away-day I had arranged for the room to have six comfortable 
chairs organised in a circle without a table in the middle. As we entered the room and 
the directors saw how it had been arranged, Sharon, the director of policy, suggested 
we shouldn’t make anything of her sitting near the door and Neil, the international 
director suggested it was good not to have a table between us, and Barbara made a 
joke about expecting something like a therapy session. There was a lot of nervous 
laughter at these exclamations and I was immediately struck by a curiosity about what 
these comments might be about. I welcomed everyone to the workshop and explained 
that we were going to start with a video from Brene Brown about her research into 
shame, this would not necessarily have been a surprise to the directors as Barbara had 
previously engaged with them through the work of Brene Brown in encouraging them 
to think about their vulnerability. I then started the video and we all watched it.  
 
A video about shame 
 
In the video (Brown, 2015) Brene Brown describes how in her research she came to 
the conclusion that vulnerability is essential to whole-hearted living (she does not 
describe what wholehearted living is and seems to expect the audience to take a 
mutual understanding of that for granted). She describes this through a narrative of a 
conversation with a friend which is confessional in nature which is in itself describing 
a form of confessional speech in her previous video appearance. The public 
confession seems to be important for her in what she describes as a personal 
transformational experience. Brown says that she is regularly asked to talk to people 
in businesses and companies but is asked not to talk about vulnerability and instead to 
talk about innovation, creativity and change. Yet, she suggests, vulnerability is the 
birthplace of innovation, creativity and change. Brown seems to locate shame as an 
individual experience expressed through internal conversation with what she calls a 
little gremlin. She suggests that shame is destructive and highly correlated with 
addiction, depression, violence and aggression. Foucault (1998, p63) describes how in 
modern society the confession as a religious act has been employed in a series of 
relationships including that of patient and therapist. If we take up the idea that the role 
of the facilitator has emerged from the role of the therapist (Heron 1977 and 1989; 
Reason & Rowan,1981 and Reason, 1988) then maybe the social object of facilitation 
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as some sort of public or group confessional with me as facilitator/priest is what is 
going on here and is suggestive of what that means for Barbara’s expectations of the 
group and herself. It is maybe no wonder then that the group entered the room with 
some trepidation. 
 
The video ended and there was a moment of quiet in the room, and I started the 
talking. I brought attention to the comments people had made on the way into the 
room and wondered aloud what they might have indicated, as I did so I felt that I was 
drawing attention to something that may be important as an indicator of how this 
group expected to work together and how comfortable they might be as a group in 
talking about their feelings. I wondered whether their comments had come from a 
sense of anxiety that the room had been arranged differently to how they usually met. 
I explained that I had felt some anxiety in deciding how to arrange the room, knowing 
that the absence of a central table might meet with some hostility from them. Sharon 
said that she had been joking and there seemed to be some awkwardness between all 
of us. There followed a long pause, there seemed to be no-one who wanted to pick up 
the questions about what their comments on entering the room might mean.  
 
Using Three Hundred and Sixty Degree Feedback and Competency Frameworks 
 
I moved on to briefly explain the agenda that Barbara and I had prepared and 
suggested we move onto the first session on the agenda. The directors had all received 
three hundred and sixty degree feedback in recent weeks. This feedback was compiled 
from submissions from people across the organisation. Some of these were direct 
reports to the directors, some were peers and there was also feedback from Barbara as 
their line manager. The feedback was in response to questions as to how well the 
directors were demonstrating the behaviours that are described in the organisation’s 
competency framework. In arranging the workshop I had come to an agreement with 
Barbara as to how we would display the feedback. We agreed to show the individual 
director scores and a mean average score against each competency with the individual 
scores being anonymous. This meant that only the individual directors knew which 
scores theirs were but they could see how their score matched up against other 
directors’ scores.  
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I introduced a discussion on the data and asked the directors what sense they were 
making of it. Neil said that having the data displayed competitively in the way it was 
may not be helpful, like a football league table. I responded by suggesting that whilst 
I could see that the data had been set out in a comparative format, that didn’t 
necessarily mean that it was competitive. Michael agreed that it was intended to be 
comparative rather than competitive. As we discussed this and made our way through 
each competency, Sharon said that she didn’t want to appear defensive but without 
knowing from whom the feedback was coming she found it difficult to understand the 
context of the comments and scores. There were several comments and agreements in 
the group of this nature as we went through the session.  
 
As I reflect on this part of my narrative I am struck by Neil’s comments about feeling 
that the data was creating competition between the directors.  I presumed that he 
meant that he was having his behaviour compared to the behaviour of others in a way 
that those who demonstrated the behaviours set out in the competency framework best 
would be looked on more favourably than those who did not. I notice that I 
discounted this and instead made a gesture to suggest that they were in fact 
comparative rather than competitive. On reflection there seems little difference 
between competitive and comparative, given that the standard of expected behaviour 
was being dictated by a set of generalised, desired behaviours within a competency 
framework that does not pay any attention to the local context. I am also struck by the 
comment from Sharon, that although she didn’t want to appear defensive, without 
knowing from whom the feedback was coming she found it difficult to understand the 
context of the comments and scores. I can see that Sharon was reflexively pointing 
out the challenge of using such tools out of context and others also offered such 
comments as we went through the session. I think she was pointing to how she was 
anticipating that her remarks might be taken as being resistant. Sharon’s comments 
about context were never taken up, and yet it seems they are important reflexive 
questions about the validity of the competency framework. I am left wondering what 
would have happened if we had been able to have a conversation that could have 
legitimately challenged the usefulness of it as a tool in their particular context. What 
happened was very little, in that although we discussed the feedback, it was in a fairly 
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cursory way that did little to enlighten or help with any understanding of the way that 
this group works together.  
 
Three hundred and sixty degree feedback processes and competency frameworks take 
for granted that the skills and competencies in any given situation are located in 
individuals and therefore the purpose of the three hundred and sixty degree feedback 
is to show how managers are doing in demonstrating their level of competency 
against any given indicator. The job of the individual is, therefore, to consider this 
feedback and change their behaviour accordingly to better demonstrate the required 
behaviour. Therefore, cognitivist psychology and strategic choice theory (Stacey, 
2007) underpins the processes of competency frameworks and three hundred and 
sixty degree feedback as feedback loops are used to measure performance against 
expectation and adjustments are then made to the human systems (in this case the 
directors) to improve performance. The relevance and generalizability of the 
competency framework is taken for granted and unchallenged. Challenges to the 
relevance of any given competency framework, such as that described by Horton 
(2000), would be likely to be interpreted as resistance and would require further 
training. Stacey (2012) refers to such things as competency frameworks as techniques 
of instrumental rationality and, using the work of Michael Foucault, demonstrates 
how they are used as instruments of disciplinary power to which everyone is then 
subjected, even those leaders who design them. In considering my own experience of 
working in organisations and using competency frameworks I would agree with 
Stacey that they are often used in a disciplinary way to constrain and encourage 
particular behaviours. To give an example, every spring as an employee of my 
organisation I am required to complete a performance appraisal giving examples of 
how I have performed against the objectives that I agreed with my manager the 
previous year. Alongside this assessment I am also required to assess my behaviours 
set against the desired behaviours as set out in our corporate competency framework. 
To ‘support’ me in this assessment I receive anonymised three hundred and sixty 
degree feedback from a selection of people including the people that I manage, my 
peers and my managers. This assessment is graded from one to three depending on 
how well I have behaved. This process is required of all employees. My experience is 
that such a process is not unique to my current employer, I have completed similar 
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assessments throughout my career. Perhaps it was this sense of being disciplined and 
constrained that Sharon and Neil were expressing. 
 
 
Using Myers Briggs Type Indicator 
 
We stopped for a coffee and when we returned we moved on to look at what the 
MBTI assessments could show us about how they were likely to respond to each other 
and as a group, especially in issues of change, decision making and communication. I 
asked each individual director to write their name on a post-it note and to append it to 
the posters around the room. The MBTI tool is arranged across eight pairs of 
dichotomies under which are five other pairs of facets.  
 
I asked the directors to place their post-it notes on the facet score that related to their 
profile. They did this for each facet on the posters. At one point I found myself 
directing people to move on, chivvying them along much as a teacher would do to 
errant pupils. As I noticed that I was doing this, I caught myself acting in a way that I 
hadn’t intended but seemed to me to be both appropriate and inappropriate at the 
same time. It seemed to me that no-one was paying any attention to me behaving in 
this way, other than to do as I asked, nor did anyone object. I encouraged the group to 
share examples of how past experiences might illustrate or illuminate what we were 
seeing on the poster.  
 
The MBTI tool, was derived from the work of Carl Jung by Katharine Cook Briggs 
and Isabel Briggs Myers. It is based on the typological theories proposed by Carl Jung 
in his book Psychological Types (Sharp, 1987). The tool consists of a questionnaire 
and an assessment process which seeks to uncover innate preferences, which Jung 
suggested were inherent in all individuals. There is a parallel here with the use of the 
three hundred and sixty degree feedback as a tool in the preceding session. Both tools 
take for granted an individual psychology within which individuals can learn about 
their own mental models through external feedback processes and in uncovering this 
learning can make individual choices to change the way they behave to better align 
with what is expected of them.  
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I notice how in examining people’s behaviours using the MBTI tool the motivation 
and responsibility for how the directors behave is rooted in the individual director and 
their innate typology, and therefore the dynamics of the group, can only be 
understood through how each of these individual types interact with each other to 
create an outcome. I also note how this process places me in the position of 
knowledge and authority as the sole arbiter of the process and the only one qualified 
in the use of the tool. It may not be so surprising then that I was tempted into taking 
the position of the teacher, with the directors as my pupils, in a dynamic with me as 
the expert and them as passive novices.  
 
Trying to Notice How We Were Relating Together Using a Balloon 
 
In the afternoon of the away-day we started with a session entitled: How do we use 
our authority individually and collectively? Can we be different together? I tried to 
take a different approach to my participation in this session, where in the previous 
sessions with the three sixty feed-back and MBTI I had been prominent in directing 
the process, this time I did not do so and tried to allow the process of the session to 
emerge from the interactions. I was keen to move away from a prescribed process 
towards a more open conversation. Barbara explained that she had been approached 
by a member of the policy team directly who had expressed concern about a piece of 
work that had been done by the communications team which used dogs’ behaviour to 
illustrate issues of gender. The member of the policy team had felt that the work 
would be perceived as frivolous and inappropriate. Barbara had suggested to her that 
she speak to the communications team and ask that the work not be published in any 
way until there had been a wider discussion as to whether and how it would be used. 
This had somehow gotten translated by others in the organisation into a message that 
Barbara had not liked the work and had it cut. As the directors discussed the issue, 
other examples were introduced to illustrate similar patterns. Sharon suggested it 
might be better for them to share their plans at the earliest opportunity to enable a 
more thorough discussion as they progressed. She used an example of how the 
decision by the finance directorate to set carbon budgets had not been fully discussed 
and had resulted in overly tight budgets that didn’t allow the appropriate level of 
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travel. Terry, the finance director, responded that his department had been given the 
task of setting the carbon budgets and they had apportioned them according to 
headcount. There followed an exchange between Sharon and Terry that seemed to 
demonstrate the pattern of defensiveness that Barbara and I had discussed in our 
planning conversations.  
 
I took this as a prompt for me to interrupt the flow of the discussion by blowing up a 
balloon. I introduced the idea that to avoid the conversation ending up in a defensive 
argumentative pattern perhaps we could use the balloon to refocus the issue into the 
centre of the room. I suggested that this might help them to notice the patterns that 
were emerging between them, thus introducing the process that I had agreed with 
Barbara in our planning of the day. This shift from allowing the conversation to 
emerge to directing using the balloon resulted in a passing of the balloon when people 
started talking, with it moving between individuals and the centre of the room. I 
suggested that we return to the example of the carbon budgets and how it might have 
been improved by them each sharing their plans earlier to enable better agreement on 
such issues. Neil responded that he would find it difficult to do so. He used 
militaristic metaphors to suggest that he needed to defend his teams. I noticed the 
militaristic language and asked Neil what the use of those kinds of metaphors might 
mean for him. He appeared to stop short, he said he didn’t know, and that he would 
need to think about it further. I suggested that others in the room may feel similarly 
and thanked him for being willing to respond in the way that he had. I asked for views 
from the rest of the directors but no one seemed willing to continue to explore it. 
Sharon started to talk about how what she called the ‘myth’ of how Barbara’s 
decisions about what she did and didn’t like was patterned across the organisation. I 
suggested that the word ‘myth’ might be important and that they might explore it 
through a mythical metaphor involving kings and queens. In doing this I was hoping 
that the group would use my invitation to explore the power dynamics between them. 
However, my invitation wasn’t picked up by anyone in the room and the conversation 
continued as if I had not said anything. The session ended with us breaking for coffee 
and with a recognition of this myth building being important but without a resolution 
about how they might want to try to change it together. 
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In this session I was attempting to use the balloon to offer a new way for the group to 
discuss their relationships but in doing so I was still focusing on the two-way 
interaction of two individuals and missing the wider impact of the dynamics of the 
group. I was also, through the use of the balloon, exercising power over what 
happened within the group and deciding through my intervention what we should talk 
about and how we should talk about it. I notice how readily the directors agreed to my 
working with them in this way. There was little or no resistance to my directive way 
of facilitating. It seems to me that in taking up the disciplining and constraining 
processes I have described earlier I participated in a pattern of behaviour that I, and 
the rest of the group, had unconsciously created together. Neil, in his reaction to the 
request from Barbara for the directors to share their plans at an earlier stage, indirectly 
expressed how vulnerable this made him feel and that he felt unable to do so. The 
reaction from the group was to become quiet. People seemed unsure what to do next, 
it seemed to me that at this point there was potential for something different to 
happen. In my asking Neil what might be significant about his use of militaristic 
language, I was seeking to explore how Neil had expressed himself and whether this 
may have been something shared in the group. However, in a similar way to my 
offering a discussion using mythical language, and in offering to discuss the director’s 
initial comments as they entered the room, the idea wasn’t taken up and, after a pause, 
the discussion fell into what seemed a pattern where the participants acted in a way 
that seemed familiar and usual. It seems that when moments offering the potential for 
novelty arose in our relating together there followed a pause, as if no one knew what 
to do in facing a moment that had not been encountered before and which did not 
follow a familiar pattern. In these moments it felt to me as if time was suspended until 
I or someone else was able to say something that re-engaged us back into a known 
pattern of relating that allowed us to continue. It seems to me this may indicate a 
pattern of relating that maintains the status quo in response to the anticipation of 
feelings of shame that are caused by an unpredictable future. This echoes Brene 
Brown’s (Brown, 2015) suggestion that vulnerability and therefore the risk of shame 
are core to novelty and innovation. 
 
A Disappointing End to the Day 
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In the final session of the day, Barbara and I had planned to move the conversation to 
talk about what they might do differently together as a consequence of the day’s 
discussions. I suggested that we take up the issues raised in the MBTI session. The 
directors discussed how they communicated to the rest of the staff in the organisation 
and they agreed to use their weekly meetings to share what might be worrying them 
more and to be more open about the issues that they were experiencing. They also 
agreed to spend more time on priority issues in their bigger monthly meetings and not 
to fill the agenda with lots of items as they had in the past. They planned to always 
end their meetings with a discussion of what messages would be communicated to the 
wider organisation and who would ensure that those messages were sent out from 
them as a group. They agreed to do this through a podcast after each monthly meeting 
and finally to pay attention to where the balloon might be. The away-day ended with 
an upbeat feeling. The directors thanked me for facilitating their day and we all left in 
good spirits. In the days that followed I got further thanks from the participants. 
 
I remember being disappointed by the discussion in the group in the last session. The 
conversation became rather mundane as the group made plans for some minor 
changes to the way they worked together and how they communicated with others in 
the organisation. I felt a sense of lost opportunity and that very little had shifted in 
how the group worked together as a result of the day we had spent together. Even now 
I feel that I participated in a set-piece of relatively predictable conversations in which 
we all, as participants, contrived to stay within a pattern of relating to which we all 
had become accustomed and which felt safe. It is this feeling of planning the 
processes involved in the away-day to provide a safe yet apparently constraining 
environment that I find interesting. 
 
Feeling Shame at the Idea of Infantilising Others 
 
I have since offered this narrative, along with some early ideas as to what I might 
focus on as I started to analyse the narrative, to my learning set within the doctoral 
programme. The response from them was to offer some similar lines of inquiry to the 
ones that I was already thinking about. However, within that early discussion in the 
learning set, there was also a suggestion that the use of such tools as the balloon in 
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such team meetings can be infantilizing for the participants. My initial reaction to the 
idea that I had engaged in processes that may have been infantilising was one of 
shock and resistance. I certainly hadn’t intended to infantilise anyone and I felt shame 
at the idea that I might have done so. I think the combination of feelings of shame and 
experiencing learning at the same time, once I had overcome my shock, were part of 
the genesis of the movement of my thinking in this project.  
 
What is Shame? 
 
In discussing this project with my learning set we got involved in a discussion about 
the difference between shame and guilt. There seemed to be a point of view that 
shame is an individually felt affect, resulting from feeling socially exposed as inferior, 
whereas guilt was as a result of having done something that is seen by yourself and 
potentially others as wrong. I took from that conversation that shame is about who we 
are seen to be to others, and guilt is about what we have done. The conversation 
resulted in a definite sense that feelings of shame required us to be publicly exposed 
in some way. However, this way of describing shame did not fit well with me. My 
recollection of having experienced feelings of shame did not necessarily involve 
being publicly exposed in any way. Dearing and Tangney (2002, p15) state that in 
empirical studies there is little difference between people reporting solitary shame and 
guilt experiences. In studies 17.2% of children reported experiencing solitary shame 
against 14.9% experiencing solitary guilt. Similarly, in adults, 16.5% reported 
experiencing solitary shame experiences against 22.5% experiencing solitary guilt. 
So, it seems that in studies people have reported feelings of shame without being 
publicly exposed in any way. Dearing and Tangney (ibid, p17) go on to suggest that 
there is little difference in what sort of event or behaviour might induce shame or 
guilt, stating that in their study respondents gave similar examples. They argue that 
the main difference seems to be that shame is an individually felt affect that is about 
who we are and guilt is about something we have done, a conclusion I had already 
reached based on my own experience. Therefore, in the case of guilt, reparation is 
possible whereas with shame there is a felt need to be not who we are, resulting in a 
wish to run way, or to hide, or to avoid the situation. 
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This then leads to me wondering what might be going on in processes of shame if it is 
not necessarily about being publicly exposed. Stacey (2007), Stacey et al (2000), 
Griffin (2002), and Mowles (2015), draw on the thinking of George Herbert Mead, 
Norbert Elias and John Dewey, among others, to propose that the individual and the 
social are the singular and the plural of a single process. Mead (1934, p178) proposes 
that the self-consciousness of individuals emerges from the internal conversations in 
which one becomes an object to oneself. This conversation involves a ‘me’ (an 
identity) which is the attitude of a group taken toward oneself. The individual’s 
response to this me is the ‘I’, which is the spontaneous individual response to the 
individual’s perception of the group’s view of him/herself. This ‘I’ is potentially 
novel in its response and therefore offers the possibility of change in others as they go 
through the same complex responsive process of relating.  Individually the I and the 
me represent a single phenomenon in which the ‘I’ in the living present can only be 
understood as part of the ‘me’. It is important to understand that Mead describes the I 
and the Me as inseparable elements or parts of an ongoing process. 
 
If we take up Mead’s (ibid) suggestion that our sense of conscious responsibility 
comes as a result of the I/me dialectic then who we are is fundamentally social. If we 
are faced with a situation where the assumed attitude of the others in our social 
situation causes our ‘I’ to cast doubt on our previous understanding of our ‘me’, 
regardless of whether that doubt is publicly known, a feeling of shame is the result, as 
we can no longer be who we thought we were. This gives us an explanation of how 
feelings of solitary shame can be experienced as an internal but nevertheless social 
process. 
 
Processes of Learning Involving Shame 
  
Aram (2001) suggests that such processes of shame are inevitably induced in a 
learning process. She suggests that a learning process (she uses the examples of 
university learning or therapy) involves accepting that there is something which we 
do not know which in turn results in a loss of the power of knowing and a challenge 
to our sense of who we are, thus giving rise to the individually felt shame. I think 
therefore that Aram is describing significant learning processes that offer the risk to a 
 49 
change in our sense of self, learning processes that are potentially transformational of 
our identity. If the away-day is an intended learning process for the individuals and 
the group that is potentially transformative of themselves and the way they work 
together, then according to Aram, processes of shame, which she suggests may come 
in the guise of anger, contempt or withdrawal, will be inevitable. Aram describes the 
paradoxical way in which the destructiveness of shame is at the same time potentially, 
but not necessarily, creative. This point is missed by Brene Brown (2015) who sees 
shame as entirely destructive. Aram (2001) describes this feeling of shame as being 
the individually felt instances of incremental transformations of identity that occur in 
groups as people make meaning together as an emergent property of their interaction. 
Thinking now about the away-day I think we missed an opportunity to reflexively 
work with the dynamics of the group and the feelings of shame that such work might 
have created. I think instead we worked together as a group in a planned way to 
maintain familiar patterns of relating to avoid or minimise such shame. The question 
then is, why might we have done so? 
 
Stacey, using the work of Antonio Damasio, describes a physical aspect of social 
interaction, 
 
He (Damasio) holds that mind arises when bodies interact with each other and 
that changes in body rhythms continually affect mental states and the sense of 
self. It is not a great step to suggest that when people are relating to each 
other, in the presence of each other, their body rhythms might resonate with 
each other. An intuitive sense of how another is feeling could well be 
conveyed in this way (Stacey, 2003, p115). 
 
Lewis et al (2000) describe a process of limbic resonance which occurs in all social 
mammals including humans. They suggest that when human beings interact with each 
other a process of social resonance occurs whereby our limbic systems resonate at the 
same frequency. Warm social contact instigates the release of physically internal 
opiate-like chemicals. Whereas according to Dossey (2005), feelings of shame lead to 
inflammation and stress in the human body. 
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Elias describes a civilizing process of human society based on an increasing sense of 
shame,  
  
The feeling of shame is a specific excitation, a kind of anxiety which is 
automatically reproduced in the individual on certain occasions by force of 
habit. Considered superficially it is fear of degradation or, more generally, of 
other people’s gestures of superiority (2000, p415).  
  
Elias proposes that people are susceptible to other people’s gestures of superiority if 
they accord with the,  
 
agency of self-constraint implanted in the individual by others on whom he 
was dependent, who possessed superiority over him…… The conflict 
expressed in shame-fear is not merely a conflict of the individual with the 
prevalent society of opinion; the individual’s behaviour has brought him into 
conflict with part of himself that represents this social opinion (ibid, p415). 
  
It is the bringing together of the thinking of Mead’s and Elias’s perspectives that 
Aram (2001) uses when she describes shame as being inevitable in situations where 
there is potential for transformation, as it is through this complex responsive 
processes of relating viewpoint that shame is perceived as the individually felt affect 
emerging from a social process involving inclusion and exclusion, whereby 
individually the ‘I’ is constantly responding to the shifting ‘me’ as an ongoing process 
within a group process whilst at the same time the ‘me’ is constantly responding to 
the gestures and responses of other ‘I’s/‘me’s. Mowles (2015) draws on the thinking 
of Hegel as he describes this dialectical process of movement between polarities of 
paradox, such as the individual forming and being formed by the social at the same 
time as being inherent in our experience of participating in groups. The thinking of 
Mead, Elias and Mowles helps me to understand how, if shame is an individually felt 
affect of a social process, it is possible to feel solitary shame without public exposure. 
It is this taking the attitude of others to oneself that allows our sense of self to be 
exposed to our self in an internal I/me dialogue that results in the felt sense of shame. 
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Working Together to Avoid the Risk of Shame 
 
It is easy to see how we might avoid putting ourselves at risk of experiencing the 
discomfort of shame. To do so, as our sense of self is fundamentally social, we must 
then work together through our gestures and responses in the groups in which we 
work to avoid novelty and ensure that we maintain familiar patterns of relating. 
Therefore, I can now understand how anyone attempting to introduce novel gestures 
and responses could easily find themselves being ignored or even resisted. 
 
If we take up this way of thinking about individuals and groups then our involvement 
in groups inevitably has the potential to provoke inclusion and exclusion, creating 
conflict and the potential for feelings of shame as the individually felt affect of the 
dialectical social process. In this case, rather than seeking to organise groups in 
activities that remove or minimise the potential for conflict and shame in pursuit of 
harmony and a sense of transcendence or wholeness (which is the usual pursuit of 
team away-days when looked at from the perspective of a humanistic psychology and 
was the hope for our away-day, as stated by Barbara), it seems to me that if it is our 
intention to learn and to change how we relate to each other in groups, then it is 
important that in attempting to understand our participating together that we are able 
to deal reflexively with and discuss such feelings as they arise in the social processes 
of us acting together in groups. Or as Stacey (2012, p89) puts it, “Thinking together 
about what we are doing and why we are doing it seems to me to be the only way to 
produce reasonable and lasting changes in what we do”. 
 
In this doctoral programme, when I was confronted with the idea that my facilitation 
practice was infantilizing, working in this reflexive way in staying with my own 
feelings of shame and struggling to understand and learn through the experience, has 
enabled me to continue my research into my practice and develop new ways of 
thinking about it. At the same time, I felt isolated and undermined by feeling that 
what I thought I had known had been in some way false. 
 
In attempting to use these differing perspectives to understand what was going on in 
the away-day with these directors it seems clear to me that the working assumptions 
of the group belong to the perspective on groups defined by the humanistic and 
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individualistic perspectives. This is revealed by Barbara as the group leader in her 
desire for the away-day to enable the group, through a form of confessional process, 
to reach for a form of alignment through which they can transcend the individual and 
attain a state where they represent the kind of supra individual, as described by 
Rogers (1951, p288). It is possible that the nervous remarks of Sharon and Barbara at 
the beginning of the away-day were responding to this as a perceived possibility. It is 
also interesting that the group’s response to my attempts to discuss their remarks at 
the beginning of the day, and my offer of picking up the mythical nature of the 
discussion, resulted in a minimisation and dismissal of their importance, perhaps to 
avoid any new patterns of behaviour emerging and thereby negating the risk of any 
feelings of shame. Mead (1934, p179) describes how in the conversation of gesture 
and response an individual takes the attitude of the other towards his or her own 
stimulus. If we take up the complex responsive processes perspective and see shame 
as the individually felt affect of changing group dynamics and we take up the idea of 
an individual taking the attitude of the other in his own stimulus, then in a social 
situation where the potential for shame is present it must be shared by others in the 
group. Therefore, it must be that we were all complicit in maintaining the patterns of 
relating to which we had become accustomed, perhaps to avoid the ensuing 
challenges to our sense of identity and our inclusion in the group.  
  
I am led to wonder whether the planning that Barbara and I were engaged in was 
influenced by our mutual imagining of the potential processes of shame such an 
away-day may provoke. Our planning of the away-day was, in some way, an effort to 
reduce or negate such feelings for the other participants and for ourselves (evidenced 
by Barbara holding back the agenda for the day) and yet at the same time wanting to 
have sufficient possibility of these processes being present to have the potential for 
transformational learning to take place on the day. In short, wanting to have our cake 
and eat it in trying to predict and manage the feelings of shame that might be 
provoked and in doing so attempting to instrumentalise that shame in our planning of 
the day. Furthermore, our deployment of anonymised tools such as three hundred and 
sixty degree feedback mechanisms, decontextualized behavioural competency 
frameworks and psychological instruments such as MBTI, may be offering the 
potential for understanding oneself in a formulaic and known way that minimises the 
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potential for the emergence of the individually felt experience of the affect of shame 
and the social losses that could ensue. 
 
As I have said earlier in this project, within the community of people working on this 
doctoral programme with whom I shared my work, some have pointed to the potential 
for the work with the balloon to lead to infantilisation of the group. It is interesting to 
note that the use of a balloon was accidental in that the initial idea of a ball, and then a 
blow-up globe, became unfeasible. I think it’s interesting because although the use of 
a child’s toy such as a balloon may bring the potential for infantilisation into sharp 
focus, the processes of three sixty feedback tools and psychometric tools such as 
MBTI, through their foundations and generalizability appearing unchallengeable, and 
tight facilitator led processes involving flip-charts, posters and balloons, are also 
fundamentally designed to produce dependence upon the facilitator in such group 
meetings as a defence against anxiety rather than the rational analytical tools they 
appear to be. Using planned agendas, and these tools and techniques, the facilitator, in 
this case me, in collusion with the leader, in this case Barbara, can maintain a position 
of power in the group and the group and the facilitator co-create a dynamic of 
dependence from the group on the facilitator. The dependent dynamic of such 
facilitator led meetings could therefore easily be interpreted as infantilising in its very 
nature whilst purporting to be about encouraging participation and transformation. It 
would seem such infantilizing practices are common with Mowles (2007 and 2009) 
describing the use of pipe cleaners, Play-Doh, balloons and bits of cardboard, as well 
as very strict facilitator led rules in meetings, intended to support people to come 
together to create organisational strategy.  Crewe (2014) also points to the use of 
coloured stickers, post-it notes and flip chart paper in what she describes as rituals of 
visioning the future in international development organisations. I’m drawn to the 
moment of clarity and realisation I had in the midst of the MBTI part of the away-day 
when I experienced myself acting as if I was a teacher directing errant pupils as a 
moment that clearly demonstrates the power dynamics between me as the facilitator 
and the rest of the group. However, this power would seem to be limited to 
maintaining the reiteration of expected patterns of relating within the social object of 
facilitation. When I made attempts at changing the pattern of the conversation through 
noticing the pattern (an example would be the use of mythical language) and inviting 
 54 
conversation about it, the group dismissed this by pausing and then ignoring it and 
carrying on with their previous conversation. 
  
What I’m coming to realise is that the way the day was planned, and the assumptions 
that Barbara and I were making in such planning, were ultimately denying others the 
opportunity to participate in how the day would proceed. And yet it seems that their 
expectation of Barbara providing an agenda for the day, their outward acceptance of 
the agenda and their passive participation on the day, would suggest that they wanted 
and expected such planning and forming of an agenda to take place. If the balloon, or 
perhaps even the away-day as a whole, in its planning and the way it transpired on the 
day, was in any way infantilising, maybe such infantilisation is an emergent property 
of the gestures and responses of me, Barbara and the rest of the group as we engaged 
in the social object of facilitation. In generating the need to be open to the feelings of 
shame in order to engage in transformational learning and yet also working 
unconsciously together with the highly ritualized processes, tools and techniques of 
cognitivist psychology and strategic choice theory to minimise or eliminate any 
opportunities for such shame to arise, we co-created a situation of both wanting and 
not wanting transformation and change at the same time with a repetitive pattern of 
interaction where compliance with such processes is expected. If, as has been 
suggested by those who have read this paper in its numerous iterations, the experience 
of facilitated team away-days is a common one, then such repetitive patterns of 
relating in avoidance of shame must also be common. In support of my contention 
that such repetitive patterns are a common experience, Mowles (2009), through his 
experience as a consultant facilitator describes a similar dynamic to the one I have 
shown here.  He depicts a group resisting his attempts to change the expected 
dynamic of meeting, together with a pre-prepared agenda with specific intended 
outcomes to a more exploratory and emergent way of working, even to the point of 
criticizing his capability as a facilitator in suggesting that he wasn’t in control of the 
workshop. When he proposed to his contractor that this criticism should form part of 
the workshop conversation he was prevented from doing so with the contractor 
reasoning that it would be unfair as the participants were unaccustomed to reflecting 
on their actions. Mowles argues that to reflect together on our actions in an authentic 
sense requires us to recognise each other and in doing so risks the inevitable change in 
our own sense of self. As I have argued in this paper, it is this reflecting on our acting 
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together and the unknown impact on our own sense of self of that reflecting that 
causes the potential for the occurrence of feelings of shame. Mowles (ibid) further 
argues that facilitation is a form of temporary leadership in which there is an ethical 
challenge in the junctures of negotiation, 
 
The ethical and performative challenge for the consultant seems to me to 
reside in these junctures of negotiation, where we have a genuine opportunity 
for the recognition of others and alternative understanding of what is possible. 
The difference that I think a consultant can bring is to exercise a temporary 
form of leadership by taking part in, and encouraging negotiation as way of 
helping permanent members of staff to see each other anew (ibid, p291). 
 
He argues that consultants through reflecting on their practice and developing theories 
about it can develop a better sense of self and through this better developed sense of 
self they are able, paradoxically, to have a more authentic exchange with others. In 
my recent experience, and in my work on this project, I have been reflecting on my 
practice as a facilitator and in doing so I have recognized myself in my own practice 
and in my participation in groups with others. I have demonstrated how with the use 
of tools and techniques of cognitivist psychology and strategic choice theory it is easy 
to collude with groups in the avoidance of mutual recognition and the inevitably 
ensuing shame. I am in agreement with Mowles (2009) in that this is the ethical and 
performative challenge that I face as I continue to practice as a facilitator. It is in the 
continued negotiation of my practice with others in the organisation that this 




In thinking about how I might proceed in project three I am drawn to looking for 
opportunities to research into instances where I and others may be unconsciously, or 
maybe even consciously, colluding with each other through making assumptions 
about what we are doing and why we are doing it. The work of Mead in his 
description of social objects, along with Fleck’s (1979) ideas on thought collectives 
and thought styles, has prompted me to wonder how in the environment of 
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international development, assumptions about how change comes about in 
organisational contexts have emerged and taken root. In the organisation where I 
work I have participated in a process of numerous management meetings, which have 
resulted in the production of a pictorial representation of a ‘vision’ of change. A 
change team is being assembled whose role will be to build a ‘roadmap’ to develop 
the vision into a deliverable plan. The change team is then expected to coordinate and 
facilitate this change process across the organisation to deliver this vision. Already, 
through my learning on this doctorate programme, I can see this description of a 
change process is awash with assumptions about how change takes place in 
organisations and how individuals and groups are able to participate in it. It is not yet 
clear what my role in this ongoing change process will be but given my new 
understanding of the type of collusion that can take place I am keen to notice how I 




Project Three: The Job Interview, Collusive Performances, Forming and Being 




 In project one I wrote about my experience of managing and being managed, and 
assumptions about power and control in organisations based on systems thinking and 
formative teleology, as described by Stacey et al. (2000). This led to my becoming 
aware of a collusion that takes place in the interactions between people in 
organisations that takes the form of leaders and those being led having expectations of 
being in control of future outcomes in situations of complexity where such control is 
impossible. In project two, in developing my theme I proposed that the social object 
of facilitation (a term I derive from Mead, 1938), involving tightly managed 
facilitator led processes, competency frameworks and psychometric instruments, 
often leads to collusion between the participants in facilitated events to retain familiar 
patterns of relating in the avoidance of the discomfort of shame, which is an 
inevitable aspect of shifting identities.  
 
As I am increasingly describing what I am noticing in my experience at work as 
collusion, I think it’s important that I set out more clearly what I mean. Alvesson and 
Spicer describe a phenomenon in organisations that they call functional stupidity 
which is characterised by an “unwillingness or inability to mobilise three aspects of 
cognitive capacity: reflexivity, justification, and substantive reasoning” (2012, 
p1199). That is to say that individuals do not reflexively question the norms, rules and 
routines of organisations that are then taken as given and true. Neither do they look 
for justification of why things are done the way they are, and instead, ways of 
working are merely accepted. In avoidance of substantive reasoning people will 
narrow their focus on delivering specific outputs without any further questioning of 
the validity of those outputs. Alvesson and Spicer describe such behaviour as 
functional stupidity and its function is to create certainty for people and reduce 
anxiety. They also suggest that functional stupidity can result in promotion, pay rises 
and smooth organisational performance. They point out that the danger of such 
functional stupidity is that risks to the organisation are not appropriately anticipated 
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and significant problems can arise without being noticed or attended to. I would 
suggest that what I am describing as collusion is similar to the phenomenon of 
functional stupidity as described here. Collusion is a social phenomenon in which 
patterns of relating emerge as interdependent people interact with one another to 
maintain their ways of being together. It is important to point out that I am proposing 
that such collusion takes place without prior discussion or planning by those involved, 
and may also be outside of their awareness, and so is different from what one would 
understand as deliberate cooperation or conspiracy. However, I would argue that in 
common with functional stupidity, such collusion has the function of giving certainty 
and predictability to those colluding, and reduces their anxiety. Such collusion may 
well involve limitation of reflexivity, the absence of pursuit of justification and 
inhibited substantive reasoning.  
 
I have become increasingly curious about different forms of collusion and whether the 
situations described in projects one and two are substantively different from collusion 
in job interviews. If they are, then I intend to investigate how and why the differences 
occur.  
 
What follows is a narrative of my experience of applying for a new job in my 
organisation.  
 
Applying for a New Job 
 
 A job as the head of a corporate change team was advertised in the organisation 
where I work. This job had come about through the creation of a corporate vision that 
involved a number of meetings of senior managers across the organisation. This 
vision incorporated intentions for the organisation to be globally networked, digitally 
enabled and financially resilient.  
 
The job description described the role as: “A two year (fixed term) appointment to co-
ordinate and facilitate an organisational wide change process that will enable the 
organisation to transform the way it operates in order to significantly scale up its 
impact on poverty eradication”. I applied for the role because it was better 
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remunerated than the job I was doing and it would allow me to work across the 
organisation in a leading change role. I felt excited and nervous about the possibility 
of doing it. The application process involved completing an online form and the main 
part of the application asked for examples from the applicant’s experience set against 
the organisation’s competency framework. I went on to fill out the form and later I 
was pleased to be invited to interview.  
 
In the days running up to the interview I prepared myself by brushing up on the detail 
of what was being called Vision 2020 which set out the intentions for changing the 
organisation. I frequently found myself wondering what questions I might be asked at 
interview and how I might respond. In private conversations with myself, I imagined 
the voices of both Michael and Barbara asking me questions, as I knew that they 
would be both on the interview panel. I also found myself wondering what I would do 
if I didn’t get the job. What might I say to colleagues, family and friends? At one 
point I thought that it would prompt me to move to a different organisation and I even 
made a flurry of online applications for other jobs. I openly discussed the job with 
others in my organisation and beyond and the fact that I had made an application. I 
was interested in who I was competing against but secrecy surrounded the 
applications and shortlisting. Every time I had one of these discussions I would get a 
spike of adrenaline and I would feel physically shaken. By the time of the interview I 
was in a high state of anticipatory excitement and nervousness.  
 
The Day of the Interview 
 
The day of the interview arrived. I had put a lot of thought into what I might wear for 
the interview: should I wear my usual work attire of open necked shirt and trousers? 
Certainly, anything more casual seemed inappropriate. Or should I make a special 
effort and wear a suit with a shirt and tie? I decided to wear a suit and tie. This 
seemed to be the safest option as I imagined the panel may make unwanted meaning 
of anything more casual. I had my suit cleaned, I polished my shoes and off I went for 
the interview. It struck me later that the only other time I’ve put so much thought into 
what to wear was when attending weddings and funerals that are similar rituals in the 
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sense that they interrupt everyday processes in which clothes can have symbolic 
meaning. 
 
I arrived ten minutes early and waited at my desk to be escorted by an administrative 
assistant to a room where I was given the subject of the ten-minute presentation I was 
to give at the beginning of the interview. I found it strange that I was being escorted 
around a building where I work every week and in which I’m free to roam around at 
will under non-interview circumstances. On reflection what I think I was finding 
strange was the highly stylized way I, and others, were acting in response to the fact 
that this was a formal interview situation in which I became a temporary outsider. The 
quality of my interactions with others was markedly changed. Being escorted was a 
process of gesture and response that was emerging as a pattern between me and the 
administrative assistant in responding to our perceptions of what it means to be 
involved in a formal job interview. In cooperating with being led around in this way I 
was already colluding in an artificial suspension of my everyday identity.  
 
I was given forty-five minutes to prepare and the room contained a table and chairs, 
flipchart paper, coloured pens, and writing paper. The presentation subject was as 
follows:  
 
“Vision 2020 anticipates a very ambitious period of transformational change for the 
organisation in the way that it manages and delivers its work in the future. As you 
consider the planning and implementation of the change programme that will be 
necessary to deliver this scale of transformation :-  
 
 What do you envisage its shape and complexity to be? 
 Who do you see as the main stakeholder groups we must be mindful of in 
designing and delivering this change and why? 
 What do you see are the critical key streams of work that are required to 
support it? 




As I set about preparing a presentation I was aware of what I had been learning from 
my research on this doctoral programme. In the questions there were a number of 
indications of a taken for granted view that transformational change could be 
designed and delivered according to a preformed plan and that relationships could 
also be managed through stakeholder management. I was, and remain, sceptical about 
the ability for managers being able to manage change in such a way but I also thought 
that to challenge such thinking at an interview may well be the best way of ensuring 
that I didn’t get the job. In my previous conversations with Michael and Barbara I had 
noticed how much faith they put into such planning and risk management and I 
imagined that anything I said that might cast doubt on that faith and may have caused 
them to respond to me negatively as a candidate. I note a contradiction here. I was 
being interviewed for a job as head of corporate change in which I would be expected 
to bring innovation and yet I was also sensing that to be too different would be 
threatening to their assumptions about how change comes about in organisations.  
 
I set about preparing a presentation that described a combination of planned and 
managed change using a well-recognised project management approach alongside a 
more emergent appreciation of change over time, where a process of regular reflection 
is required to understand progress so far and adjustments to actions to keep the 
change on course. I also referred to the need for a second order form of reflection to 
consider whether the change we were aiming for was still appropriate. I went on to 
explain how I would construct a process to report progress to senior managers and 
board members. In what I was proposing there is a clear reflection of what Mintzberg 
(1987) describes as a deliberately emergent strategy in that there would be an overall 
set of guidelines and processes in which managers would be free to interpret those 
guidelines and develop content as they see fit. Senior managers are then able to guide 
such a process by stopping any plans that are deemed unhelpful and others, that are 
deemed helpful, can be incorporated into the formal strategy. The assumption 
underpinning this proposition is that emergence can be harnessed within a strategy in 
which managers can still assert overall control. Whilst I don’t share this assumption, 
my proposition was based on how much I sensed that I could move away from ideas 
that suggest that one can manage change in a deliberate and planned way and still be 
recognised as a good candidate for the job.  
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After forty-five minutes of preparation the same person who had escorted me to the 
room arrived to escort me to the interview and so the ‘out of the ordinary’ quality of 
my experience was maintained. The interview began with a short round of 
introductions, as I hadn’t met the third member of the panel who was a member of the 
board named Pamela. I was then invited to give my presentation. I used Venn 
diagrams and graphs with Cartesian coordinates to denote tasks delivered over time to 
show how I proposed to manage change. I explained that I felt that any plan needed to 
be flexible enough to change according to how people were responding to it. I talked 
about Bolman and Deals’ (2003) idea about culture and complexity, that the 
consequences of action – seen clearly if striking tightly packed billiard balls – was 
unknowable and particularly so when dealing with humans rather than objects. By 
doing this I think I was trying to act ethically given how my thinking has been 
changed by my work on this doctoral programme. By which I mean that my 
appreciation of complexity has led to me being very sceptical about the predictability 
of outcomes involving interactions between many people.  
 
After my presentation there followed a number of questions relating to it. The 
question I remember most clearly was from Pamela who asked me what I thought the 
biggest challenge to the change was. I remember replying that I thought that it would 
be ourselves, that when things became difficult or challenging as the changes 
progressed, would the senior team and the board be able to continue with the change? 
I think what I was pointing to here was my recognition that unpredictability and 
ambiguity often lead to people feeling anxious and the change that was being 
proposed would inevitably lead to an increase in ambiguity for those involved. The 
rest of the interview was a series of requests from the interview panel for examples 
from my previous work experience set against the chosen competencies. In my 
application form and in the interview, I chose to give examples that showed me as 
being capable of managing large-scale change programmes. I chose examples from 
my work in the UK Border Agency and in the Prison Service when I had led or played 
a large part in leading such change. In the telling of the story of my experiences I 
minimised the problems that had occurred in my previous work except where I could 
demonstrate how my actions had solved the problems. I also told the stories as if it 
were my actions or my leadership that had caused the successful completion of the 
work. I did this because I had been in interview situations where applicants had not 
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been successful because they could not demonstrate their positive personal impact. 
Barbara specifically asked what role I had played in these examples I was giving and I 
said that I had played a programme leadership role, which was true in that my job title 
was indicative of programme leadership, but I was aware of giving the impression 
that I was individually delivering the work rather than it being a collaborative effort 
of lots of people, which is how I really thought about it. I felt that any other answer 
would have reduced my chances of getting the job. In all of my conversations I have 
gotten a strong sense that they were looking for a project leader and in my application 
and my interview I tried to talk about myself in a way that give that impression. I 
wasn’t lying as such, because I had indeed led change programmes in the way I was 
describing. It was more that I was aware that I was choosing to emphasise my actions, 
and diminishing those of others, according to what I was perceiving that the interview 
panel wanted. The interview ended with me being given a chance to ask any questions 
I might have. I explained that as I had been close to how the job had been created I 
didn’t need to clarify anything. What I was feeling was that this seemed like one of 
those questions that have to be asked of all candidates where, as interviewers, we ask 
it without really thinking about why. I was thanked for taking part in the interview 
and I was shown out of the room. I later found out that I had been successful and was 
offered the job. 
 
Making Sense of my Interview Experience 
 
In this narrative I am clearly colluding with what I perceive to be the expectations of 
Barbara and Michael. I feel that if I had been completely open about my views in my 
interview I would stand no chance of getting the job and therefore limit my own 
influence in the ongoing change process and earn less money. In this collusion, if I 
had said things that I think aren’t necessarily true, I would be challenged by my own 
measurement of what I deem to be ethical behaviour. I found myself trying to walk a 
line of being ethical and telling the interview panel what I thought they wanted to 
hear. I was attempting to sense what the interviewers were expecting in my answers 
and adapting my responses accordingly. Whilst never saying anything that was untrue 




The interview process went much as I expected and matched my experience of both 
interviewing and being interviewed. Whilst the actual detail of the conversation could 
not be predicted, the pattern of the process of panel questions followed by candidate 
answer – where the expectation is to explain what one has done previously and why it 
was successful because of your actions – was very familiar from my work in this 
NGO organisation and in the UK public sector. I felt unable to have the type of 
conversation I would have liked to have had with the interview panel because it 
would have meant me challenging the interview process and perhaps endangering the 
panel’s ability to make what they would probably describe as a fair and equitable 
comparison of my ability with that of the other applicants. As a consequence, I was 
having to make choices about what I could and couldn’t say and still be considered a 
suitable candidate for the job. The process is fundamentally individualistic in that it 
wholly focuses on the actions of the individual applicant as if their historical 
performance was in isolation from their interactions with others. Assumptions of 
strategic choice theory and systems thinking necessitate the reduction of humans to 
individual objects of economic production. Honneth describes this reduction as the 
reification of people in which “selective interpretation of social facts can significantly 
reduce our attentiveness for meaningful circumstances in a given situation” (2005, 
p131). This helps me understand the suspension of my everyday identity in my 
experience of being escorted around the building. It is almost as if I cease to be the 
‘me’ that everyone knows and works with and instead become a faceless applicant for 
the job. An explanation for this may be that it is important for those making the 
decision, as they are able to make claims of fairness in their judgment of my 
performance at interview against others who they may not know as well. As a 
consequence, I felt it necessary to collude with this way of relating for the process to 
continue as expected. I refer to this as collusion because the process of relating is not 
formally pre-agreed or previously discussed, rather it has emerged from what people 
have interpreted as the appropriate way of conducting interviews at this particular 
organisation. 
 
After the announcement I received a number of congratulatory messages, including 
messages from unsuccessful applicants. It is clear that in these processes there are 
winners and losers. The stakes seem to be high for how our identities and 
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relationships are affected by the results of such processes. I think the stakes are almost 
as high for those that are doing the interviewing. They are making high profile and 
very visible choices in offering this job to me. Both Michael and Barbara have 
publicly stated how important this Vision 2020 change process is to them and they are 
both known to have been instrumental in its construction. As the successful applicant 
for this job I will play an important part in how the changes proceed and therefore by 
extension the responsibility for my success, or indeed my failure, in my future 
endeavours also reflects on Michael and Barbara. When the decision to give me the 
job was announced in an organisational newsletter the wording of the announcement 
was very carefully put together between Michael and Barbara. The text they chose 
made significant reference to my previous experience that I had put forward in the 
interview and that I had successfully led large-scale change in various other 
organisations. When changes to this text were suggested, Barbara was very clear that 
these references to my experience must remain. My interpretation of this was that it 
was a kind of public justification for her decision as well as a bid for why people 
should take me seriously in my new job, as others’ view of me will be important in 
my performance in this new role. The high stakes for all involved is perhaps an 
explanation for how they were behaving and why I felt I had to collude with them and 
the whole process before, during and after the interview. 
 
How job interviews are Described in my Organisation and the Underlying 
Assumptions 
 
At the organisation where I work there is a lot of guidance and policy on what to do 
when you are a manager intending to conduct job interviews to select a new member 
of staff. The guidance states that the process needs to support the organisation’s 
commitment to ensuring a diverse workforce and should be, transparent, timely, cost-
effective, equitable, and free from conflict of interest. The guidance goes on to 
suggest that if interviews are conducted in an unstructured way by untrained 
individuals they are likely to have very poor predictive validity and that in order to 
have any value they (interviews) should always be conducted by trained panel 
members (that is to say those that have learned the rules of the process), structured to 
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follow a previously agreed set of questions and exploring the various competencies 
the individual brings to the organisation which are essential to the role. 
 
The guidance also argues that presentations are a useful tool to gauge the level of 
understanding a candidate has of the role and to support the interviewers in exploring 
ideas and skills the candidate could bring to the role. Because of this guidance the 
process of the job interview is a highly organised set piece event underpinned by 
assumptions drawn from a cognitivist and realist perspective whereby job applicants 
are deemed to possess skill sets that can be revealed through questioning. There is 
also the assumption drawn from strategic choice theory that takes for granted that 
organisations are systems where the future state can be designed for optimal and 
predictable outcomes. Strategies are chosen as to their acceptability, feasibility and 
suitability or fit (Stacey, 2007). In such thinking people and their skill sets are 
considered a resource for, or input into, the organisational system and are selected in 
the same way. People’s capabilities are analysed through testing and consideration of 
past performance. These capabilities are then considered alongside the organisation’s 
competency frameworks that set out the various behaviours and competencies those 
who have designed the strategy deem appropriate to deliver it. In this way people are 
considered as individual objects of economic production for organisations (we can see 
this in the almost ubiquitous use of the term ‘Human Resources’ to identify the teams 
who work to produce and manage the policies and processes that dictate how people 
get into and out of the organisation and how they should act when they are there). 
These interviews will often involve the use of competency frameworks, psychometric 
tests and other presentational tests intended to draw out and understand the 
capabilities of individual job applicants. 
 
The guidance described above is drawn from literature such as Anderson and 
Shackleton (1993). They suggest that common weaknesses of interviews are; 
interviewers may ask questions designed to confirm initial impressions of candidates 
gained either before the interview or in its early stages; interviewers sometimes 
assume that particular characteristics are typical of members of a particular group; 
interviewers rate candidates as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in some aspects, and then replicate this 
judgement across the board, reaching unbalanced decisions; interviewers can allow 
the experience of interviewing one candidate to affect the way they interview others 
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who are seen later in the selection process; interviewers sometimes give preference to 
candidates they perceive as having a similar background, career history, personality or 
attitudes to themselves; and interviewers may make decisions on the basis of whether 
they personally like or dislike the candidate. 
 
They suggest that structuring the interview can help improve the ability to predict 
performance in the job and that a growing number of employers take this approach. A 
structured interview means that; questions are planned carefully before the interview; 
all candidates are asked the same questions; answers are scored using a rating system; 
and questions focus on the attributes and behaviours needed in the job.  
 
Asking the same questions of all candidates is likely to be in support of the idea of 
being able to compare and contrast the answers from each candidate and, therefore, 
make an objective judgement based on that analysis as to which candidate will 
perform best in the job in the future. However, in suggesting that interviewers ask all 
candidates the same questions it is inevitable that such interviews will follow a set 
pattern as determined by the interviewers, thus constraining the conversation between 
the interviewee and the interviewers. Also, because each candidate is different, the 
same question will necessarily have a different meaning for each person, leading to a 
necessarily different interaction. As a consequence, the intended aim of consistency or 
standardization of the interviews becomes impossible and meaningless. That is to say 
that the aim of obtaining standardized and comparable responses from all candidates 
to compare and contrast them is impossible because each individual candidate can 
only respond from their own unique experience and perspective. In addition, an 
individual’s future performance must also depend on the nature of how that individual 
and many others relate to each other in getting the work done and yet there is no 
reference to such interdependence. 
 
The guidance on job interviewing described above is more or less common to all of 
the organisations in which I have worked in the UK in both the public and third 
sector. However, I find the abstracted impression that these interviews give of a 
method of standardizing responses from candidates, as if it is comparable evidence, 
highly problematic. In many discussions about the interview process with colleagues 
over the years I have noticed people expressing concern that the formulaic way in 
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which interviews are conducted enables those being interviewed to perform well at 
interview by learning the rules of interviewing and that such a good performance does 
not mean that they are the best person for the job. I note here that even though people 
can call the process into question there remains a belief that it is possible, if we could 
only get the process right, to predict an individual’s future performance and select the 
right person for the job.  
 
Notions of Rationality and Bias Against Bias in Literature on Job Interviews  
 
A simple search for literature relating to job interviews produces a plethora of results 
relating to different aspects of the interview process. Much of the literature is in the 
shape of advice on how best to prepare for and perform at interview to successfully 
get the job for which you are applying, or advice for employers in finding the right 
employee. It will often take the form of an explication of some research and then in 
extrapolating that research, an offer of advice to interviewees or interviewers, usually 
as a number of steps to be followed to improve the chances of successful 
employment. Barnett (2008) offers a typical example of such literature in which 
employers are given five steps of advice for achieving successful outcomes in 
interviews. These steps include reversing the process to give an applicant an 
opportunity to learn about the organisation rather than the interviewer interrogating 
the applicant; predefining the capabilities you are looking for and designing tests to 
enable the applicant to demonstrate those capabilities; using psychometrics as they 
“provide objective, scientific data about a candidate and can help to predict how that 
person will perform in a given situation” (ibid, p39); and including research tasks in 
the interview process which are described as an opportunity for applicants to 
demonstrate how well they can research a topic and communicate their findings. Step 
five is to assimilate the four previous steps into a selection centre to rigorously 
explore candidate’s capabilities to find the right candidate for the job. Tremayne et al 
(2007) describe a preparation day to support nurses in job applications. The 
preparation day consists of a combination of teaching nurses the theory of job 
interviewing aimed at underpinning the background, process and decision-making 
skills used when interviewing and enhancing the student’s knowledge and 
understanding of the process and its associated complexities and the acting out of 
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interview scenarios with a selection of different types of candidates being 
demonstrated by the teachers. Derous et al (2016) offer a theoretical framework in 
relation to interviews using dual process theory that “proposes that humans can be 
rational information processors, but are also fallible human beings whose decision-
making processes are influenced by heuristics and biases” (ibid, p91). In doing this 
they are suggesting that rational decisions are those that are made without the 
involvement of people’s feelings and preferences. 
 
A common theme of this literature is that bias against job applicants’ physical or 
perceived behavioural attributes on the part of the interviewer is unhelpful in 
objective decision making. That is to say, decisions that have overcome or set aside 
any potential bias of the interviewer are perceived as desirable and more likely to 
result in the successful employment of the ‘right’ candidate. That a ‘right’ candidate 
exists is a common assumption and, as explained above, much of it is in the shape of 
advice to employers in creating complicated processes to find this candidate and 
advice to applicants about how to give a successful performance at interview to 
persuade the employer that they are that applicant. In addition, increasing 
expectations of equal opportunities in society have subsequently been taken into UK 
law that then requires competition for jobs to be open to all. This has placed those 
doing the interviewing in the position of having to demonstrate that all candidates 
receive the same treatment. 
 
If we take up this way of thinking it is important that any factors such as unconscious 
bias that will get in the way of such a selection are designed out of the process. 
Underlying how people see decision-making in circumstances such as choosing 
someone to do a job using an interview process are two ways to understand the 
meaning of rationality. Stacey (2007, p151-152) points out that it is important to 
distinguish between a technical mode of rationality in which gathering the facts, 
generating options and making choices that satisfy the objective, and the second view 
of rationality that is about making decisions and acting in a way that seems sensible 
given the observable reality of the circumstances. In the former, irrationality is 
considered to be the making of judgments that cannot be substantiated by testing of 
objective facts, whereas in the latter, irrationality is making judgments and behaving 
in a way that is based on fantasy. This second sense of rationality allows for the 
 70 
involvement of emotion, ideology and cultural influences in decision-making whereas 
the first form of rationality does not. It is this former notion of rationality that I am 
suggesting is influencing the literature on job interviews that I have been describing. 
From the position of the human resource literature that I have been describing, the 
latter form of rationality would be deemed flawed, or perhaps even irrational, as it 
involves emotion and changeable cultural influences.  
 
As I have described in my narrative, I believe that emotion was an inevitable part of 
the job interview for me and I would argue that it would be impossible for anyone to 
be in any way separate from their emotional responses (although I recognise that 
people can be more or less aware of their own emotions). As Vedeler (2014) points 
out when describing the experiences of disabled job applicants at interview, emotional 
responses, such as anger in some instances, are present as people relate to each other 
in these high stakes situations. Vedeler argues that there are three kinds of story from 
the disabled person’s perspective that are discrimination, uncertainty and recognition. 
In arguing this position she puts these stories on a spectrum with discrimination and 
recognition at either end. Where discrimination occurs, applicants are seen as a 
disabled person rather than as individuals whereas recognition involves an assessment 
of the competence of the individual applicant. This provides an interesting point in 
that disabled candidates feel more recognized when their disability is set aside giving 
an indication as to the importance of treating applicants equally. Additionally, an 
interviewer’s ability to argue that they have not discriminated against someone with a 
disability is important given that it is illegal to do so. Williamson et al (1997) indicate 
that structured interviews are more likely to be defendable in court. If one takes the 
view that the validity of a job interview can be tested through how well the applicant 
performs in the job then there is also evidence that structured interviews are more 
valid than unstructured ones (Conway et al., 1995; Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994; Huffcutt 
& Woehr, 1999; Posthuma et al., 2002). Whilst I do not agree with this view, it may 
well be part of the commonly held cognitive and individualistic assumptions of 
employers. It is hardly surprising then that they would choose to structure their 
interview processes.  
 
Riviera (2012) looking at what she called elite firms suggests that the cultural 
background of interviewers and interviewees are also important in interview 
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situations with the suggestion that employers are more likely to hire job candidates 
with similar backgrounds to themselves. Judge and Higgins (2000) in their review of 
literature on job interviewers also found that similarity to the interviewer is an 
important factor for interviewees in getting the job with interviewers showing bias 
towards those most like themselves. Judge and Higgins (ibid, pp390-391) and Delery 
and Kacmar (1998) discuss something they call impression management as being a 
mediating factor in interviews. They describe this as being what an interviewee will 
do and say in an interview to give a favourable impression of themselves. Actions 
such as: entitlement – where an individual will take credit for past outcomes; 
enhancements – when someone attempts to persuade the interviewer of some positive 
or admirable qualities; and self promotion – when the applicant wants the interviewer 
to believe that they have a particularly high level of skill or ability that the interviewer 
is looking for. The authors describe impression management actions as tactics and 
whilst they recognise that an interview is a social process, they describe interactions 
between interviewers and interviewees as a process of sender-receiver communication 
in which individuals are choosing what to do and say to manage the impression they 
are making on others.  In considering the description of what I was doing in my 
narrative it could be described as impression management. There is no doubt that I 
wanted to make a favourable impression, surely to do otherwise when one is being 
interviewed for a job that one has applied for would be strange. However, it seems to 
me that how my and others’ actions were emerging in the interview process is much 
more complex than the description given here of impression management.  
 
Lunenburg (2010) recognizes the importance of the job interview as a selection 
process and suggests that the interview has a disproportionate amount of influence on 
hiring decisions given that, contrary to Conway et al., (1995); Huffcutt & Arthur, 
(1994); Huffcutt & Woehr, (1999); Posthuma et al., (2002), he suggests the job 
interview is a poor predictor of future performance of those hired.  
 
There is no doubt then that job interviews are very important in the decisions about 
who gets employed. The structuring of interview processes has emerged from the 
threat of legal challenge, well-intentioned attempts to remove bias against such things 
as race and disability, as well as an ongoing response to research into organisational 
psychology. Stacey (1997, pp152-153) suggests that human perception inevitably 
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involves interpretation and people cannot decide using a purely technically rational 
mode. As I reflect on my own experience I’m inclined to agree. I would further argue 
that assumptions that deciding in that way is possible have led to the emergence of a 
highly ordered and ritualized interview process that has resulted in restrictions as to 
what feels desirable, or even possible, in the job interview scenario for everyone 
involved.  
 
I am going to go on to suggest that interviews could be understood as performances in 
which the protagonists collude with one another in job interviews to maintain 
expected patterns of relating rather than them being the application of a technically 
rational process of employee selection. 
 
Interviews as Collusive Performances 
 
Irvine Goffman (1959) describes a process whereby individuals enter into a situation 
in which they interact with each other and put forward a partial projection of 
themselves. In doing so they set up a pattern of relating in which these projections 
must be maintained by all of the people involved. Not to maintain such a projection 
would risk the occurrence of what he calls a disruptive event that would cause the 
interaction to come to a confused and embarrassed halt and, consequently, the 
participants would find themselves in a situation and set of interactions that no longer 
fit with their definition of what was expected to happen. He goes on to say that the 
cause of this move away from the expected becomes situated in the individual who 
fails to maintain the expected projection of themselves resulting in the potential for 
that individual to feel shame and others to feel uncomfortable and hostile towards that 
individual (ibid, pp23-24). 
 
 When we are in situations where we find ourselves relating to others, it seems that 
there is a form of performance going on in which we all collude in our participation, 
to avoid the discomfort of such disruptive events. Goffman’s description of these 
interactions that he describes as “minute social systems” has strong echoes for me of 
Mead’s (1938) description of social objects that I described at length in project two, 
albeit I would suggest that Goffman is operating from assumptions of a systems 
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perspective in which interactions are between autonomous individuals in a bounded 
situation. For Mead, the social object is a situation where the actors are only able to 
take part if they can take the attitude of the other. In the case of the job interview, we 
can only be an interviewee if we can take the attitude of the interviewer and we can 
only be an interviewer if we can take the attitude of an interviewee. Mead suggests 
that in our interactions we engage through significant symbols. A symbol becomes 
significant when we call out in ourselves what we are calling out in others in an 
anticipatory and adaptive exchange. This means that we are creating the feeling in 
ourselves as a stimulus for how we want others to respond (Mead, 1934, pp71-72). In 
doing this we are taking the attitude of the other although given that we are all 
different, we could never feel exactly the same thing. Therefore, Mead is offering a 
more interdependent view of how people interact because for Mead the meaning of 
the gesture is in the response of the other. Mead’s social object would go beyond that 
of only the interview situation, it would incorporate the interactions between people 
leading up to and after the interview, including in my case the application process, 
being escorted to and from the interview room and the announcement of the results of 
the interviews afterwards. 
 
It appears then that there are some situations in which we participate where the 
expectations of what we are to do seem predefined. I am proposing that such a 
situation is the job interview, especially where interviews are structured the way I 
have described earlier. Prior to my interview I worked extensively with both Michael 
and Barbara, my interactions with them had become socially easy and friendly. 
However, in the interview situation and setting, the relationships between participants 
felt different. They were stilted, and characterized by a turn taking pattern where 
question followed answer and each interviewer participated in a seemingly 
predetermined manner. It was clear that the interviewers were following the guidance 
I have described above, and I imagined they were doing this in the belief that this was 
the best way to find out who should get the job whilst also following the rules.  
 
Goffman describes well how this led me to feel, “When an actor takes on an 
established social role usually he finds that a particular front has already been 
established for it. Whether his acquisition of the role was primarily motivated by a 
desire to perform the given task or by a desire to maintain the corresponding front, the 
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actor will find that he must do both” (Goffman, 1959, p37). Goffman is pointing here 
to individuals playing roles within a given context for which they must adopt a 
particular front. By that I take his meaning to be that an individual will present a 
version of themselves that fits with the social system in Goffman’s terms, or the social 
object in Mead’s terms, in which he or she is engaged. The social object of the job 
interview is well established and the expectation of those involved is that the 
interviewee will play his or her part. This is perhaps something of an explanation as to 
why I felt unable to have the kind of exploratory conversation that I wanted with the 
interview panel, who held the power to manage how the interview should proceed. 
The front that I was expected to display had already been established and to fail to 
display that established front could have been perceived as a mis-performance and 
perhaps judged as such by the interview panel. This, given the high stakes of money 
and future work prospects I perceived were in play in my interview, was a risk I was 
unwilling or even perhaps unable to take. I say that I may have been unable to take it 
because of my experience of facilitating that I related in project two. In that example, 
when I attempted to change the dynamics of how we were relating together, there 
came a silence, a pause, during which it seemed people were unable to act, until 
someone said something or did something that brought us back into the expected and 
established ways of being together. As pointed out by Vedeler (2014), failure of the 
interviewee to do what is expected can lead to unpredictable emotional responses (in 
that case anger) from the interviewers. 
 
Goffman (1959, p43) explains that in circumstances where an individual performs in 
their professional capacity the choices that contribute to their performance will be 
those choices that support the individual’s professional identity. In the case of my 
interview I was keen to offer a view of me to the panel that matched their 
expectations of a competent change manager and leader. It follows from Goffman’s 
theory that had I taken the risk of attempting to shift the conversation to move away 
from the established expectations of the job interview, then I may have risked being 
identified as incompetent. Whilst I am drawing on Goffman’s work in understanding 
my experience at a job interview and its distinctively structured set of expectations, 
behaving out of the norm of what is expected in many other social and work situations 
may also result in the risk of being judged negatively by others, such as the 
facilitation event I described in project two. 
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Goffman (1959, p80) uses the analogy of a wrestling match to describe how a 
relational process can be prescribed and obey pre-set rules and yet within that 
prescribed process there is expression and movement that does not come from the 
rules and needs to be improvised by those involved moment to moment. This seems to 
me to be the same phenomenon that I am describing that takes place in the job 
interview. The process in which the participants are acting is pre-set and tightly 
planned and yet it is necessary for those involved to improvise their specific gestures 
and responses to all play their part and present a version of themselves that suits the 
situation as it emerges. Goffman (1959) points to a necessary distance between the 
performer and the audience in that the performer is presenting a version of themselves 
with which the audience must collude. He suggests that the nature of this 
improvisation in specific contexts allows the performers space to decide for 
themselves what they choose to say and do. This enables each performer to decide for 
themselves what to include and what to leave out of their performance to present the 
partial version of themselves that they wish to convey. He further asserts that the 
audience, “in awe of the performer”, allows this partial performance through which 
the performer avoids any shame related to a fuller disclosure of themselves (ibid, 
p76). As I have argued in project two, shame is a social process and the anticipation 
of any shame is likely to be shared in the group. I would therefore add that even if 
there was awe of the performer, the felt potential for shame in the group is also a 
motivator for the audience to collude with the performer’s partial disclosure. This 
suggests that any collusion, or impression management, that is going on is not just 
about fulfilling individual interests, it is also about emotions and relationships. By this 
I mean that the emotion of shame is a social process and is felt in our relationships 
with others. The anticipation of the discomfort of shame for all involved is a strong 
motivation for collusion. 
 
If we take up this idea in relation to the interview described in my narrative I would 
suggest that myself, Barbara, Michael and Pamela were all performers and audiences 
for each other at the same time. We were all presenting a version of ourselves that we 
deemed appropriate for the interview situation and other versions of our selves were 
necessarily concealed. As Goffman (1959) points out, should our performance be 
unsuccessful and other versions of ourselves were to be revealed we take the risk that 
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the expected process would not be followed with an ensuing risk of a sense of shame 
arising in one or more of us. This is very reminiscent of the description of the 
potential for shame arising from acting outside of expected interactions in the 
facilitated away-day that I described in project two. I would suggest that in this 
interview situation the stakes were even higher. The audience for our performance of 
a successful interview is not limited to the interviewers and me. The result will 
necessarily be communicated to others across the organisation who may also have a 
stake in who gets the job as it would affect their ongoing relationships with the 
applicants. Therefore, the panel and I are aware that our actions will be judged by 
others as to whether they were successful or not. This gives an explanation for 
Barbara’s insistence that a description of my experience was a vital part of the 
announcement to the organisation that I was being given the job.  
 
Simmel (1906) reinforces my understanding of how it is that when we enter into 
social interaction with others, we are able to take for granted certain aspects of those 
interactions. He describes how the objectification of culture has led to a situation 
whereby the level of knowledge about an individual needed in any given situation is 
limited by the known historical and traditional nature of the situation, 
 
The modern merchant who enters into a transaction with another, the scholar 
who undertakes an investigation with another, the leader of a political party 
who makes an agreement with the leader of another party with reference to an 
election, or the handling of a proposed bill – all these with exceptions and 
modifications that need not be further indicated, know, with reference to their 
associates, precisely what it is necessary to know for the purposes of the 
relationship in question. The traditions and institutions, the force of public 
opinion, and the circumscription of the situation, which unavoidably prejudice 
the individual, are so fixed and reliable that one only needs to know certain 
externalities with reference to the other in order to have the confidence 
necessary for the associated action (Ibid, pp450-451). 
 
As I’ve said previously, Goffman (1959) points to the need for participants to 
maintain an expected performance in such situations. Simmel explains that a mis-
performance not only risks shame, it also casts doubt on that which was presumed 
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known, this then challenges all other previous assumptions about the mis-performing 
participant. The utility of a successful, by which I mean expected or even collusive, 
performance within the social object of the job interview by the interviewee as well as 
the interviewers becomes very clear. Referring to my own performance in the 
interview described in the narrative above, the risk I felt in any attempt I might have 
made to change the style or content of the interview conversation, was the risk of a 
mis-performance and the potential for the loss of trust in my competence. This held 
the potential for the accompanying discomfort of having failed in my attempt at 
achieving promotion in the hierarchy with the result of feeling exposed as 
inadequately skilled for the job and risking shame for all involved. It seems then that 
not colluding with expected performances in job interviews, and social situations 
generally, comes with some considerable risk. 
 
So far in this section of the paper I have described the process of my job interview as 
being the complex interdependent performances of individuals. This resulted in a 
pattern of everyone involved behaving in the way they were expected to behave and 
doing as they were expected to because to not do so risked a mis-performance and a 
consequential breakdown of relationships between the participants, loss of trust 
between the participants and the potential for shame to arise in the group. This would 
also have risked me being deemed to be incompetent and not getting the job with the 
loss of the resultant increased income and status. 
 
Whilst I’ve found the work of Goffman and Simmel to be useful in understanding 
how the interplay of the participants in the interview could be seen as a form of 
performance I also found their explanation to be limited in that neither of them have 
helped me understand the history of how the process of the job interview has come 
about. As I described earlier it seems that organisations in attempting to contain bias 
and discrimination from job interviews and responding to the threat of legal challenge 
as a result of any discrimination have, over time, developed very tightly structured 
interview processes.  Historically, and in situations where these processes had not yet 
developed, jobs would have simply been given on the basis of pre-existing 
relationships through social networks, friendships or family contacts. I would suggest 
that to understand the nature of our collusion more fully we need to look carefully at 
how the traditions, norms and rules that shape that collusion have come about. 
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The Importance of History in the Emergence of Knowledge and Truth 
 
Norbert Elias’ description of a civilizing process (Elias, 2000) is helpful in explaining 
how our perceptions of what is appropriate change over time. Elias describes a 
process that took place in French society over many years in which behaviour and in 
turn identities changed as small societies became larger and eventually nation states 
were formed. In this process, differentiation of individual contributions to society 
took place and the level of interdependence was vastly increased. In turn, it was no 
longer acceptable for people to settle differences through violence and processes of 
law emerged through which use of violence was monopolized by the state. In this 
process, as individuals were born into this ever more complex and interdependent 
society, how to behave in the society gets taken for granted. Changes took place over 
time so that human functions relating to sexual reproduction and defecation that used 
to be acceptable in public were no longer so and were restricted to being performed in 
private within the family home. Elias describes how as people grew up in French 
society, these behavioural expectations became part of their identity. People learned 
who they were through their experience of growing up and acting into the situations 
they found themselves in, with the ensuing feelings of displeasure, shame and disgust 
as regulating factors of their behaviour (ibid, pp108-109). 
 
Elias is giving us an explanation here as to how over time we take as part of our own 
sense of self the expectations of society as to how we should behave. In the UK, what 
we now know as human resource functions grew out of increasing numbers of women 
entering the workplace during two world wars and the development of rules and 
regulations that were intended to morally protect women and children at work. By 
1945 the term personnel management had started to be used as employment policies 
began to be seen as influencing factors in productivity and output for organisations. 
The emerging profession of personnel management was seen as a bureaucratic one in 
developing and implementing such policies. In the 1960s and 1970s personnel 
techniques were developed which took up ideas from social sciences looking at 
motivation and organisational behaviour and specialisms began to develop alongside 
increasing uses of selection testing.  Around the mid 1980s the term ‘human resource 
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management’ arrived from the USA with the term human resources suggesting that 
people were an asset or resource for organisations, as if they were machines (CIPD, 
2016).  
 
It is from this increasing bureaucracy, and the taking up of assumptions from strategic 
choice theory and research in the social sciences, that the method of conducting job 
interviews has emerged. What I am taking from Elias is that over time assumptions 
such as thinking of people possessing cognitive skillsets, and as resources and assets 
of organisations, have been taken for granted and people coming into the HR 
profession unquestioningly accept them as true. They eventually form part of their 
identity as HR professionals. The HR professionals then design the interview 
structure and process that gets used by interviewers. This forms expectations as to 
how things should be done. Consequently, when people act outside of these 
expectations they not only risk the judgement of others but also a negative judgement 
from themselves towards themselves. In this way expectations of how people relate to 
each other and themselves emerge from their ongoing interaction. I propose that this 
is what is going on in the context of a job interview. Over time the way of doing 
interviews has become relatively fixed and to conduct interviews all involved must 
collude with one another in the rituals, rules and norms that govern them. To not do 
so risks us judging ourselves as well as others judging us. This again could lead to the 
experience of shame for those involved much in the way that I have described shame 
arising in groups in project two. 
 
Using the work of Elias, I am attempting to show how the highly ritualized process of 
the job interview as I experienced it in my narrative has come about. Over time, 
through processes of people relating to each other, patterns have arisen which have 
then been formalized into rules, advice and guidance of the sort I have described 
earlier. Those of us coming to the interview process at a later stage have no 
knowledge of the particular contexts that brought about these rules and advice, 
although as a social object we are very familiar with it. We must make our way 
through each situation by interpreting the rules, both formal and informal, as we 
encounter them in the contexts in which we find ourselves even though the specifics 
may well differ. Chevrier, (2009, pp77-89) points to the differences in HR culture and 
practice between France and the USA for instance. In this project I am describing my 
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experience in the context of an international NGO with its headquarters in the UK 
although it also corresponds to my experience in the UK public sector in central 
government. Both of these types of organisations with their histories rooted in UK 
culture are likely to have been subject to the emergence of the same set of 
expectations in dealing with people at work. This point about my experience relating 
to employment in the UK is important if we are to take seriously the idea that the 
patterning of how people relate together and what they assume to be true emerges 
from, and is inextricable from, their local context.  
 
The work of Ludwik Fleck (1979) and his description of what he called ‘thought 
collectives’ presents an argument for how people come to take up ideas from their 
specific context and regard them as taken for granted truths. Fleck was a 
microbiologist working during the first half of the 20th century. He introduces a 
theory of the sociology of knowledge in which he argues that knowledge evolves in 
groups of people. He uses the example of the changes in understanding of syphilis to 
show how what we call scientific fact comes about through the interaction of many 
actors within the scientific community. He puts forward the idea of thought 
collectives and thought styles as a way of understanding truth. He argues that 
knowledge is produced through a social process within a thought collective that will 
have its own thought style. Fleck notes that the thought collective of scientists make 
claims for their truth being universal and social processes of enforcement are then 
used to criticize any argument that undermines their paradigm. Kuhn in his 
descriptive analysis of Fleck’s work argues that, “a thought style functions by 
constraining, inhibiting and determining the way of thinking. Under the influence of a 
thought style one cannot think in any other way” (Fleck, 1979, p160). It is clear that 
Fleck, in his description of the interactions between people in thought collectives and 
thought styles, was pointing at human power relating as being very important in the 
development and maintenance of knowledge and truth.  
 
I find the work of Fleck helpful in understanding how the socially dependent nature of 
knowledge and truth, maintained and policed through social processes of 
enforcement, makes thinking in any other way than that which I have described, very 
difficult. Taking up this idea and applying it to the context of job interviews 
necessitates that we all, either with or without awareness, collude with each other as 
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to what is taken for granted as true. We may do so unwittingly if we have taken up 
ideas relating to job interviews as part of our own understanding of truth and 
knowledge as played out in our interaction with others. If we do so with awareness it 
may be because even if we have become aware of such taken for granted ideas, and 
personally challenge the truth of them, we may need to act as if they are true to 
continue to participate with others and avoid the risk of shame and exclusion. The 
work of Simmel and Goffman support my understanding that this collusion then 
involves us performing appropriately together when participating in such interviews. 
To do otherwise would be to give an inadequate performance and risk the exposure of 
our collusion and the ensuing negative judgment of each other and ourselves.  
 
My Emerging Appreciation of Power 
 
What has become increasingly clear in my research so far is that power relating 
between people is an important aspect of what I am describing as collusion. The 
power to give me the job I was applying for and to promote me was in the hands of 
the interviewing panel and in the context of my interview it would be easy to see 
power in those circumstances as being applied by the powerful interview panel upon 
the powerless interviewees. However, the obedience of all of us to the process of the 
interview cannot be so easily explained.  
 
Michel Foucault as a social theorist was interested in what he described as 
disciplinary power and he suggests that the instruments of disciplinary power are 
surveillance and normalisation. In his work Foucault illustrated how techniques of 
disciplinary power emerged in institutions such as the army, hospitals, schools and the 
workplace in Europe. Foucault (1977) argues that the human body is disciplined and 
controlled to act in certain ways to show obedience. He was interested in how 
discursive practices produce individuals through disciplinary processes. Foucault 
describes discursive practices as historically and culturally specific sets of rules and 
norms. In discourse certain ways of speaking are legitimised that then regulate how 
people think and behave (ibid). In this process, power relating between people creates 
these discourses that then regulate what can be regarded as true. Power and 




This is reminiscent of how Elias (2000) describes the development of French society 
with individuals coming to be who they are over time as they take the expectations of 
society as part of their own sense of self. There are also echoes of how Fleck (1979) 
describes the socially dependent nature of knowledge and truth. I am coming to 
understand power to be an inherent part of people relating to each other and that 
through it, what we come to assume to be true emerges and is in a constant state of 
renewal and negotiation. My exploration of power relating has come quite late in this 
project three and as I move into project four I want to explore it further. 
 
Interviews as Participative Processes of Power Relating, Negotiation and Collusion 
Rather than Strategic Choices 
 
In summing up my argument in this project I am proposing that the job interview is a 
social object in which the participants take up assumptions about how to perform 
from their familiarity with that social object and in the micro interactions in the 
specific contexts in which they find themselves. These interactions then take the form 
of an improvised negotiation in which people seek to achieve a desired or agreed 
outcome whilst being constrained and enabled by their own and others’ assumptions 
and expectations about what is true which also show up in organisational rules and 
guidance, although the specific nature and content of such rules and guidance will be 
dependent upon how they have emerged in the particular context to which they 
pertain. This constraining and enabling leads to the necessity for people to collude 
with each other, with or without awareness, to maintain a social order and the 
impression of having made choices that could be justified to a wider audience through 
an explanation that appears to conform to the given guidance.  
 
As I have said earlier, I have noticed in my research the potential for this collusion to 
take place between people in the maintenance of ways of being together which is 
often outside of their awareness. That is to say that it is taken for granted. It seems to 
me that in my experience of the job interview process there has developed, over time, 
a legitimisation of the discourse of strategic choice and rational decision making that 
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makes any other discourse difficult. As a consequence, people are colluding with each 
other to give the impression of using a notion of technical rationality that calls for 
gathering the facts, generating options and making choices that satisfy the objective. 
At the same time they are employing a form of rationality that involves making 
decisions and acting in a way that seems sensible given the observable reality of the 
circumstances they find themselves in, which inevitably involves emotion, ideology 
and cultural influences.  
 
Mowles (2015) takes the position that there is nothing other than local interaction 
between people and changes occur in those paradoxically predictably unpredictable 
interactions that may maintain or change the wider social patterns of relating. Being 
able to act into situations such as the job interview requires the participants to be able 
to make choices in their particular situations whilst navigating both the written and 
unwritten rules that set out how one is expected to behave. Stacey (2012, p107) 
suggests that it is possible to offer a competent performance by following rules and 
procedures and that an expert performance requires us to move beyond those rules 
and procedures. He argues that experts demonstrate the ability to exercise practical 
judgment. Such practical judgment is the ability to reflexively improvise in 
recognizing patterns of similarity and difference drawn from experience. In the 
example of my job interview I would argue that having been aware of how the 
patterns of relating, such as turn taking, were emerging along with my anticipation of 
what was expected of me, I was exercising practical judgment in sustaining the social 
object of the interview whilst making choices about how to respond to achieve my 
desired outcome (to get the job) and to stay true to what I believed. This practical 
judgement involved me understanding and paying attention to how the power 
relations between those involved was expected to play out. In getting the job, it is true 
that I have been promoted and earn more money. It is also true that I can maintain my 
involvement in an influential position as a process of change is embarked upon in my 
organisation. In colluding with others in performing the job interview whilst also 
introducing ideas of complexity into the conversation I would also argue that I was 
introducing the potential for novelty to arise as I, along with others, take this work 
into the future. 
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Looking Ahead to Project Four 
 
As I look towards project four I am increasingly noticing how my relationships with 
others are changing as I start to act into being the head of corporate change. Not only 
am I now having to think about how to apply to my work the many policies and rules 
and regulations that exist in my organisation, I also have to think about how I work 
with others to change those very rules and regulations to be more suitable for the 
desired future state of the organisation as described in what we call Vision 2020. All 
the while I am having to negotiate anew the many relationships I have from my new 
position which is a step up in the hierarchy. This new role involves me working much 
more closely with directors as part of their group even though I will not hold the 
formal position of a director. I will also have to work regularly with the board of 
trustees as another powerful group in deciding how we will work together in the 
future in my organisation. It remains to be seen how a programme of change will 
proceed. I am clear that I would prefer a process that paid attention to how people 
currently relate together across the organisation and brought people together in 
conversation as to how they might change. My assumption is that there will be many 
who hold expectations of a much more planned and conventional approach that 
involves the delivery of a pre-designed future state for the organisation. My intention 





Project Four: Attempting Change in a New Job, a Disciplining Experience 
 
In project three I wrote about my experience of being interviewed for a new job. I 
described how participants in the job interview seemed to be involved in a form of 
group performance that emerged from a combination of the formal rules of job 
interviewing (which had themselves emerged over time in the organisation where I 
work in response to how similar rules emerged across the UK) as well as our 
expectations of each other based on previous experience of interviewing and being 
interviewed. I described this process as a form of social object, an idea that I took 
from Mead (1934).  I experienced the interview process as a form of dance in which 
all participants are expected to perform their part. I drew on the work of Goffman 
(1959) and Simmel (1906) to demonstrate how a failure to perform as expected in the 
social object of the job interview would call into question the competence of that 
individual leading to the potential for shame emerging for those involved in the 
interviewing process. I went on to describe my experience of job interviews as being 
an example of what I am calling functional collusion. That is to say, for a successful 
performance of the social object, whether that social object is a facilitated event (such 
as I the one I described in project two) or a job interview, the participants are required 
to collude with one another in what they hold to be true and what they assume to 
know for them to go on relating together. However, the collusion I described in 
project two was outside of my awareness, while I was immersed in it, in that I was 
responding to my perception of the expectations of others involved as well as what I 
had come to know about facilitation from being involved in previous similar 
situations. Only on reflection after the event did I come to think of it as collusion in 
response to the anticipation of shame.  
 
In project three, as a consequence of reflecting on my experience in project two, I was 
much more aware of how my perception of the expectations of others and the formal 
rules were affecting my choices about how I might perform in the circumstances I 
found myself in. As I pointed out in project three, much of the literature and guidance 
on job interviews attempts to contain emotion, ideology and cultural differences in 
pursuit of fairness to all job applicants. It is my assertion that emotion and ideology 
are inevitably involved in relating between human bodies and such attempts to set 
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emotions aside are futile. In making judgements about how to perform we are part of 
the interdependent gestures and responses of everyone involved in the social object. 
 
Collusion and Power 
 
 In project three I argued that one of the functions of collusion in job interviews is to 
give the impression of certainty and predictability and reduce anxiety. Although I 
recognise that collusion may also happen to change things, I argued that functional 
collusion is a social phenomenon in which patterns of relating emerge over time as 
interdependent people interact with one another to maintain their ways of being 
together. Before and during the process of collusion there is no discussion, planning 
or even recognition of what is going on between those involved. In contrast, 
cooperation or conspiracy, imply some explicit recognition between the people 
involved about what they are trying to achieve.  
 
I understand that interpreting collusion in this way is different to how collusion is 
commonly understood. Popular discourse usually describes collusion in pejorative 
terms. Indeed, the Collins English dictionary describes collusion as, “a secret 
agreement for a fraudulent purpose”. Moral judgement underpins most views of 
collusion. Some researchers working in economics and organisational studies see 
collusion as an undesirable aspect of how companies work together to avoid 
competition or to fix prices, (Marx, 2017; Harrington, 2016; Roux and Thoni, 2015 
and Porter, 2005). These authors also assume that companies are entities in their own 
right and act with agency in relation to each other, which is very different to how I 
have been describing organisations. I would contest the idea that organisations could 
have any agency of their own. Since organisations cannot think or feel, they cannot 
have agency. 
 
Other writers describe collusion between individuals in organisations and similarly 
assume that people act collusively with awareness to game the system (Tirole, 1986 
and 1992; Laffont and Martimort, 2000; Kouroche, 2005). These authors are making 
collusion synonymous with corruption. In these examples the authors assume that 
collusion is a deliberate act between people for a specific purpose. This is quite 
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different to how I am describing it. I am arguing that organisations are imaginative 
constructs that enable and constrain how people interact with each other. Therefore, 
collusion cannot occur between organisations and can only occur between people in 
their local interactions. In addition, my definition of collusion is not as a deliberate act 
that has been discussed between people before they act. I am using the word collusion 
to point to an emergent pattern of relating between people of which they are often 
unaware.  
 
Some other authors recognise aspects of what I am describing as collusion. Bullough 
Jr et al (2004) describe a form of collusion that takes place in communities of practice 
to maintain power dynamics. Although they are working in an educational setting 
their work supports my argument that collusion involves an absence of reflection by 
people about how they are relating to each other. Working in a medical setting 
Atkinson and McNamara (2016) reference what they call unconscious collusion in the 
relationships between midwives and patients in the avoidance of discussing obesity. 
The authors don’t specify how they are using the word ‘unconscious’ but they 
describe such collusion as the use of evasive language that will minimize tension or 
distress without any form of prior agreement between the people involved. Although 
the authors describe a clinical setting, collusion through discourse is also part of what 
I am pointing to in an organisational context. In addition, I want to draw attention to 
the way Ashforth and Kreiner (2002) describe collusion as normalizing through the 
application of ritual. They describe how the performance of rituals and symbolic 
practices can minimize the experience of unwanted emotion and give momentum to a 
social process, 
 
Thus, rituals tend to serve expressive rather than instrumental functions—
although instrumental practices may well assume ritualistic overtones over 
time. Here, the term ‘‘ritualism’’ refers to the use of rituals (whether 
deliberate or otherwise) as a means of normalizing emotion. Normalizing is 
accomplished by fostering: (1) a sense of control or (2) a momentum of means 
(ibid, p224). 
 
They describe a similar phenomenon to that which I have described in project three in 
which participants in a particular social situation (they use the example of a funeral 
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parlour) collude with mutually acceptable performances to maintain a particular view 
of what’s going on. These authors assume that the individual and the social are 
separate and in their way of thinking an organisation is ascribed agency, which then 
acts upon the individual, 
 
Accordingly, organisations often fill a therapist-like role, exposing individuals 
to anxiety-producing stimuli, but under somewhat controlled conditions so as 
to elicit responses sanctioned by the organisation (ibid, p223). 
 
This then leads them to split the individual and organisation into levels in which one 
could consider whether the normalizing effect of rituals could be functional for the 
individual and/or the organisation, thus assuming a Kantian form of dialectic in which 
the paradox of the individual and the social forming and being formed by each other 
is collapsed into a both/and proposition. I have gone into more detail here because as 
Griffin (2002, pp5-6) explains, this splitting is common in theories of change. Whilst 
the authors describe how rituals may develop over time, the splitting of the individual 
and social and the reification of organisations allows for them the possibility that such 
normalizing could be instrumentalised by organisations as if they had agency. This 
reification is typical of how many authors write about change and organisational 
development (see Cummings and Cummings, 2014 as an example). It is common for 
authors to write about organisations as systems upon which one can act with tools and 
techniques. Most practitioners see organisational development as an approach to a 
total system and that an organisation is a sociotechnical system, (Warner Burke,1994, 
p13). More recently, organisational development writing and research has moved 
from a diagnostic perspective to a dialogic perspective in which power, politics, self-
organisation and emergence are recognized, but thinking of organisations as systems 
and an instrumentalist approach is retained (Bushe and Marshak, 2009). 
 
So, whilst there are similarities between how many other authors and I conceive of 
organisations and collusion, there are also clear differences. For me, splitting the 
individual and thinking of the social as a system doesn’t work as a social theory to 
explain how social patterns emerge from the interactions between people. As I argued 
earlier, the organisation is an imaginative construct, and organisations can have no 
agency of their own. Thinking in this way then directly challenges any suggestions 
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that normalization through the use of ritual could be instrumentalised or deliberately 
applied in the way that Ashforth and Kriener (2002) suggest. Any intervention by 
anyone involved could only be an attempt to influence the ongoing patterning of how 
people are relating in any given context. Such an attempt would be to try to disturb 
the already present ongoing patterns of relating and may have unpredictable results. 
When I describe the possibility for people being able to collude with or without 
awareness I am suggesting that people can be more or less aware of collusive patterns 
of relating that are occurring as they interact with others. This awareness then leads to 
the potential to improvise actions in an attempt to change the patterns of relating or 
alternatively to perform in such a way as to maintain the collusion. Such collusion 
would become conspiracy if it was made explicit through discussion between those 
involved and, therefore, there is significant pressure to keep quiet.  
 
Bullough Jr et al (2004), Atkinson and McNamara (2016) and Ashforth and Kreiner 
(2002) variously describe collusion as the absence of reflection between people 
relating to each other, the unconscious use of evasive language to minimize stress and 
anxiety and the minimizing of unwanted emotions through rituals and symbolic 
practices giving momentum to social processes. I would argue that these phenomena 
are also present in my description of functional collusion in organisations. I am 
arguing that people are unreflectively, and often unconsciously, using evasive 
language and taking up ritualistic and symbolic practices in processes of relating 
together to minimize distressing feelings and emotions. 
 
I want to be clear that my use of the terms conscious and unconscious in this project is 
not drawn from a psychoanalytical perspective in which the unconscious is part of a 
person’s internal world. Instead, I am taking the meaning of the word ‘unconscious’ 
from the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating. In this way of 
thinking, unconscious means the habitual and automatic gesture and response between 
people as physical bodies that is formed from their histories of relating together. 
People relate to one another in repetitive themes that are not discussed and are not 
understood by those involved in them unless they are able to reflexively discuss them. 
They then, without awareness, that is to say unconsciously, reiterate patterns of 
relating with the result that these patterns become stuck in rigid repetition leaving 
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little room for even small changes that may be amplified into new forms of relating 
(Stacey, 2003, pp141-142).  
 
If we were to imagine collusion as a form of game, then we may describe this 
potential for individual choice making as how much one might choose to play the 
game and how much one would choose to call it into question. Issues of power 
dynamics are important as to how much an individual can question the game. When 
the power dynamics of any situation are weighted in favour of any one person or 
grouping, then those members of the group without power have very little scope to 
make individual decisions if those in powerful positions don’t support it. Often, the 
only choice is to leave the group. If the power dynamics in a group are more or less 
equal then the scope for individual decision-making is greater for all involved with 
much less predictable outcomes (Elias, 1991, pp52-53). As I described in project 
three, the human body is disciplined and controlled to act in certain ways to show 
obedience, and discursive practices emerge as historically and culturally specific sets 
of rules and norms. In discourse, certain ways of speaking are legitimised that then 
constrain how people think and behave. All human relationships are a negotiation of 
power (Foucault, 1977). A person’s ability to influence patterns of relating by calling 
the game into question will be dependent on the power dynamics of the situation, an 
individual’s position in the group, and their ability to perform through improvising 
their performance in any given context. 
 
Narrative One: Attempting Not to Collude 
 
Since writing project three, I have started my new job as Head of Corporate Change.  
This puts me in the position of leading a major organisational change process aimed 
at large-scale changes in how work gets done, and how power is distributed across the 
organisation, as well as a reduction in the number of people employed. This change is 
described in the documentation as the delivery of a vision of a new global network 
that is digitally enabled and financially resilient. This documentation has emerged 
from many prior meetings between many senior managers in response to how they see 
the need for change in the organisation. In this new job I find myself working for a 
great deal of my time with the executive team of directors including the chief 
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executive. I also regularly report progress to the board of trustees of the charity.  What 
follows is a narrative drawn from my early experience in this job and especially from 
an experience of working with the directors and the board of trustees in discussion 
about how the change process might take place. 
 
In taking this job, I have also started participating in the ongoing relating between 
existing directors and trustees. Some of the meetings I participated in suggested that 
relationships between these groups were tense. Darren, the fundraising director, was 
in an ongoing dispute with the trustee who was chairing the fundraising committee 
about the fundraising strategy. At one meeting Barbara was describing an altercation 
between her, Darren and this trustee. Barbara was visibly upset as she recounted the 
argument. There had also been tension between some of the directors in the shifting of 
some people between departments. 
 
Into this set of tense relationships we were introducing the change programme across 
several work streams and the membership of those streams included senior managers 
from across the organisation. The changing shape of how the organisation worked had 
been emerging from these work streams in what felt like a haphazard manner at times. 
In board meetings and director’s meetings I sensed a growing frustration from others, 
both directors and trustees, because they were dissatisfied with the slow pace of 
change. They talked of wanting to see a more concrete description of the changes 
being proposed.  
 
During a coffee break at one particular board meeting one of the trustees suggested 
that I might find the work of John Kotter useful in thinking about how the change 
process might be managed.  In setting up the change programme I resisted the use of 
any models or processes that one would recognise from some of the classic authors on 
change: models such as Kotter’s eight steps to implementing successful change 
(1996) or Lewin’s unfreezing and freezing of organisational systems (1947). Lewin’s 
prescription for change offers a model whereby managers can apply force to 
counteract resistance and to unfreeze and freeze organisational processes and systems 
to make change possible and to make it stick.  Lewin takes a functionalist approach 
and conceives of social processes as fields upon which one can directly act. The 
reason I resisted using these kinds of models and prescriptions is that I am 
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uncomfortable with their underpinning assumptions of organisations as systems upon 
which managers can act in an instrumental and predictable way. In common with 
other authors writing about organisational development and change (as discussed 
above), both authors reify organisations and offer tools and techniques for changing 
them. As I described in project one, I also used to think about organisations in those 
terms. However, I now view organisations much more as imaginative constructs in 
people’s minds (Stacey, 2012, p60). Increasingly, as I reflect on my experience, I find 
Stacey’s assertion that it is impossible to do the designing, aligning or constructing of 
whole organisations much more convincing than I do the kind of models offered by 
Kotter and Lewin.  
 
Every time we had a board meeting I was expected to update the trustees on progress 
on the change programme that we called Vision 2020. Within this Vision 2020 
programme was the idea of movement towards becoming a global network. The aim 
was to have a more even share of power between the organisational entities that form 
it. In this way the whole organisation was to be reshaped from a centrally managed 
one into a network of peer entities. Updating and reporting to the board consisted of 
the preparation of a paper or proposal, which was then reviewed at a preceding 
directors meeting before going to trustees to be considered at a board meeting. For the 
meeting I am going on to describe in this project I prepared just such a paper, also 
reviewed by Directors, in which I invited trustees to consider the implications of 
deliberately attempting to change the way power relating is managed across the 
organisation. I planned to have a session in which participants in the meeting would 
split into small groups to discuss the following question, “How do we manage the 
challenges arising from the power transitions involved in delivering a globally 
networked organisation?” This would be followed by a plenary session in which we 
would share the group discussions. 
 
The board meeting opened, as most meetings do in my organisation, with what is 
called a “reflection”. Usually this involves one of the participants offering some 
reflective thoughts, and these are often drawn from a biblical text. On this occasion 
one of the trustees used the text from 1 Corinthians 12 in which followers of God are 
all encouraged to see themselves as one body in God, indivisible, much as the parts of 
a body are indivisible. 
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The trustee then went on to suggest that our organisation as a body needs to learn 
from this reading and think of ourselves as a body where all parts are equal and yet 
diverse. There was no response to this reflection in the meeting, merely a period of 
quiet. There was no opportunity to discuss what it meant to think of the organisation 
in this way. In fact, I got a strong sense from the responses around me (people sat in 
silence, and bowed their heads as if in prayer) that to ask for such a discussion would 
be somehow disrespectful towards the speaker. The upshot was that no one else, 
including me, said anything and we accepted the reading and the reflection as was. 
 
For me there are clear systems assumptions in this way of thinking. The one body 
argument in which we all play a part seems to me to be a call for alignment and the 
sacrifice of the individual to the group. Due to the Christian nature of the 
organisation, and the customary process of these pre-meeting reflections, these 
assumptions seem to be taken up as true but for me they gloss over the power 
struggles that often take place between individuals in groups. I experience these 
reflections as a form of rhetoric that severely narrows any opportunity for reflexive 
discussion about whether it is even appropriate to require such individual submission. 
My experience of the board meeting that followed is that the expectations of unity set 
up by this rhetoric made explorative and potentially conflictual conversations 
difficult. The meeting was, for the most part, a tightly managed set piece as we went 
quickly through the many agenda items.  
 
I went on to facilitate the session that I had planned. My approach departed from the 
normal pattern, which is to present trustees with three options, outlining pros and 
cons, and ask them to discuss and choose between them. Instead, I invited them to 
have an open conversation in small groups and to consider how we might pursue the 
idea of sharing power across the different geographical groups that exist as part of the 
organisation.  
 
In setting up this conversation I offered my view that power is not something one 
possesses and one cannot therefore give it away. I suggested instead that power is a 
facet of all of our relationships and that renegotiating the power relationships across 
the organisation could not be done through a central plan devised by either me or 
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them as a group of trustees. I didn’t explain why I held that view because in such 
situations my own view, and the theoretical concepts that underpin it, seem so 
different to those around me that I felt any attempt to explain myself would flounder. 
I had hoped, and to some extent expected, that trustees would accept the task I had 
given them and co-operate with me.  
 
As I invited trustees to discuss these issues they seemed unsure as to how to proceed. 
One of them, Penelope, a director from a large manufacturing company, said she 
wasn’t sure what I was asking her to do. I said that I was inviting them into my 
thinking, that this conversation was intended to give them an opportunity to consider 
the implications of the idea of a global network and how we might make it happen. I 
got the impression that the trustees wanted something more familiar, something much 
more specific to consider and perhaps they wanted me to do the thinking for them. 
The groups had some discussions and in a plenary conversation the overall impression 
was that they wanted a more concrete proposal. They said that it was difficult for 
them to consider how they might respond to a global network until a firmer proposal 
in the form of some prototypes was in place. As a consequence of this conversation I 
undertook to develop some firmer proposals on what these prototypes might look like. 
I wondered, was this me colluding? I wanted to maintain a sense of exploration for 
this group and the executive directors, but kept feeling as if I was being forced to go 
away and prepare a model of the organisation as if it was a piece of machinery. In 
agreeing to do this I felt as though I was being disciplined into colluding with a way 
of thinking with which I didn’t agree. 
 
Whilst there seemed to be agreement across the trustees about the move to a global 
network in which power was more distributed, there seemed to be some 
dissatisfaction as to how I had presented the way forward. However, during lunch, 
immediately after my session, one of the trustees sat down next to me. He became 
quite animated and argued that we were focusing on the wrong things. He suggested 
that the move to a global network and discussions of power were a distraction from 
being more effective in eradicating poverty. I was curious as to why he hadn’t raised 
this point in the meeting but I found myself defending the change that was proposed. I 
argued that shifting power and reaching for more of a partnership way of working was 
a desirable thing to work for.  
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It seems that in the face of an apparently unanimous and publicly agreed narrative of 
the change programme this trustee didn’t feel able to voice his concerns in the 
meeting with the other trustees present. Perhaps this indicates his own assessment of 
his position of powerlessness in the group. That he was able to voice his concerns to 
me over lunch is also interesting in that it may indicate his perception that he might be 
able to influence the board through me. The idea of moving towards a globally 
networked organisation is clearly one of the themes patterning the discourse in this 
group that has somehow become publicly unarguable. My response in defence of the 
idea surprises me as I reflect on it. I am not personally wedded to the idea of a global 
network and his critique of it makes a lot of sense to me. However, coming so soon 
after the bruising encounter of my own session, perhaps I wasn’t interested in taking 
something up that might cause even more trouble. Also, to cast doubt on the 
programme of change is to potentially cast doubt on my own role in it, something I 
wasn’t ready to do. It seems that as a justification for my continued engagement in the 
process, the publicly unarguable nature of the proposed change also has a function for 
me in being able to close down the potentially conflictual conversation with this 
trustee, just as the other trustees had done with me in the meeting. 
 
At the other breaks and after dinner in the evening I felt detached from the 
conversations that went on. I saw people talking in groups of two and three and felt 
awkward at the idea of just joining any of them. I decided to go to bed early, more or 
less straight after dinner. In other circumstances I enjoy socializing over dinner and 
drinks so this was unusual behaviour for me. I’ll say more about this in the next 
section. 
 
The next day the directors met to consider the outcomes of the board meeting. In this 
meeting Barbara, the CEO, said that she thought that the chair of the board was losing 
patience with the vagueness of our proposal for a global network (I privately 
responded to this as a rebuke to me for not doing my job properly). She added that we 
must quickly move to more firm proposals. I felt ill at ease throughout this meeting. I 
felt a strong sense of responsibility for the change programme and defensive about the 
slow pace of progress that seemed to be the perception of others. Throughout this 
meeting I also perceived the conversation going on without me. I found it difficult to 
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know when to say something and when not to. At one point Sharon said that there had 
been little progress in how the work streams had developed and I responded quite 
strongly and argued that there had been clear progress on how we might change how 
we budget and plan projects that operate across the organisation. Neil, one of the 
directors, was chairing the meeting and he cut across me and moved the meeting to 
the next agenda item. Two other times I attempted to offer a view on the discussions 
in the meeting only to be cut off by Neil again. I felt belittled and excluded by Neil 
and the others. It was as if the disciplining process I experienced at the board meeting 
was still going on. 
 
The directors and I met again the following week and in this meeting Barbara 
facilitated a discussion to develop what she described as the prototype of the global 
network. We discussed how each entity might bring leverage to the network and the 
different contributions each might make. We also discussed the idea of a global 
council that might, in the future, provide the governance for the network. As we 
talked, Barbara drew a model on a flipchart with boxes and circles to denote an entity 
in the network, its contribution and its leverage. As this model developed I sensed a 
relief running through the group, people’s bodies seemed to become markedly more 
relaxed. I shared this relief that the need for a prototype seemed to be being served 
and I felt guilty that it was Barbara rather than me who facilitated the discussion that 
produced the prototype. On reflection I’m puzzled by why I felt relieved and guilty. 
Barbara had collapsed our thinking about how we might manage the dynamics of how 
people relate to each other into boxes and circles on a piece of paper and I might well 
have been angered by that. It has taken me sometime to understand why I wasn’t. It 
seems to me that, without being aware of it, I have taken up the pattern of conflict 
avoidance, in the board meeting, in the conversation over lunch between the trustee 
and me, and in this meeting with the directors. As a result, I was left feeling confused 
and unsure as to my ongoing contribution to the overall change process. 
 
An Analysis of the Narrative So Far 
 
I will add a further narrative later in this project but for now I will provide some 
reflexive analysis of the story so far. I have understood that what I was experiencing 
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was the disciplining process of joining the new groups of directors and board of 
trustees. My feelings of being inadequate may come from not knowing how to be in 
these circumstances. The board meeting took place over two days and an overnight 
stay. Rather than staying to talk and form political alliances with others after dinner, I 
chose to go to bed and avoid further discussions. I had a sense that I couldn’t trust 
myself to have any conversations with directors and trustees without unwittingly 
committing a ‘faux pas’ of some kind. I felt a lot of responsibility to get things done 
and ended up feeling inadequate when things were not moving fast enough. I know 
that I cannot be solely responsible for how things emerge from the interactions 
between many people at different times and in different places and yet I found myself 
feeling that way. This has echoes of how Foucault (1982) describes the disciplining 
effect of discourse. It seemed that if I were to make a plea for others to recognise the 
complexity of what we were trying to achieve, it would in some way be construed as 
an attempt by me to avoid my proper responsibility and that I must collude with the 
relatively simplistic, individualistic and overly optimistic views of how things get 
done.  
 
In my participation in the board meeting I was making judgements about when to 
challenge the assumptions we were making and when to compromise and go along 
with them. I often felt that I lacked the confidence in myself to be able to challenge 
any existing assumptions that I perceived and in response to the disciplining processes 
going on in my relationships with these people, I didn’t have the power and influence 
to be able to adequately argue my position. 
 
I am reminded of my description in project one of when I presented to a board the 
Burke Litwin model (1992) as the basis upon which I had understood the findings of 
my review of a particular division. I drew attention to the suggested positive strategic 
impact that aligned leadership, organisational culture, and mission and strategy can 
have on an organisation. I then went on to explain how these factors were misaligned 
in the division under review and gave suggestions as to how changes in leadership 
would be likely to lead to improved performance. The use of the model had the 
desired effect in the group and was met with acceptance and nods and smiles from the 
person chairing the meeting. It is clear to me now that I was using the model to 
manage my own anxiety about the impact of my work and to call upon symbolic 
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power (Bourdieu, 1992, pp163-183) to improve my position relative to others in this 
meeting through which I could be experienced as knowledgeable and therefore right 
in my assessment and proposals for change. I was clearly unconsciously colluding 
with this group in using the model to support me politically and practically in my 
work in a situation where ideas of management control were taken for granted.  
 
As I explain below, I have come to understand power to be an inherent part of people 
relating to each other through which what we understand to be true emerges, changes 
or is maintained. As a consequence, I would describe what was happening in the 
narrative about the review quite differently now to how I would have understood it as 
I was writing project one. In that short narrative I now see my responses to the 
challenge of how to present the findings in my review as being disciplined by my 
understanding of what was expected of me by the group to which I was responding. 
Even at that time I was sceptical about the systems perspective that was inherent in 
the model I was using but my sense was that such a reality was taken for granted by 
those to whom I was presenting. Therefore, in using it I was taking up those ideas to 
win favour. As the chair nodded and smiled I felt immediate relief and confidence. I 
wanted to be accepted by those who I saw as holding the power in that group and the 
use of the Burke Litwin model helped me to achieve that. It was this kind of collusion 
that I see that I was trying to avoid in the board meeting. 
 
What I was trying to do instead was to draw attention to the challenges that we were 
facing and invite exploration into what should be done in response to them. I thought 
it would be unethical for me to make a claim to the symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1989) 
that comes from using organisational models given that I was aware of the collusion 
that would involve. Bourdieu argues that, 
 
symbols are the instruments par excellence of social integration: as 
instruments of knowledge and communication…they make it possible for 
there to be a consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of 
the social order (ibid, p166).  
 
As a consequence of choosing not to collude I couldn’t benefit from the relief and 
confidence that may have come from doing so. In not colluding I was also calling into 
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question the social order; the unspoken consensus; the apparent truth of how to 
behave in such meetings. What I am describing here is indicative of how my thinking 
has changed as I have come to understand power differently and that truth and 
knowledge are historically and socially dependent. Foucault describes well how 
power, knowledge and truth are intertwined, 
 
Truth isn’t outside power… Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only 
by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of 
power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics of truth’; that 
is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true, the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned… the status of those who 
are charged with saying what counts is true (Foucault, 1980, p131).  
 
Relating this to my narrative, in my choice not to use the well-known models of 
change management that privilege individualistic and systems perspectives, I am 
forfeiting my claim to knowledge given that such perspectives are assumed to be true, 
appropriate and professional in the context that I am in at work. Perhaps, in not 
colluding I was also trying to change the way people think about power by my 
description of it as a process. However, I was carrying out this political act without 
having invested time and effort in forming alliances and building trust with those with 
whom I was working.  
 
I am persuaded by Elias’ (2000) argument that my identity has been formed by my 
own social experience, which would include assumptions of the truth of such 
perspectives.  It’s understandable that I would feel incompetent given that the 
individualistic and systemic assumptions will also be part of my own identity in this 
social context. In other contexts, such as the DMan group with its habitus of reflective 
inquiry, I would feel much more confident in putting forward my viewpoint about 
power and teasing out the assumptions. The work of Bourdieu and his description of 
habitus helps me to understand the process of identity formation and will assist me in 
explaining why my identity is different at work as opposed to within the DMan 
community, the consequences of this, and what this reveals about collusion. 
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Bourdieu: Habitus and Implicit Collusion 
 
Bourdieu’s (1990, pp52-65) idea of habitus is helpful in understanding that the 
individual and the social are paradoxically forming and being formed by each other in 
the “internalization of externality and the externalization of internality” (Wacquant, 
2016, p65). This forming of the individual identity involves the patterns of relating in 
society becoming imprinted upon the person and shows up in how people think, feel 
and act as they respond to their environment and the enabling constraints they 
experience (ibid). There are echoes here then of the paradoxical forming and being 
formed by our social experience as described by Mead (1934) that I described in 
project two and the civilizing process described by Elias (2000) that I took up in 
project three. From the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating there 
is nothing going on in social life other than bodies relating to each other. If we take 
that perspective when thinking about Bourdieu’s habitus, even though he sees the 
individual and the social as being separate phenomena which are dialectically related 
rather than paradoxical, it helps us to understand how bodies physically take on the 
patterns of relating that they experience in their social environment which are then 
reproduced (although never in exactly the same way) in continuing interaction. 
 
For Bourdieu (2000) the forming of who we are through our social experience of 
groups is a thoroughly bodily experience. He argues that through a disciplining 
process exerted through emotional, psychological and even physical suffering, our 
very bodies are imprinted with the habitus in which we become who we are. Bourdieu 
is suggesting here that we are conditioned, as we are brought up, to act appropriately, 
to act in accordance with a habitus that is also continuously being formed and 
performed by us, and those around us. Bourdieu makes it clear that this conditioning 
is a bodily process and he likens it to the mutilation and scarification of tattoos. This 
tattooing metaphor gives a sense of permanence that I find problematic as I see 
identity formation as a more dynamic and plastic process. Nonetheless, I think the 
argument that we bodily become the habitus in which we participate still works.  
 
Bourdieu describes our participation and maintenance of the habitus as implicit 
collusion. This is how I see the process that I am experiencing at work and which I 
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have also described as functional collusion. A way of being together that is taken for 
granted, 
 
Habitus is the basis of an implicit collusion among all the agents who are 
produced of similar conditions and conditionings, and also offer practical 
experience of the transcendence of the group, of its ways of being and doing, 
each agent finding in the conduct of all of his peers the ratification and 
legitimation (‘the done thing’) of his own conduct, which, in return, ratifies 
and, if need be, rectify, the conduct of the others.  This collusion, an 
immediate agreement in ways of judging and acting which does not 
presuppose either the communication of consciousness, still less a contractual 
decision, is the basis of the practical mutual understanding, the paradigms of 
which might be the one established between members of the same team, or, 
despite the antagonism, all the players engaged in a game (Bourdieu, 2000, 
p145). 
 
Reflecting on my own experience helps me to make sense of what Bourdieu is saying. 
In project one I described a series of events that led to the resignation of a senior 
home office Minister in the UK. The assumptions about leadership and management 
pertaining to those events meant that the Minister was expected to be in full control of 
what was going on in his department. Given these assumptions, when the Minister 
said something that turned out to be untrue in Parliament, he must either have been 
incompetent or lying. The truth of what was going on was that a complex set of events 
was emerging from a huge number of interactions between people across many 
geographical areas in which, what people knew and did not know, was changing 
moment by moment. However, if the Minister were to point to what was actually 
going on, and the difficulties involved in knowing what was happening in such a 
dynamic situation, it could only have been judged both by others and by himself that 
he wasn’t in control. Indeed, if what I am arguing about people being formed by (and 
forming) the habitus holds true, then the Minister could well have felt incompetent 
and that he should have had control. As I was involved in these events, and have been 
involved in many similar smaller events relating to managing and being managed in 
the past, I have been formed by my experience and it’s unsurprising that I have taken 
up these assumptions about what it is to lead and manage others. Therefore, the 
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expectation I have come to have of myself is that I should be in control of the 
outcomes for which I am held responsible.  
 
Bourdieu argues that emotions are integral to people’s responses and actions as they 
are shaped and directed by the habitus (Emirbayer and Goldberg, 2005). Vince and 
Voronov (2012) suggest that it is important that studies of institutional work 
recognise the importance of emotions. I would agree in that how I was feeling when 
engaging with directors and the board of trustees had a great deal of influence on my 
choices about how to act in those groups. My wish to belong to these groups whilst 
also being asked, through my contract of employment, to consider ways to transform 
these groups, and how they relate to each other, left me feeling conflicted about how 
to act. If I take the view that there is nothing going on other than local relating 
between people, habitus can only show up in the processes of relating that take place 
in what Griffin (2002) calls the living present. As human beings we are “continually 
constructing the future on the basis of the enabling constraints developed over time as 
our past” (ibid, p184). In project two I argued that shame was an individually 
experienced social process and the anticipation of shame was a significant factor in 
the group of directors engaging in collusion to avoid such shame. It seems to me that 
my emotional response to what was going on in the narrative above was a defining 
factor as to how enabled and constrained I was in my actions. I will go on now to 
discuss feelings and emotions and how I consider them to be important factors in how 
people are constrained and enabled in their relating together in organisations. 
 
Feelings and emotions as Emergent Social Processes 
 
Fineman (2000, p79) describes how the experience of emotion in organisations is 
influenced by the context of how people relate to each other at work. He suggests that 
emotion is important in how we define our work relationships, which people spend 
much of their time at work maintaining. Simpson and Marshall (2010) argue that 
emotion can be described as “dynamic relational practices that are part and parcel of 
the everyday social interactions of organisational members", that “arise in gestural 
conversations in which differences between intended meanings and perceived 
interpretations may come to be recognized by socially engaged selves” (ibid, p362). 
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Or, as Emirbayer and Goldberg (2005), drawing on Bourdieu, Dewey and Mead put 
it, 
 
…such transactions (collective action), which include social movements as 
well as the various institutional and extra-institutional forces with which they 
engage, always unfold within a context of transpersonal emotional 
investments, a collective-psychological context of action (ibid, p470). 
 
Burkitt (2014) points out that how we interpret our feelings as emotions depends on 
the context. He argues that how we interpret our bodily experiences depends on the 
circumstances we find ourselves in. By way of explanation as to the importance of 
context I would point to my physical experience of the session with trustees I have set 
out in the narrative above. As confusion in the group began to arise my heart rate 
quickened, my breathing became shallow, my gut tightened, and I could sense that my 
body was shaking. This is what I would call the uncomfortable and unwelcome 
experience of panic and shame in those circumstances. However, if I was seated on a 
roller coaster and was about to set off at high speed I may feel very similar physical 
experiences but there would be no sense of panic or shame, only the anticipation of a 
thrilling ride.  
 
Other authors support the idea that emotions in general, and shame in particular, is 
important in the maintenance of power relations at work. Creed et al (2014) suggest 
that communities at work are shaped by power and that what they call systemic 
shame, the sense of shame, and episodic shaming, are integral to sustaining them. 
Smith-Crowe and Warren suggest that shame is differentiated from guilt in that “one 
feels guilty about a specific behaviour rather than evaluating the global self 
negatively, while shame is elicited by transgressions for which the global self is 
blamed” (2014, pp4-5). This differentiation is aligned with how I described these 
emotions in project two. Smith-Crowe and Warren (ibid) further argue that shame and 
guilt along with embarrassment are self-directed moral emotions that indicate to those 
experiencing them that they have done wrong. I have described what I was feeling in 
my narrative as shame because it was not so much a feeling that I was ‘doing’ 
something wrong, rather, it was a sense that I was ‘being’ something wrong, that how 
I was performing my identity didn’t belong in that context. 
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These descriptions of the importance of emotions and how they are socially and 
contextually dependent is useful in understanding how, by not colluding with the 
usual ways of relating in the group of trustees and directors, I brought about the 
potential for shame, resulting from not knowing what to do, for me and everyone else 
involved. It is likely therefore that the group’s response to this possibility was to 
subtly exclude me and for me to exclude myself. Whilst no one specifically told me I 
had done anything wrong, it is clear to me now that I had not performed in a way that 
maintained the usual ways of relating and the power dynamics in this group.  This 
may well have introduced uncertainty and ambiguity into what might happen next in a 
way that may have led to emotional discomfort for the participants as it clearly did for 
me.  
 
In project three I described how in job interviews there is a perception that a 
separation exists between thinking and feeling and that to think rationally one has to 
remove feelings from the equation. Damasio (2000, pp40-41) challenges the idea that 
human choice making can be devoid of emotion. Through exploring the brain, and 
responses of people with brain damage, he argues that the areas of the brain that are 
responsible for rational decision making, that is making choices about what is 
appropriate to do in any given context, and emotional experience are physiologically 
intertwined. Damasio goes on to argue that feelings and emotions are essential to our 
ability as people to make sensible choices. He connects this with our ability to make 
ethical judgements. Damasio suggests that outside of our awareness the brain 
monitors and regulates how our organs such as the heart, lungs, gut, and muscles as 
well as the immune system, physically respond to stimuli. He calls these background 
feeling states and argues that such states unconsciously narrow down the options for 
us as we make choices about what to do. These feeling states are attached to learning 
experiences when the body perceives external objects such as a smell or someone’s 
face. When an individual experiences something similar to a previous experience, 
similar feeling states are roused that help them make sense of what is going on. 
Damasio distinguishes feelings from emotions in that he argues that emotions arise 
when such a background feeling state is connected with a particular mental image.  
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Burkitt (2014, pp78-99) recognizes Damasio’s contribution to understanding that 
reason and emotion can’t be separated but he suggests that Damasio uses a cognitive-
behavioural framework to understand feelings and emotions and as a consequence he 
artificially separates them. Burkitt also argues that Damasio, in attributing the genesis 
of emotions to the brain and body, misses the social and contextual nature of them. 
I’m inclined to agree with Burkitt. In the board meeting I was thinking that the panic 
and shame I was experiencing were as a consequence of my personal response when 
interacting with others and were arising from within my body. Of course, they were 
bodily experiences (of which I would be hard pushed to distinguish between feeling 
states and emotions) but I wasn’t paying attention to the paradoxical social process 
involved. I would argue that in the complex social gesture and response between me 
and the board of trustees as I was attempting to avoid collusion, confusion arose in the 
group as to what to do next.  This confusion led to panic in the group in the 
anticipation of shame because of my choosing not to collude. This deliberate mis-
performance by me in the social object of the board meeting, without having first 
made the political alliances necessary to take people along with me, led to a subtle 
collective disciplining process, involving feelings of shame, through which I became 
excluded from the group. This, I would suggest, is the disciplining social process that 
supports the maintenance of the status quo through requiring a form of implicit 
collusion.  It is this repetitive form of relating in organisational contexts that I am 
pointing to in the board meeting between directors and trustees that I am calling 
functional collusion. In maintaining the social object of the meeting, we needed to 
make improvisational choices about what we were doing in our micro interactions to 
maintain and recreate the overall pattern. The need for thinking about what we were 
doing whilst we were doing it was greatly reduced by familiarity with the process, and 
as a consequence the need to pay attention to our choices, as we improvised, was 
greatly reduced. This then points to the functionality of such collusion in minimizing 
the need for continually discussing what to do next, in maintaining social momentum 
and minimizing the possibility of uncomfortable feelings and emotions.  
 
As I prepared for the meeting with trustees my assumption was that as corporate head 
of change, part of my job was to raise issues that related to how we were thinking 
about how the organisation needed to change. In our discussions about a move to a 
globally networked organisation and a more global management and governance 
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structure it seemed to me that the trustees would want to discuss how this might affect 
their experience of working together. However, in inviting them to discuss this in a 
way that they didn’t expect I may well have unnecessarily caused higher levels of 
anxiety than I had intended that resulted in my partial exclusion from the group. On 
reflection, given that I was acting with some awareness of what I was doing, there are 
clear ethical considerations in making choices about how much I chose to collude or 
not to collude with this group.  
 
Ethics in the Living Present 
 
When we think about making ethical choices the phrase, ‘the ends justify the means’ 
often comes to mind. I take this phrase to mean that the ‘ends’ - the outcome one is 
trying to achieve justifies the ‘means’ - the method one is using to achieve them even 
if one has ethical reservations about those methods. Thinking in this way separates the 
means and the ends as a kind of before and after and as such there is an assumption 
that the present and the future are somehow separable and that one can deliberately 
create a future through planning and acting in the present. Stacey (2012) argues that 
this way of thinking involves a form of Kantian dialectic that I described above and 
represents the dominant discourse in organisations.  From this perspective the future 
can be predicted as an outcome of our current action, and is much aligned with the 
thinking that underpins the work of Kotter and Lewin that I discussed earlier.   
 
However, I would contest this view of ethics. Griffin (2002, pp169-170) argues that 
the future is perpetually being constructed in the ‘living present’ through the gestures 
and responses between people in local contexts. These gestures and responses form 
patterns around themes. Organisational themes are often framed around visions, 
values and cultures of organisations. Whilst these themes are often framed as global, 
they can only arise in local situations in the living present. This living present then is 
the moment-to-moment interaction between people in which understanding of the past 
and anticipation of the future is constructed; it cannot be comprehended as ‘now’ as it 
will always have just passed us as we try to understand it. The use of global themes 
then acts as an enabling constraint in sustaining or changing current power relations. 
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The outcome of these interactions can be relatively unknown. Current patterns of 
power relating may be maintained or they may change. 
 
If we take up this way of thinking about ethics, we can see that the idea of the ends 
justifying the means is a theme through which our local interaction is framed. We 
cannot really know the ‘ends’ so they can only really be a theme that shapes the 
‘means’. I am arguing that the ethics of taking action can only become apparent as the 
interactions play out in a social context. As Mead says, 
 
You do have to bring the end into your intention, into your attitude. You can at 
every stage of the act be acting with reference to the end: and you can embody 
the end in the steps that you are immediately taking. That is the difference 
between meaning well and having the right intentions. Of course, you cannot 
have the final result in your early steps of the act but you can at least state that 
act in terms of the conditions which you are meeting (1934, p383). 
 
In taking the idea of the living present seriously with regard to ethics I would argue 
that it becomes very important to pay attention to the themes that are at play in our 
local interactions that have arisen in our history and may be being reiterated without 
awareness. If I take this into my reflections on my earlier narrative I can see that there 
are competing goods at play for me. In bringing up power relating for the group of 
directors and trustees I was pointing to a theme that shapes their ongoing relating. In 
doing so in a way to which they are not accustomed, I was also asking them to relate 
to each other in a different way. This could be a good thing to do, as they have 
specifically referenced changing the way power is distributed in the organisation as 
something they want to do. However, in introducing the potential for novelty in the 
way they relate together I was also introducing the potential for the discomfort of 
panic and shame. In addition, I was risking being excluded from this group as a way 
for them to maintain their current patterns of relating.  My experience of this group so 
far has been that they focus intently on controlling the future through many plans and 
strategies attempting to control the income, expenditure and outcomes of the 
organisation. In their interactions, the idea of focusing on future predictable outcomes 
is an unalloyed good thing to do. In this way the future is split off from the past and 
the present.  
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What I am proposing is that we focus on the ethics involved in our relating together in 
the living present in which our understanding of the past and anticipation of the future 
shape our interaction. I am arguing that this cannot be collapsed into a set of 
proposals or list of ideal behaviours but needs to be a reflexive response to what is 
going on between us in the here and now. This does involve the risk of feelings of 
panic and shame arising as our identities are potentially changed as a consequence of 
emerging changes in power relating. 
 
If I take up this way of thinking in reflecting on Barbara’s actions as she drew up the 
prototype model I can see that the anxiety in the group was being alleviated in a 
number of ways. The directors were comfortable with Barbara taking the lead in the 
conversation as she is the chief executive and she often does so. In addition, in 
focusing on controlling the future using systems models Barbara is reiterating familiar 
themes of how the group relate to each other thereby reducing the potential for shame 
and panic. We can see that Barbara was acting in accordance with the accepted power 
dynamics in the group and making shared assumptions about the use of systemic 
models. I would argue that she was unconsciously colluding. In my own feelings of 
relief as Barbara took this action I can see that as a participant and member of this 
group I share the anticipation of discomfort that was being felt and enjoyed the relief 
of it becoming less likely. However, I felt an ongoing and different sense of disquiet 
as my role in the organisation is bound up with the idealized depiction of how I as an 
individual can instigate change. Yet, in this case my relief was as a consequence of us 
falling back into a form of functionally colluding with one another to maintain the 
status quo.  
 
When I have shared this narrative with other researchers in the DMan community 
they have pointed to how little I did to prepare the group for the session I was asking 
the trustees to participate in. In not doing much in the way of preparatory 
conversations with them, I was introducing a surprising novelty. They were expecting 
something familiar and I was withholding it. Stacey (2001, p158) argues that when 
anxiety is acute then great efforts are made to reiterate familiar patterns of relating 
with minimal variation. It’s not surprising then that the group would blame me for 
withholding the familiar and consequently I was subtly excluded, and I then went on 
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to exclude myself. In my narrative so far, my judgement has led to an outcome that I 
wasn’t seeking, my partial exclusion. I compounded this exclusion by not taking the 
opportunities that might have arisen to explain myself through participating in the 
informal conversations after dinner. As I have reflected on this with my colleagues on 
the DMan (and even as I write it here), I have felt shame at how I seem to have 
misjudged my approach to engaging with directors and trustees. How then might one 
be able to engage ethically with others in exploring the potential for change and the 
clear possibility for discomfort for those involved without being excluded? Mowles 
(2012) links ethics, as I have been describing them here, with what he calls practical 
judgment. The idea of practical judgement comes from the work of Aristotle on 
phronesis and has been taken up by a number of authors to describe the skill of 
dealing with contradictions and dilemmas in one’s ongoing relating with others, 




By using the phrase practical judgement, I am not suggesting that it is simply deciding 
what to do. Aristotle argued that there are three ways of thinking about knowledge. 
First there is episteme, which is a scientific way of knowing in which truth is an 
external and universal constant. The assumptions are that there are timeless laws and 
that the causality of phenomena can be discovered through experimentation. 
Secondly, there is techne, which is a mode of knowledge that comes about through 
the incremental process of learning such as in developing a craft or art. In this mode, 
knowledge is still context free and manifests as rules, principles and propositions.  
Thirdly, there is phronesis, which is a way of knowing that is action oriented, context 
dependent and pragmatic. Phronetic knowledge, which is the same as practical 
judgement, comes about through taking a reflective stance on experience. It cannot be 
taught through rules or principles because of its context dependence (Stacey, 2012, 
pp56-57; Hager, 2000; Doddington, 2013). Stacey (2012) argues that one can see the 
assumptions of episteme in systems thinking of wholes and parts and that techne 
assumptions show up in the instrumentalisation of organisational tools and models. 
However, Stacey does not argue for a splitting off or privileging of any one or other 
of these ways of knowing. Instead he suggests that managers in organisations may 
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well take up systems thinking or approaches involving tools and techniques as part of 
deciding what to do. He points to the social nature of making practical judgements in 
that it involves interdependent people inquiring into the patterns of relating in which 
people negotiate what is ethical. This is reminiscent of my description of the 
competing ‘goods’ that were at play in the narrative above as I was choosing how 
much to collude in minimizing anxiety and how much I was choosing not to collude 
in trying to raise awareness of the power dynamics as I worked with the directors and 
trustees. Gadamer (2004) suggests that practicing phronesis, 
 
…means that one distinguishes what should be done from what should not, it 
is not simply practical shrewdness and general cleverness. The distinction 
between what should and should not be done includes the distinction between 
the proper and the improper and thus presupposes a moral attitude, which it 
continues to develop (ibid, p21). 
 
In my narrative I was trying not to collude because I thought, and still think, that it is 
ethical to try to become aware of and to pay attention to the power relating that is 
going on between me and others as we decide what to do next. It is this awareness of 
power relating that gives us the opportunity to bring these ethical choices into play in 
our conversations. There are clear ethical choices in trying to change the power 
configurations in the organisation by changing the governance arrangements and 
trustees had already agreed that they wanted to explore that idea. However, for me to 
raise such issues with practical judgement in this situation would have meant being 
able to do so whilst minimizing the risk of being excluded and to maintain my place 
in the game, even if that meant colluding with concepts and models drawn from 
systems perspectives. I hadn’t played the game that directors and trustees were 
expecting. I introduced significant novelty without adequately preparing the ground 
and I lacked the symbolic and political capital to carry it off. As Bourdieu (1991), 
points out, “This solidarity between all the initiates, linked together by the same 
fundamental commitment to the game and its stakes…is never demonstrated so 
clearly as when the game itself is threatened” (ibid, p180).  
 
It’s clear to me now that my attempt to change the way the trustees and directors were 
used to relating to each other failed to recognise the importance of the game and their 
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investment in it. Consequently, taking seriously the notion that one’s identity is 
formed by one’s social experience, it was received as a misrecognition of their 
identity. Honneth (1995) argues that, 
 
The reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative for mutual 
recognition because one can develop practical relation to self only when one 
has learned to view oneself, from the normative perspective of one’s partners 
in interaction, as their social addressee (ibid, p93).  
 
I wasn’t paying sufficient attention to the routines of social recognition that were a 
part of this group relating together and I offered a clear threat to the ‘game’ that was 
in process.  It’s clear then that to maintain participation and to act with practical 
judgement, recognition of the participants in the game and their processes of relating 
is important. 
 
I find this understanding of what it means to exercise practical judgement helpful in 
my consideration of when to collude and when not to. Taking seriously the idea of the 
living present, and reflecting on the feelings and emotions that were involved for me 
and almost certainly for others, as I’ve said above, I think bringing an exploration of 
power relating into my conversation with the trustees was an important and ethical 
thing to do. Yet I can recognise that it is unhelpful and potentially self-defeating to 
refuse to take up models and tools that are accepted and expected to properly 
recognise others in our processes of social relating. To refuse to collude rigidly and 
without variation is likely to result in exclusion and a discontinuation of one’s 
participation and therefore one’s influence, if one is in a less powerful position in any 
given situation. Conversely, if one is in a powerful position it could result in 
something of a tyrannical expectation of people having to cope with extreme anxiety 
and uncomfortable emotions. As I will explore in the further narrative below, my 
experience suggests that if one can be sufficiently detached from one’s experiences 
they serve as ongoing data and opportunities for further reflexive interpretation and 
phronetic engagement with others. 
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Narrative Two: Relating with Practical Judgement 
 
After the board meeting I was feeling somewhat excluded from the group and to 
continue my participation at work I recognized the need to improve my relationships 
with the directors. A week or two after the events described in the above narrative I 
was in another, less formal, meeting with the directors in which Barbara wasn’t 
present. As I anticipated this meeting I saw that it might be a good opportunity to try 
to explain how I was feeling. On previous occasions I had been part of conversations 
with other directors when they had also voiced their frustration or confusion as to how 
things were going for them that sounded similar to how I was feeling. As we had 
previously discussed the idea of vulnerability (as I have described in project two) I 
took up that theme and explained to the group that I was feeling unsure about how to 
do my job and that I was struggling to understand how best to take forward the work 
of the change programme with Barbara and the board. This met with a sympathetic 
response from the group. Sharon explained that she often felt the same. Michael also 
said that he felt unsure because we were changing how we were working together in 
response to our new roles and relationships.  
 
Since that meeting Sharon and I have become much closer and I have been discussing 
with her how she is reshaping her department. I have also worked closely with Terry 
in developing a better approach to the digital changes we are making in the 
organisation with the result that I will now take up the leadership of that work for the 
group. Feeling encouraged by the response of the directors I also had a meeting with 
Barbara where I expressed to her how I was feeling unsure about how to proceed. We 
had a very open discussion in which she said that she wanted me to play a more active 
and visible role with the directors. She said that she had seen me do so in the previous 
work in developing cost reduction plans and felt that I had not been so visible since. I 
agreed with her and suggested that I would take the opportunity of resetting my 
annual objectives to reflect her request and that would give her the opportunity to 
hold me accountable for how I was responding. I have since taken up the model that 
was drawn up by Barbara and I have used it to support our conversations and 
documentation of how we expect to make the organisational changes we are wanting. 
In addition, where the opportunity arises I take the opportunity to explore with others 
my differing views about organisations. This occurred recently when a colleague from 
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Africa explicitly made system assumptions about the organisation. He was arguing 
that in a future shape of the organisation the different country offices around the 
world represented parts to the system of the organisation as a whole and that we were 
looking for a way for those parts to interact differently. In taking this up with him in a 
coffee break I was able have a discussion with him to explore those assumptions. At 
his request I have since sent him some of the literature I have been reading to further 
our interaction. In this way I hope to make some small impact on people’s flexibility 




What I am trying to demonstrate in this further narrative is the interchange between 
my research and my practice. In sharing and reflecting on my narrative, and using 
literature to further my understanding, I have been able to engage with others at work 
with a new awareness of what I was doing. In trying to be reflexively aware of the 
situation I was in and the power dynamics and themes that were shaping the 
interaction between the people around me, I was able to do something different. I was 
aware of the call on us as individuals to show our vulnerability as a theme that had 
developed in our relating. So I was responding to that theme in my gestures to the 
directors and was able to call out in them the appreciative and sympathetic response I 
was looking for as an act of mutual recognition. As I chose to play the game I was 
also offering, as far as I could, a true explanation for how I was feeling and keeping 
the means and ends in view in terms of taking an ethical approach to my relationships. 
I see what I was doing as being as open as I could to the potential for mutual 
recognition and transformation in the situations I was finding myself in with the other 
directors and Barbara. Bourdieu (1991, pp179-180) argues that when one is involved 
in the political game, to avoid being excluded one must develop a feel for the game 
and adhere to it without arousing surprise to be recognized by others as competent 
and trustworthy. It is this feel for the game that I can see that I lacked in my 
interactions with the directors and trustees early in my first narrative. I surprised the 
group with my actions and as a consequence lost their trust. In my further narrative, as 
a consequence of my research, I have tried to demonstrate that my practice has been 
changing and that I have been able to exercise practical judgement as I have 
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continued to go about my work and attempt to be reflexively aware of the situation I 
was in. I was trying to be aware of instances when I might or might not collude with 
awareness with the assumptions and themes that were patterning the discourse and 
doing so ethically in the living present. Although I recognise that due to the 
complexity of the themes that may be at play in any given situation, my awareness of 
them was likely to have been partial. I’m not suggesting here that what I have 
described in this project is some kind of linear learning process for me as an 
individual, although I have clearly learned along the way. It is entirely possible that in 
a different context at a different time I will find myself in similar difficulties again. 
Hopefully, through this process of research I will be better equipped to continue my 
work if that happens. 
 
Reflecting on my experience of the changing nature of my relationships with Barbara 
and the directors I would challenge Bourdieu’s (1990) suggestion that the body 
always reproduces its habitus. As Burkitt (2014, p118) points out, we are reflective 
individuals interacting with other reflective individuals who may subtly refract and 
deflect social values. He argues that although we are constrained by our bodily habits 
(habitus), through our reflective consciousness we can learn new bodily practices that 





As I embarked on this project I was starting a new job and keen to make a good 
impression on those around me. I was entering into new relationships and old 
relationships were being changed because of my new position. In previous projects I 
had been developing the idea of functional collusion as being the unconscious or 
conscious repetition of patterns of relating in the maintenance of existing power 
relations. In this project I have deepened my understanding of what I mean by 
collusion and how my understanding of it differs from other researchers using the 
same or similar terms. I have also provided an explanation as to what I mean when I 
describe it as functional as a means of maintaining predictability in current power 
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relations. I have also pointed out how my thinking differs from other authors writing 
about organisational development and change. 
 
The narrative I have explored was a meeting with trustees and directors in which the 
ways of relating had become repetitive and fairly fixed. In this project I have 
described how my actions in this board meeting, in trying to get the trustees to engage 
with each other in a different way by introducing a conversation about the power 
dynamics in the organisation, disrupted the expected ways of relating which led to 
confusion for trustees about what to do next. After managing to stumble through the 
process of the conversation I became partially excluded from the group. In subsequent 
meetings with directors this partial exclusion continued along with feelings of panic 
and shame. This was until the anxiety in the group was diminished by the chief 
executive bringing the group back to familiar patterns of relating with the 
development of a systems style model as was desired by the board of trustees. 
 
I went on to explore, through the work of Bourdieu, the concept of habitus and how 
our identity is formed through our social experience of habitus in our ongoing 
interactions with others. I have pointed out how Bourdieu’s habitus involves implicit 
collusion that constrains how people relate to each other and if necessary rectifies 
how people act in the maintenance of the habitus. This idea of rectification points to 
how power dynamics are an important factor in the continuation of patterns of 
relating. I have taken up the work of Foucault who argues that power is an inevitable 
part of human relating and how through discourse we come to understand what is true 
and the nature of knowledge. I took up this way of thinking to help me understand 
how my feelings of shame and guilt emerged as part of a disciplining process in the 
maintenance of power dynamics and the habitus of what was assumed to be true. This 
led to me feeling relieved as the chief executive instigated a return to familiar patterns 
of relating.       
 
In exploring the events set out in the narrative I have deepened my understanding of 
how changes to patterns of relating can bring about instances of individually 
experienced feeling states. These feeling states are experienced as emotions in 
particular social experiences. I then suggested that emotions such as guilt and shame, 
as the individually felt responses to disciplining social processes, are important in the 
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formation and continuation of identity and habitus. The narrative clearly sets out the 
excluding social consequences for me of choosing not to collude. 
 
I went on to explore what ethical implications there are to how we act, given that I am 
arguing that one can become more or less conscious of the patterns of relating in any 
given situation and therefore can make differing choices about what to do. In my 
consideration of ethics, I understand that one cannot know for certain the future 
implications about what one is doing and therefore the consideration of ethics cannot 
be about what will happen but needs to be about what is happening now and the 
anticipation of one’s actions. Strategies of action one employs will inevitably involve 
competing ‘goods’. In my case the desire for change was in competition with the 
anticipation of shame and the discomfort of anxiety. There is no doubt that exercising 
practical judgement in making choices about what to say and do involves 
compromise. As a small example, almost every day I notice people unreflectively 
using the word “mindset” to indicate ways of thinking. I understand the use of this 
phrase suggests assumptions of cognitive psychology but if I was to start a 
conversation to discuss their assumptions every time someone used the phrase, I 
wouldn’t get very much else done. This then suggests that in paying attention to one’s 
ongoing intentions as one reflexively responds to one’s participation and the patterns 
of relating between people, one must make ethical choices about when to consciously 
collude and when not to. This has led to me being more comfortable in taking up the 
model designed by Barbara, that I described in my earlier narrative, in my ongoing 
work. I’m not suggesting that this compromise means giving up on one’s intention. 
To take the living present seriously is to recognise that the future is unpredictable and 
one can compromise whilst keeping one’s intentions in view. That is to take seriously 
Mead’s (1934, p383) invocation to bring the ends into my intention. 
 
In thinking about paying attention to one’s ethical participation I take up the idea of 
what it means to make practical judgements. Practical judgement involves a wider 
awareness of the group and the organisational and societal patterns. I would argue that 
it will inevitably involve the potential for emotional discomfort that accompanies the 
potential for exclusion as one makes judgements about whether to collude or not with 
the power dynamics, ongoing assumptions and patterns of relating of any given 
situation. Again, this is with the understanding that the future is unknowable and the 
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implications of one’s actions for oneself and for others, especially in attempting not to 
collude, cannot be known in advance. However, in developing one’s capability in 
exercising practical judgement one can become more astute in one’s political and 
power relating to stay in the game. 
 
I then explained how I took this new understanding of ethics and practical judgement 
into my ongoing relationships with the directors at work. I also took up the theme of 
vulnerability that has played a part in shaping our power relating in sharing my own 
feelings of vulnerability with them. In this act of recognition I was able to become 
more included in the group. Sharing my own feelings of vulnerability seemed to 
change the dynamics of how we were all relating to each other as we found things in 
common that has facilitated my ongoing participation and made it easier for us to 
work together. Since then I have agreed with Barbara that I will seek individual 
conversations with directors to understand their aspirations for organisational change 
and what they might expect of me and my team in supporting them. It is my hope that 
we will be able to maintain the more open and mutually encouraging ways of relating 
we have been able to develop since the events described in the narratives above. 
 
 In this project I have tried to inquire into the paradoxical complexity of my 
experience of attempting to bring about change in an organisational context. In doing 
so I have worked hard to avoid thinking of organisations as systems and the 
separation of the individual and the social. Instead I have sought to maintain the 
perspective of organisations as imaginative constructs in people’s minds and the 
individual and the social forming and being formed by each other in the context of 
local relating between people. As part of my argument is that much is dependent on 
context, I am not offering any prescription or advice for how organisational 
practitioners might go about making change happen. Nor am I arguing that becoming 
aware of collusive patterns of relating offers any guarantee of more successful 
management of change. Instead I have set out to reflexively understand and deepen 
my awareness of my experience as a practitioner in relation to others and, in turn, that 
deeper awareness has further shaped my practice. In sharing my work, I am inviting 
people to consider whether my experience resonates with theirs and in doing so to 






In this synopsis I will offer a further reflexive review of my research to take my 
analysis further. I want to explore the theme of functional collusion in the different 
settings and configurations of people as described in the four projects.  
 
The setting out of my arguments will lead to a proposition for my contribution to 
knowledge and practice. In this synopsis I will also describe how I have managed my 
way through the ethical challenges of my research and the methods through which 
I’ve undertaken it. 
 
The content and context of my research relates specifically to my experience in a 
particular international NGO in the UK. The organisation described in this thesis 
began as a response from the British and Irish churches for the need to reconstruct 
Europe after WWII. In 1964 there was a shift in emphasis in response to global 
famine and since that time the aim of the organisation has been the eradication of 
what is described in organisational literature as ‘the scandal of poverty’. The 
organisation started out with a Christian ethos which continues to this day. Upon 
joining the organisation a number of people described the organisation as ‘working 
with people of all faiths and none’, a phrase that would also be used in corporate 
documentation. There were many professed Christian employees but there were also 
many who had little or no professed faith. As Head of Change I had a number of 
conversations with people who either thought the organisation was too Christian in its 
outlook or not Christian enough. Whilst people described this issue as problematic I 
experienced it as something of a healthy tension in the relationships between 
employees because as a consequence we were frequently required to reflect upon the 
issue of faith rather than take it for granted.  
 
By contrast, throughout my time working in the organisation I was most struck by 
how those I was working with took for granted, perhaps as a new kind of faith, 
assumptions about strategic choice in discussions about how to prioritise the effort of 
employees towards achieving the organisational aims. I will take up two short 
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narratives to illustrate how such discussions took place. I will also analyse the 
narratives by looking at how they have relevance to the theme of functional collusion 
that I have been exploring in this thesis. 
 
When I first started working for the organisation I took part in a number of activities 
intended to help me settle into my job. This was part of the employee induction 
process that all new starters had to go through. One of these was to attend a meeting 
with a number of other new starters that was being led by one of the directors. During 
this meeting the director explained the aims of the organisation and he spoke 
passionately about how there were enough resources in the world for everyone if they 
were fairly distributed and how proud he was to work for an organisation that was 
committed to making poverty a thing of the past. He also set out how the 
organisational departments and divisions disaggregated resources and made strategic 
plans in order to achieve the strategic aims. I was enthused by his speech, as were the 
other attendees, and in our conversations together afterwards we were all agreed that 
we had been positively affected by the meeting in terms of how we felt about working 
in the organisation. However, reflecting on the meeting now, the speech had the effect 
of minimising the opportunity for discussion about how achievable the aim of 
eradicating poverty really was or how we were meant to go about it. It seems to me to 
have had a similar rhetorical quality to the Christian reflection I refer to in project 
four. Rather than encouraging discussion, these speeches closed down the potential 
for reflection to take place. This rhetorical way of speaking seemed also to be taken 
up by other employees in everyday conversations so that the symbolic power 
(Bourdieu, 1992, pp163-183) of invoking the grand aims of the organisation had the 
effect of closing down the opportunity for anyone to bring the aims into question. It 
seemed to me that we were all expected to align with these aims without discussion or 
question. To raise questions or invite discussion was discouraged without anyone 
specifically saying so. I would argue that the rhetoric was being employed by people 
to discipline each other into colluding with the assumption that by working together 
we could deliver on the organisational aims. 
 
More recently, a new Chief Executive has started working for the organisation. In a 
recent meeting with directors she has described the need to align the organisational 
strategy and to narrow the focus of how managers prioritise their efforts. Currently 
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the organisation has eight strategic priorities that set out the work that is being done in 
different national contexts around the world. The new Chief Executive has said that 
we need to reduce these priorities from eight to around three. In the discussion with 
directors this need to narrow the focus of these priorities seems to be taken for granted 
as an undisputedly good thing to do. In the past, before my research on this doctorate 
programme, I may have also taken up this view without question. However, there 
were clear assumptions of strategic choice theory (Stacey, 2007) in how the Chief 
Executive was expressing herself, assumptions that I have come to question in my 
research. In my experience these assumptions represent a pervasive organisational 
discourse. As I’ve said earlier in this thesis, Foucault (1977) describes how discourse 
limits how we are able to discuss what is going on in the world and creates the 
conditions for how people act in relation to each other which then continues to form 
discourse. Similar to the assumed need for a vision of change, there is also the 
assumption that narrowing the strategic focus of what people do in the organisation is 
not only possible but will inevitably result in an improvement in the organisation’s 
ability to eradicate poverty. People regularly used the metaphor of eating an elephant 
in small chunks, where the aim of eradicating poverty is the elephant and our 
everyday tasks are the small chunks. Even if one is aware of these assumptions there 
seems to be little choice but to collude with them if one is to continue to be included.  
 
In these circumstances managers in countries far away from where these priorities 
have been set have to find ways of working within the strictures of such assumptions 
and still respond to the contexts in which they find themselves. In private 
conversations with managers in Africa they have explained to me how they find 
themselves having to make choices when there are a number of competing good 
actions to take. They talk of worrying about keeping their staff employed and 
maintaining the size of their team through taking on work that doesn’t fit within the 
priorities of the organisation. They then describe how they have to provide 
explanations for what they are doing to their managers to satisfy them that they are 
still working within the parameters that have been set. This results in a public 
explanation for what these managers are doing that is separate and different from how 
they privately talk about it. In trying to make sense of class divisions in a Malay 
village, Scott (1990) differentiates between a public and a hidden discourse and 
describes how those without power make use of disguise and concealment, which 
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“requires an experimental spirit and a capacity to test and exploit all the loopholes, 
ambiguities, silences, and lapses available to them” (ibid, p138). I would argue that 
the managers in Africa were doing something similar. They seemed to be able to do 
what they wanted in their particular context as long as they were able to provide an 
adequate explanation as to how it fitted with the organisational priorities. In private 
discussions, individual directors would readily admit that they knew that managers 
were doing this but in the more formal meetings it seemed that they would pretend 
otherwise. I would describe this as a form of collusion, that has emerged undiscussed 
and that has the function of publicly maintaining the illusion of strategic choice whilst 
dealing with the pragmatic reality of managers having to make thing work in their 
own context.  
 
 I have also found that my description of functional collusion is recognisable to those 
working in other NGOs as well as the UK community of organisational development 
practitioners more generally, as I describe in my contribution to knowledge. I will 
now go on to summarise and further reflect on each project, before drawing together 





At the beginning of my work on the DMan programme, project one represented an 
exploration of how I came to be who I am. In delving into my background and work 
experiences I was looking for significant patterns that might have emerged in how I 
have related with others at work. Initially I was especially interested in how I took up 
assumptions about power and control and how they affected my relationships with 
other people and their relationships with each other.  Through this process I wanted to 
discover what might be at the heart of my inquiry on this DMan programme. I was 
looking for examples in my working life when I felt challenged or conflicted by what 
had happened. According to Brinkmann (2012, p3), taking everyday experiences 
seriously as a source of inquiry not only helps to get a clearer view of what was going 
on, it can also offer some illumination on larger social issues that play out in more 
generalisable social patterns of relating.  
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I started with a narrative about a time when I found it hard to decide what to do, faced 
as I was with a situation where the organisational policy might have constrained me 
from doing what I deemed to be ethical. I was working with senior police officers as a 
representative of the UK immigration department during a tragic incident. Twenty-
two people had lost their lives having been stuck on sandbanks by a rising tide. A 
piece of equipment at my disposal had the potential to help identify the bodies of the 
people who had drowned. However, the policy on the use of such equipment dictated 
that it shouldn’t be used to identify dead bodies. It felt like a double bind (a familiar 
organisational pattern as explained by Mowles, 2015, p14): if I used the equipment I 
was acting against policy and could face disciplinary action, and if I did not use it I 
could have been deemed as having been unhelpful by police colleagues and prolonged 
the time it would take to identify the people who had died.  
 
As I come towards the end of my research, I understand this narrative to be about me 
exercising practical judgement, (Stacey, 2015, pp56-57) rather than blindly following 
rules. Since decision-making inevitably pertains to particular moments in time, 
because circumstances are often unforeseen, I would argue that practical judgement 
rather than simple implementation of decontextualized rules is what is needed, which 
includes having to interpret the rules in one’s particular situation. In the decision to 
disobey the policy I was clearly deciding what to do without the understanding I now 
have of practical judgement and without understanding ethics in the way that I now 
do. At that time I would have understood ethics as being tested against some external 
and universal standard that was enfolded into the policies that were provided to guide 
and direct me as a type of formative teleology (Stacey et al, 2000, p27).  This led to 
feelings of anxiety about my decisions, linked to my difficulties in following a policy 
that didn’t support me or give me an answer to my dilemma.  I felt that to act ethically 
in the circumstances in which I found myself I would have to disregard the policy. In 
contravening it I found a way to continue relating with others successfully in very 
difficult circumstances and yet I felt that in some way I had not performed well. What 
I see now, that I couldn’t see then, is that I was part of a much broader pattern of 
social relating between those of us working in the immigration department, and 
between immigration staff and police officers more generally. Through participating 
in those patterns of relating I personally accepted perceptions of underperformance in 
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the organisation as part of how I saw myself. These perceptions emerged from the 
expectations of politicians for the removal of failed asylum seekers from the UK that 
related to a zero sum, balancing the number of immigrants coming to the UK with the 
number leaving. Such an expectation paid little or no attention to the practicalities or 
morality of what was needed to achieve it. What I didn’t write in Project one, because 
I couldn’t see its significance while writing it, was that at the time of this incident the 
UK immigration department was seen as a failure (the Minister had publicly stated 
that the department was not fit for purpose) and was under significant pressure to 
remove what many (including me) thought of as impossibly high numbers of failed 
asylum seekers from the country. I was managing a number of teams who were tasked 
with these removals and we had large targets to achieve. I was expected to achieve 
these targets by senior managers who in turn were expected to deliver them by 
politicians who had made public commitments about them. The delivery of these 
targets was monitored and reported on all the way up to senior Ministers as though it 
were a cybernetic system (Stacey et al, 2000, p65). There seemed no opportunity, 
other than in local gossip, to discuss whether such targets were even achievable let 
alone the ethical implications of what we were trying to do. I felt a sense of failure 
and anxiety which now, looking back, I assume was also felt by large numbers of my 
colleagues because of the cultural processes people, employed by the organisation, 
engaged in. It is this that Bourdieu (2000) or Elias (2000) might understand as the 
habitus (described in detail in project four, pp99-104) of the Border Agency. I would 
argue that it was unconsciously colluding by unthinkingly going along with the 
assumptions that were at play, without any discussion of them, that led to the 
maintenance of a pattern of relating. To have questioned them would have risked 
conflict and probably would have been perceived as a defensive reaction. 
 
Further in project one I relate another narrative from my time with the immigration 
department when I was tasked with the management of a national response to the 
unplanned release of a large number of foreign national prisoners.  This release of 
prisoners had caused a furore in the national press, as another example of the failure 
of the immigration department, culminating in the resignation of the senior Minister, a 
consequence of him saying something in Parliament that turned out to be untrue. 
Clearly, in the rapidly shifting situation it would have been impossible for the 
Minister to have had the control that was expected of him. Yet there was a public 
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expectation, demonstrated in the national press and media commentary, that Ministers 
should be in control of what occurs in their departments. The public view of what was 
going on seemed to be that the Minister was either deliberately lying, or lacked 
control of his department, and either perspective suggested his incompetence. I 
described how events such as these influenced me so that I took up assumptions about 
managers needing to be in control into my relationships with those I was managing. 
This produced an inability to meet my expectations of my own competence as a 
manager and that led me to feel frustrated, anxious, ashamed and incompetent. In 
retrospect this seems to be more evidence of me colluding with an organisational 
pattern of perceiving underperformance and taking it to myself. These circumstances 
eventually influenced me to change my job. On re-reading project one, the theme of 
shame as a response to my own feelings of incompetence (an issue that I explore 
much more deeply in later projects) was already present. One can also see reflected in 
this narrative how a failure to deliver the expected performance by the Minister 
resulted in his being publicly judged as incompetent. I now think of this judgement of 
competence as both an individual and social process at the same time. In retrospect I 
can see here that I am starting to see how judgements of competence are a contextual 
and ongoing social process rather than something innate in an individual. 
 
To give a recent example of how judgements of competence can arise, when I took up 
my job as head of change I brought together a number of people to form a change 
team. One particular member of the team, Julie, had the job of helping colleagues 
engage with the change process that was being proposed. In a number of meetings we 
argued about the need for what she described as a compelling vision. I argued for us 
to allow the idea of the organisation moving towards becoming a global partnership to 
develop as we engaged with people across the organisation. Julie felt strongly that as 
the change team it was our job to develop a vision that would excite people and get 
them to feel positive about the changes that were being proposed. I got a strong sense 
that Julie felt that without this vision people would think I, and the change team, 
weren’t competent to lead the change process. I recognised that a vision may be what 
people would be expecting, and the absence of one may cause some people anxiety 
because we weren’t being clear about the final state of the changed organisation, but I 
also felt that we couldn’t possibly know what the final state would be and I wanted to 
involve as many people as possible to allow them to play a part in creating it. 
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Throughout the two years of us working together Julie and I regularly argued about 
this issue. I think we were both interested in helping the organisation make the 
changes happen and we were both concerned with what was best for the people 
working in the organisation.  
 
I want to be clear that I’m not predicting that the outcome was better because we 
didn’t have a vision, it may well have been an easier route to take and may or may not 
have resulted in more engagement from employees. However, as I’ve described in 
project four, to act ethically means taking the living present seriously and recognising 
that the future is unpredictable. I think it is ethically dubious for a small number of 
people to try to decide how the future will be because the call on others to align with 
such visions can mask the politics and power relating that take place in such activities 
(Griffin, 2002). I wanted to take up Mead’s (1934, p383) invocation to bring the ends 
into my intention. I was very reluctant to collude with the perceived need for a vision, 
even if it may have been easier for people to go along with and it was clear to me that 
Julie considered me less competent as a leader because of my not doing so. I think 
what I’m describing here is what Foucault (1977) described as discourse in which a 
particular way of discussing the world creates how people act in relation to each other 
that then continues to form discourse. I have found the idea of the need for a vision of 
change to be ubiquitous in my organisation as a discourse through which we 
discipline ourselves and others. This is a different view to how writers such as Senge 
(1990) write about ‘vision’. Senge reifies the organisation as a system and argues for 
an alignment between the ‘vision’ of the organisation and that of the individual. In 
doing so Griffin (2002) argues that Senge is suggesting a “participation in a systemic 
whole of a transcendental or metaphysical kind” (ibid, p48) and I am in agreement 
with Griffin (ibid, p48) that it is because Senge employs systems thinking that there is 
a need for a metaphysical answer as to what is outside of the systemic whole that is 
being posited. Such thinking leads to an argument for the eradication of power 
relating between individuals because it is seen as a barrier to the ideal of alignment, 
whereas Elias (1998, p116) argues that power relating is a characteristic of all human 
relating. As Flyvbjerg, who takes up the work of Foucault, writes, “the neglect of 
power is unfortunate, because it is precisely by paying attention to power relations 
that we may achieve more democracy” (2001, p98). 
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To return to my reflection on project one, I went on to explain how I changed jobs 
and completed an MSc in People and Organisational Development. I was looking for 
answers to my questions about management and leadership and through that Masters 
process I took up individualistic, humanistic and systemic assumptions of what it 
means to develop people and organisations. These assumptions included the idea that 
one could plan and predict how others would respond to attempts to change how they 
think and act and that such attempts were ethically justifiable in pursuit of 
organisational and individual alignment, as argued for by Senge (1990). Even though 
the programme of study called for critical thinking, I experienced little challenge to 
these assumptions. Everyone around me in this Master’s programme, including the 
faculty, seemed to take these assumptions for granted.  I would now argue that such 
ways of thinking are indicative of the community of organisational development 
practitioners being a thought collective with a particular thought style (Fleck, 1979). 
My encountering of the DMan, which has emerged as a different thought collective 
with a very different thought style – one that involves reflecting on our own thought 
style – enabled me to reflect on, and notice my participation in and maintenance of, 
the organisational development collective thought style. 
 
Towards the end of project one I related a narrative about a particular piece of work in 
which I used the Burke-Litwin organisational model (Burke and Litwin, 1992) to win 
favour with a powerful group. The first time I wrote about it I felt that my actions 
were somewhat unethical given that I didn’t believe in the systemic assumptions that 
underpin the model. However, when I returned to this narrative later in project four, I 
developed a more nuanced perspective of the ethics of using ‘tools’. Although the use 
of such models still makes me uneasy, I can see that making choices about tools and 
techniques is another example of the need for me exercising practical judgment in 
maintaining my engagement with the group with which I was working. The 
assumptions of the group involved a belief in the usefulness of such models including 
that through their use one could get predictable outcomes that would improve 
organisational effectiveness. To avoid exclusion, and to be seen as competent and 
have some influence in this group, it was necessary for me to collude with these 
assumptions. I take up this example later in project four because it represents an 
example of the symbolic power (Bourdieu, 1989) of using such models in 
circumstances when I knew the systemic assumptions underlying them are taken for 
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granted. In relating this work in project one I felt a sense of unease with the ethics of a 
situation in which I did not entirely share the assumptions of the group but relied on 
them to get others to look favourably on the work I was doing. As a result of my work 
on project four I recognise that one can find oneself using such models to stay 
included and to have influence on what is going on and that the ethics in such 
situations have to be judged according to the circumstances that pertain to that 
particular context. Such collusion, whilst it may have been frustrating for me on 
occasion, may well have a function in supporting the ongoing work in a group. The 
ethical judgement I would make as a result of my research would be to try to be 
reflexively aware of what I was seeking to gain in such interactions, for both me and 
others, by keeping both the means and ends in view (Mowles, 2012). Returning to the 
Burke-Litwin example, I was relieved when the gestures from the chair of the group 
suggested that she was impressed by my use of the model and this gave me more 
room for manoeuvre in developing my proposals for change. I felt some responsibility 
to the manager who had contracted me to do this work, as it formed an important part 
of his ongoing intentions to improve how his part of the organisation was performing. 
I had a strong sense that the group to which I was presenting was influential in how 
that work would be perceived and I wanted to support him as an ally and in turn for 
him to continue to involve me. What I’m trying to point to here is that the ethics of 
the situation were emerging as part of the ongoing process of gesture and response. 
My practical judgement involved assessing how best to manage my way through this 
to continue my work and my relationships with those in the room and beyond. 
 
Throughout project one I talked about outcomes unfolding from people relating. 
However, talking of outcomes suggests an end point and, perhaps, that enfolded 
within processes of relating is something (an outcome) that then emerges in a 
formative teleology (Stacey et al, 2000). Of course, interaction does lead to 
consequences for those involved. Those consequences lead to further interaction with 
further consequences, and so it goes on as a continuous process in which we make 
moment-to-moment moral choices about the consequences that are emerging. To give 
an example of how assumptions of formative causality get taken up in my experience 
at work, I recently helped facilitate a conference that brought managers from across 
the world together to discuss the idea of moving our organisation to become a global 
partnership. The conference was arranged without a formal agenda and the intention 
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was to have a session at the beginning of the conference in which the participants 
could decide what they wanted to discuss. The absence of agenda seemed to cause 
some of the directors anxiety and they wanted to understand what the objectives of 
the conference were. They asked questions about what outcomes we were looking to 
deliver through the conference (the assumption was clearly that we could design an 
agenda that would assure us of the outcomes we wanted). During the conference I 
participated in a number of conversations in which managers were clearly changing 
how they perceived their relationships with each other in response to the idea of this 
global partnership. It is this changing of how we think as we relate to each other that I 
now consider as creating the potential for organisational change, by which I mean 
changes to patterns of relating. However, at the end of the conference there was a 
meeting at which directors and trustees intended to discuss the outcomes of the 
conference. There followed a discussion about how we could create documents that 
would describe the different organisational models as options for change that could be 
discussed in a future board meeting, as if they were the outcomes of the conference. I 
recognised this as a way of shifting the pattern of power relating back to one in which 
the board of trustees would consider options and decide what should be done (much 
as was expected of me in project four). However, I found myself agreeing (although I 
was privately reluctant) to write such documents and to present them to the board of 
trustees. I was reluctant because I felt that there was the potential for a broader change 
that could take place. I wanted to find a way to continue to engage the wider group of 
attendees of the conference in the decision-making. Yet I agreed with the proposal 
because I thought that attempting to withhold the expected ways of being together 
may have resulted in me being excluded or disciplined in some way. So, whilst I 
could hold open the potential for different power relating by successfully engaging a 
larger group in deciding what we should discuss at the conference, it also seemed 
necessary for me to collude with the assumptions at play in this group in the 
recognition and maintenance of the ongoing power relationships.  
 
The events described in the narratives in project one are examples of circumstances 
where I found myself unconsciously colluding with ideas of formative teleology and 
management control that led to me feeling individually incompetent and inadequate. 
In becoming an organisational development practitioner I further took up systemic 
models, such as the Burke Litwin model (1992), to gain influence in groups who 
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shared an assumption that tools and techniques based on systems thinking offered 
solutions for organisational challenges. Looking back on the narratives in project one 
I think I would describe what I was doing as making practical judgements in my 
ongoing interactions with others rather than seeing my actions coming from rational 
choices made by me as an autonomous individual. Upon writing this I am reminded of 
an example from my early career as an immigration officer at London’s Heathrow 
Airport. I was called to examine the passports of an Iranian Minister and his 
entourage. All was well with most of the group as they held the required visas that 
were mandatory for visitors from Iran. However, the Minister’s butler did not have a 
visa. This was a clear-cut case as the immigration rules stated that the butler should be 
refused entry to the UK and removed back to Iran on the earliest available flight. I 
conveyed this message to the Minister and said that I would consult with my manager 
and return with a decision. The Minister became agitated and suggested that if I 
attempted to send the butler back to Iran, rather than allow him to stay for the 
intended visit for a week, he would complain to the Home Office Minister in the UK. 
I consulted with my manager and explained that I thought we should go ahead and 
send the butler home to Iran as that was what the rules said we should do. However, 
my manager asked me a number of questions about how long the group intended to 
stay and what the Iranian Minister had said. My manager decided that we should 
refuse the butler entry to the UK as per the rules but rather than send the him home on 
the earliest available flight we should allow him to temporarily enter the UK for a 
week to allow him to carry out his duties with the Minister. I agreed to this course of 
action but at the time I was angry that the rules were being bent for this Iranian 
Minister. However, I can see that from my manager’s point of view, the best course of 
action was to find a way to exercise discretion (or practical judgement) and to find a 
way to apply the rules but to minimise the political and practical difficulties for the 
people involved. The outcome of the interaction between the Iranian Minister, my 
manager, and me was uncertain. The immigration rules didn’t offer an adequate 
solution and simply following them might have been unhelpful at the very least. 
Rowe (2012), who takes up Lipsky (1980) in exploring front line exercise of 
discretion in public services, also argues that it is important to, 
 
…understand our context, but also that centrally we understand ourselves, 
even as academics, as individuals, with ethical standards and codes, exercising 
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a degree of agency in ways that can significantly affect the lives of others 
(Rowe, 2012, p17). 
 
I see this short narrative about my early work in the immigration department as an 
example of how one finds oneself in situations where one has to solve problems or 
dilemmas. Midgley, (2000) offers a way of thinking about how people can go about 
making such decisions. He assumes that to take action people need to find a solution 
to a systemic problem. To do this we must engage in what he calls boundary 
judgements. These social and personal boundaries at the edges of first and second 
order systems help us understand what is important in our decision-making (ibid, 
pp128-129). For Midgeley, widening our understanding of the systems in which we 
are embedded is key to decision making. A first-order boundary judgement is one in 
which the consideration of the relationships that are involved is taken up and the 
second-order boundary judgement means considering the views of others not directly 
involved but who are important because they will be affected by our choice of action. 
Clearly this could lead to endless consideration of further boundary judgements but 
Midgeley suggests that will not happen because at some point we have to take action. 
It seems to me that Midgeley is assuming that people are autonomous strategic 
decision makers for whom thinking and action is separated. In addition he ascribes 
agency to the systems he describes, 
 
…what constitutes a human agent is not necessarily a simple matter to 
identify. Actions can be ascribed to a variety of possible agents: e.g., an 
individual person; a group; a team; a family; an organisation; a community; a 
nation; etc (ibid, p113). 
 
My experience of organisational life suggests that Midgeley’s way of thinking about 
problem solving is common and often shows up in the design and use of flow-charts 
to help managers follow organisational policies.  
 
Taking up this way of thinking in solving the problem of the Iranian butler without a 
visa would have involved me, and then my manager, independently and maybe 
together considering the boundary judgements that were necessary to understand our 
own perspective, those of the Iranian Minister and his entourage, and further then to 
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the immigration managers and politicians in the UK. We would also have had to 
ascribe agency to the perspective of the UK Immigration Agency as an organisation 
and even perhaps the UK Government and the UK as a nation. Having taken all of 
these matters into consideration, we may then have been in a position to take action. I 
find this problematic because although I would argue a good decision was made by 
my manager, the process I was involved in seemed to me to have a dynamic and 
emergent quality in which my interactions with the butler and the Iranian Minister led 
to further interaction with my boss which then led to further interaction with the 
Minister and the butler and so on. There may well have been some thinking about 
what the consequences for others beyond the situation may have been, but it was 
never explicitly discussed other than the political threat from the Iranian Minister to 
involve the Home Office Minister. I can imagine that the threat could have been 
influential in my manager’s consideration but was never mentioned by him as having 
affected his decision. On reflection I think this was because, in anticipation of any 
future challenge to the decision, it was important for my manager and me to collude 
in the idea that we were still, in essence, following the immigration rules rather than 
reacting and responding to political threats.  However, any pre-designed flow chart 
could not have foreseen our specific situation or adequately given us advice about the 
subtle political nuances involved. We did not follow any orderly process of thinking, 
as suggested by Midgeley. Instead I think we were making practical judgements about 
what to do in the living present, given our understanding of history and our 
anticipation of the future. Perhaps Midgeley, from a systems perspective, is arguing 
for a reflexive response to the situations we find ourselves in but in doing so I find 
that he loses the fundamentally emergent and interdependent character of human 
interaction. Also, as I have previously said, I think of organisations as imaginative 
constructs that constrain and enable our interactions and I find the idea of ascribing 
agency to them problematic. 
 
The events I was describing in project one set the scene for my research into 
functional collusion in the avoidance of shame and that shame is a social process that 
is individually felt.  I now see shame as part of the social processes that discipline and 
form an individual through feeling states that we interpret as emotions. I have taken 






In project two I gave an account of a team meeting between my chief executive and 
her group of directors that I facilitated. I explored what we mean by facilitation and 
how facilitated events often include very specific agendas with planned outcomes. 
They include the use of individualizing tools and techniques, such as psychometric 
instruments like Myers Briggs type indicator (which I described in detail in project 
two). I proposed that when we engage with others in facilitated events we take up 
individualistic and formative assumptions in thinking that one can fold predictable 
outcomes into their planning. I argue that such assumptions often go unchallenged 
and un-noticed and, consequently, any failure to achieve the predicted outcomes is 
blamed on the facilitator. I go on to suggest that such facilitated events are examples 
of what Mead (1938) describes as social objects. My description of a social object in 
project two feels bounded and systemic, as if it is a thing that has a clear beginning, 
middle and end, and yet I think the social object is a much more complex and ongoing 
phenomenon that emerges from people relating locally with each other and in which 
global themes are then taken up.  
 
A social object is the social acts of individuals which create recognizable patterns 
in social life, like a workshop or a planning meeting. So, a social object is to 
society what a natural object is to the natural world. A social act is an act in which 
the individual takes the attitude of the generalised other towards himself (Mead, 1934, 
p155),  
 
So the self reaches its full development by organizing these individual 
attitudes of others into the organized social or group attitudes, and by 
thus becoming an individual reflection of the general systematic pattern 




The concept of a facilitated away day, the practice of facilitation and the use of 
 133 
psychometric instruments, have all emerged out of an individualistic and humanistic 
habitus and discourse, forming the social object as a process that is recognizable to 
the participants as they interact to maintain it. In project two I was developing an 
understanding that my participation as a facilitator involved making practical 
judgements to stay included and to encourage inquiry into the assumptions we were 
all making.  
 
In the narrative in project two, whilst facilitating the group of directors there were 
moments when I tried to bring attention to the way the group was relating. One of 
these moments happened when I asked what the joking had been about as the group 
entered the room and another when I suggested we inquire into their use of mythical 
language. In these moments the participants in the group paused but seemed unable or 
unwilling to reflect on what they were doing together. The pivotal part of my making 
sense of what was going on in project two was when discussing my narrative with my 
learning set and supervisors; it became clear that I had been unwittingly participating 
in the infantilisation of the group I was working with. I felt shocked and ashamed 
about what I had been doing. The shame was double-edged. Firstly, I was hit by the 
revelation that I had been unwittingly colluding with the directors in their 
infantilisation, and secondly that I hadn’t noticed it until it had been pointed out to 
me. On reflection my shame is partly in response to high expectations of myself in my 
ability to understand what is going on in any given situation. I find it difficult not to 
hold myself responsible for being able to predict the outcomes of what is going on. 
My inability to do so leads me to feeling shame, as if I am underperforming in some 
way. I think this shows how difficult it can be to notice the assumptions one takes up 
as one is formed by one’s habitus.  
 
I became interested in shame as a social process and went on to explore it in more 
detail. I came to understand shame to be a necessary element in significant learning 
(Aram, 2001). However, in taking up this idea at the time of writing project two, I 
think I was conceptualising the experience of shame in learning as a single event, as if 
one could learn something from a shameful experience and never repeat the same 
mistake. There are hints here of me holding onto ideas of mental models related to 
cognitivist psychology. Mental models are internal concepts and schemas of the 
external world (Stacey, 2007, p83). Perhaps I still carry the assumption that I can 
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change the way I think merely by surfacing how I was thinking and deciding to 
change it. I am persuaded by Bourdieu’s (2000) argument that we are the embodiment 
of our habitus and it’s not so easy to just decide to think differently. In addition, each 
new social situation brings with it new patterns of relating to pay attention to, so 
previous learning cannot simply be applied to new experiences. 
 
Further in project two I went on to explore the possibility that the function of 
collusion could be that it enables groups to avoid shame arising in their relating 
together. On reflection I also recognise that there may have been other processes at 
play in the events described in my project two narrative, including perhaps the 
avoidance of potential power struggles that could have led to conflict. However, the 
experience of shame was in the foreground for me at that time. The process of 
noticing and reflecting on what was going on for me was uneven and unpredictable. 
At times I felt stuck, unable to think my way through what was going on in my 
experience, and at other times my understanding came quickly. The movement of my 
thinking was happening through the interacting with my learning set and my 
supervisors and was still going on when I wrote this synopsis. I think this is an 
important point to make in support of the method we use in the DMan programme. 
Whilst this thesis necessarily has a start and an end point, the method assumes that we 
are interdependent and that knowledge continuously emerges from our conversational 
activity and from reflecting on our practice both as individuals and in groups.  
 
In summing up project two my exploration of my experience as a facilitator started 
the process of me becoming aware of what I came to describe as functional collusion. 
Reflecting on my experience of working with the group of directors brought to my 
attention the difficulties of exposing the patterns of relating going on in groups. Aram 
(2001) argues that shame arises in processes of significant learning due to the identity 
threat involved and the unpredictability of how one’s identity will be changed as a 
consequence. Through my experience set out in project two I came to agree and I 
further came to understand that people in groups collude with each other, often 
without awareness, to avoid the experience of shame and to maintain ongoing patterns 
of power relating.  
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In my experience this idea of collusion represents a very different way of thinking 
about how people and organisations may change and develop. As I have been writing 
this synopsis I have been asked to support one of my colleague directors, Michael, in 
bringing his team together. They are a new team in the organisation and they are not 
used to working as a group. He expressed the view that one of his team would 
struggle with the new ways of working he wanted to promote. Michael wanted his 
team to improve their flexibility so that they could deploy people on projects 
according to need. Michael said that Andrew was reluctant to accept these new ways 
of working and instead argued that he wanted to be left to manage his own team and 
that he could be trusted to deliver on his own. Michael said that Andrew needed to 
change his mindset, so that he could fit in with the new team, and wanted me to help 
with that. As Michael and I were having this conversation I was thinking about a 
number of things. By assuming that he could change Andrew’s mental models so that 
he could be more effective, it was clear that Michael was making cognitive 
assumptions about how people think that I didn’t share (Stacey, 1997, pp83-84). As I 
was talking to Michael I was also thinking about Bourdieu’s (2000) description of 
habitus and my developing understanding that our judgement about competence arises 
from the unspoken assumptions that have emerged in our particular habitus, but also 
that some individuals are more competent that others. Thus, competence is both 
individual and social at the same time. I said to Michael that it is likely that Andrew’s 
experience had led him to habitually respond in a certain way and that he may well 
find it difficult to change quickly. I also suggested that rather than just being about 
Andrew, surely it was also important for the whole team to discuss how they might 
work together. By saying this I was trying to point to the importance of the social 
processes involved. Michael seemed to like my explanation and we went on to discuss 
how we might take up this idea of habits to facilitate a conversation with the team to 
discuss what it might be like for them to work in the way that Michael wanted and 
how they might do it.  
 
I wanted to set out this short narrative as an example of how my practice is changing 
in response to how my thinking is changing. In this exchange with Michael I think I 
was trying to respond in ways that allowed me to hold true to what I think and to try 
to find an appropriate language to convey that to Michael. At the same time I wanted 
to help with the challenge that he was facing. I was aware at the time that the 
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conversation with Michael involved meaning emerging from the gesture and response 
between us, as described by Mead (1934, p179), as we discussed how we might work 
together. I have come to understand this as the ongoing process involved in the 
exercise of reflexive practical judgement that seems to have a paradoxical quality of 
predictable unpredictability (Mowles, 2015, pp98-119). By this I mean that the 
exercise of practical judgement requires one to try to anticipate the responses of 
others when we may be unable to predict how we will behave ourselves. We are 
always trying to understand what is going on and deciding what to do in response to 




I began project three contrasting functional collusion with Alvesson and Spicer’s 
(2012) idea of functional stupidity. In both phenomena there is sometimes an absence 
of reflexivity, at least by most of the participants, but always a lack of discussion or 
agreed action to address the stupidity/collusion. So functional stupidity may well 
entail collusion but not necessarily the other way around. Collusion, in contrast to 
how I have described it, is often seen in organisational literature in pejorative terms as 
an undesirable aspect of people secretly working together to gain an advantage over 
others. I am arguing that the functionality of collusion is to enable people to go on 
relating with each other with minimum need to think about what they are doing, 
maintain existing power differentials or to avoid shame. I understand that Alvesson 
and Spicer used the word stupidity to convey their critical standpoint as the word 
clearly has negative connotations and yet they are pointing to a form of stupidity as 
having a function in organisations. In my use of the word collusion I am trying to 
make a similar, but not identical, argument. As I’ve said, collusion is often taken up 
as synonymous with conspiracy, as a negative aspect of people seeking to get an 
advantage by nefarious means. However, I am pointing to how a form of collusion 
might have a function for supporting people in their ongoing relating. I am not saying 
that collusion is universally necessarily good or bad as that would surely depend on 
the context. Rather than assuming people are up to no good in colluding with each 
other, I am suggesting that such activity can give people a sense of continuity and 
predictability in their social relationships.  
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There are two important factors in what I am describing as collusion. The first is that 
the contextual history is key to understanding how, without planning or discussion, 
collusion emerges and is maintained in groups and communities. The second is the 
importance that such collusion goes on being undiscussed because bringing collusive 
patterns of relating into our conversations disables our ability to continue the 
collusion. Consider the example of the Emperor’s new clothes. If the Emperor, 
realising that he is naked, was to discuss it with the people present, the collusion that 
he is fully clothed could no longer continue and feelings of shame would surely have 
followed as people recognised their collusive participation. 
 
Turning to the empirical basis of my project three, I noticed that there was something 
about the collusive nature of the job interview process, and the high stakes involved, 
that seemed to bring about a more ritualized way of relating together. Until I 
embarked on my research on this DMan programme I hadn’t paid much attention to 
what was going on in job interviews and now I found myself noticing and reflexively 
inquiring into them. In my narrative I described how I negotiated what I should say to 
have the best chance of getting the job whilst also being honest about what I thought 
about change in an organisational context. It is clear that even before the interview I 
was becoming aware of the choices I was making as I was becoming increasingly 
conscious of the collusion I was co-creating. In getting to grips with how such 
collusion, and ritualized ways of behaving, came about I pointed to how the formal 
and written rules governing interviews in my organisation have become increasingly 
detailed over time.  
 
Human resources scholars (see Arvey and Campion, 1982) have long been interested 
in the validity of job interviews and specialist practitioners tend to justify rules on the 
grounds of aiming for equal opportunities and the eradication of bias. This has the 
result of attempting to remove emotions too, as they are seen as the cause of irrational 
and flawed decision making. However, it was clear to me from my own experience 
that it is impossible to remove my emotions from my decisions about what to do. This 
is supported by the work of Damasio (2000) that I explored in project four, who 
argues that the areas of our brains that are responsible for deciding what to do are 
physiologically intertwined with our emotional experience. In contrast to ideas of 
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rational decision-making being dependent on the eradication of emotion, Damasio 
(ibid, pp40-41) found that brain damage that removes the ability to emotionally 
respond leads to difficulties in making decisions. He goes on to argue that feelings 
and emotions are essential to our ability to make sensible choices. This is in contrast 
to authors such as Derous et al (2016) who, writing from a human resource studies 
perspective, separate people’s ability to make rational decisions from those decisions 
that involve bias and emotions. Derous et al seem to me to be assuming a technical 
form of rationality that separates us from our emotions, which in my experience is 
often taken up in the rules for interviewing that are written by human resource 
specialists. Instead, rather than making strategic decisions in seeking to predict the 
future performance of a job applicant, in interview situations we are always trying to 
work with a combination of adherence to the rules, getting what we want and trying to 
be fair to the other people involved. The interview is an example of a highly political 
process where plenty is at stake for all participants, so it is important that the process 
is perceived as ‘fair’ and that the losers, if there are any, accept the result.  
 
Goffman (1959, pp23-24) and Simmel (1906, pp450-451) are helpful for 
understanding the performative nature of how people interact. Goffman explains how 
it is necessary for individuals to give an expected and consistent performance in 
fulfillment of specific roles and that it is a social process rather than performance 
being just about individual choices. Simmel points to how our competence in the eyes 
of others is dependent on our performance in any given context, which also supports 
the argument that what we understand as competent is both individual and social at 
the same time. Performance is not only individual, it is also social in that the meaning 
of the performance emerges from the gestures and responses between the people 
involved. If a participant in the interview fails to give the expected performance then 
the competence of such an individual could be called into question, both by 
themselves and others.  
 
Elias’ (2000) description of the civilizing process supports a theoretical understanding 
of how the rules and rituals of job interviews in the UK in both the civil service and in 
the voluntary sector have come about. Elias uses the example of the post-medieval 
French court to suggest that people’s understanding of what is appropriate in public 
life changes as society changes. Influenced by this idea of movement of ethics in 
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social processes, we can see the importance of history in how the rules pertaining to 
job interviews have emerged over time in the standardisation of human resource 
practice. In the UK, human resource functions in organisations grew out of increasing 
regulation that was intended to protect women and children at work. Personnel 
management was used as a term for the development of employment policies that 
were understood to be able to influence organisational productivity and the profession 
of personnel management emerged, taking up ideas from social sciences about 
motivation and organisational behaviour. Specialisms began to develop alongside 
increasing uses of selection testing. Influenced by ideas from the USA people moved 
away from thinking in terms of personnel management and started to use the term 
‘human resources’ which suggests thinking in terms of people being an asset or 
resource for organisations (CIPD, 2016). In this increasing bureaucratic development 
of policies, assumptions from strategic choice theory and research in the social 
science were taken up leading to the emergence of what I experienced as a generally 
accepted method of conducting job interviews in the UK public and third sector. What 
I am taking from Elias is an historical theory about social change – in this case 
assisting me to trace over time how assumptions, such as thinking of people 
possessing cognitive skillsets and as resources and assets of organisations, have been 
taken for granted in HR practice. In the organisations in which I have worked an 
implicit assumption has emerged that human resource specialists have the power to 
set out, in the policies that they write, how we must all behave in interview situations.  
 
I relate this to collusion by arguing that even if one perceives such rules as 
interpretable, one is obliged to essentially maintain them as one improvises one’s 
actions to continue to be considered as competent in the interview situation and to 
avoid the risk of shame and exclusion. I was aware of choosing what I was saying so 
that the interview could be successfully concluded. If I had acted outside of the rules 
there was a risk that the interviewers would not have been able to make a claim that 
they had ensured an equitable interview process, because we would have broken the 
rules for interviewing as they were set out in the organisational policy. These 
conclusions later influenced me to delve further in project four into what might occur 
when one tries to change how people relate together.  
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Before moving to project four, I will further clarify my argument set out in project 
three. The functional nature of collusion in job interviews entails the maintenance of 
the status quo in how people interact together. Through researching HR processes 
relating to job interviews I broadened my understanding that such collusion emerges 
from the interaction between many people over time and the assumptions that 
underpin it become embedded in rules and policies that become more or less 
unarguable. Since the 1970’s philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists have been 
pointing to the continual emergence of traditions in contrast to a view of culture as 
static. But continuities are also found in culture, whether in organisations or wider 
societies. I found Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of doxa persuasive as an explanation for 
how assumptions come to be taken for granted. Bourdieu explains that a custom or 
tradition emerges over time in the way people commonly speak. He describes this as 
doxa when it is something that is taken for granted by the majority of people and there 
is little support for it being anything but naturally true. Doxa emerges, undiscussed 
over time through people relating together. Such a custom or tradition “goes without 
saying because it comes without saying” (ibid, p167). When an argument is made 
against it, doxa may come to be considered as orthodox because there then exists an 
unorthodox argument against it. Rather than being a universal truth, doxa emerges 
over time and comes to be thought of as being the truth. In project three I describe the 
individualistic and systemic assumptions that get taken up by the HR and 
organisational development community that rarely get discussed or challenged. I 
would argue that such assumptions are representative of a form of doxa. Because 
these assumptions are taken for granted as naturally true any attempt to call them into 
question risks the person doing so to mis-perform and to be seen by others (and 
probably themselves) as incompetent and wrong. I am arguing that the community of 
HR and organisational development practitioners in the UK represent a thought 
collective, much as Fleck (1979) described the scientific community, whose thought 
style involves assumptions about organisations as systems, individualistic cognitive 
psychology and strategic choice. These assumptions are maintained by rules and 
policies to be followed that constrain and enable the ongoing relating of the people 
who find themselves having to apply them.  
 
In response to the anxiety of being deemed incompetent, through my research I have 
come to recognise the importance of practical judgement in understanding what to do 
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in situations where one becomes aware of collusive performances. Towards the end of 
project three I argued that practical judgement means skillfully responding to the 
situations one finds oneself in rather than simply following the rules (I go on in 
project four to explore practical judgement in more depth). To perform in a way that 
met the expectations of the interview panel meant exercising practical judgement in 
recognizing the power relating in which I was caught up and yet still trying to stay 
true to what I believed. As I moved into project four I was coming to see that, even 
though I may have skillfully exercised practical judgment in the job interview, such 
skillfulness does not necessarily translate into being able to do the same in less 
familiar circumstances, such as those I describe in project four. I am in agreement 
with Stacey (2012, p108) in that it seems to me that practical judgement is highly 
context related. The context of a job interview is very different to the context of board 
meetings in my organisation, which was new territory for me at the time of writing 
project four.  Different contexts bring people together with their own unique histories 
into different situations with diverse patterns of expected performances. As one 
becomes conversant with any given context, one can become more aware of the 
patterns of relating that prevail, thus potentially improving one’s ability to decide 
skillfully when to play the game and when to challenge it. However, there is no 
guarantee of success. Moving on to my narrative in project four I relate a painful 
example of how my unfamiliarity with the context in which I was working resulted in 




In project four I began with a more thorough investigation into what I am calling 
functional collusion. I argued that the common understanding of collusion is that it is 
an undesirable facet of people relating to each other and is defined as people 
deliberately working together to gain an advantage. Collusion is often interpreted in 
that way by organisational researchers (Tirole, 1986, 1992; Laffont and Martimort, 
2000; Kouroche, 2005). As an example, Tirole (1986) is an economist who looks at 
collusion in organisations by interpreting the relationships between people in 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations through introducing economic modelling. 
In doing so he assumes that responses between people can be predicted on the basis 
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that people will behave according to logical rules. This author recognized that 
relationships may form between people outside of those prescribed by the 
organisational design in what he calls coalitions. He does this with the purpose of 
describing how designers of organisations can put in place mechanisms that 
encourage some coalitions and eliminate others. It seems to me that authors such as 
Tirole simplify human interaction to make arguments about how best to structure an 
organisation. They view collusion as people working together with awareness to gain 
advantage for themselves. They see such collusion as undesirable because it frustrates 
efforts to predict organisational outcomes. In contrast, I am offering a more complex 
view of human interaction in which collusion emerges, without planning or 
discussion, from the history of people relating together in which ‘outcomes’ are 
understood as themes that shape the power relating in their ongoing, everyday, 
practice of working in organisations. 
 
A far smaller number of scholars describe aspects of collusion in similar ways to me 
in that they argue that it involves an absence of reflection and the use of evasive 
language in local interactions between people (Bullough Jr et al, 2004; Atkinson and 
McNamara, 2016). The work of Ashforth and Kreiner (2002) helped me to further 
argue that collusion involves ritualistic performances. Although they don’t directly 
reference her work, these authors echo the famous work of Menzies-Lyth in 
describing rituals as defences against anxiety. Ashforth and Kreiner (ibid, pp219-220) 
use the example of practices in a funeral parlour to describe how ritual enables 
emotions to be forestalled, redefined or rendered more acceptable. My recent 
attendance at the funeral of my step-father brought this into sharp definition for me. I 
noticed how the accentuated rituals of the funeral from the following of the hearse, 
religious rituals in the church, to the buffet at the wake (and in the case of my step-
father’s funeral some very heavy drinking) all served to contain the way people 
related to each other during the whole day. The rituals gave a predictability to the 
pattern of what was going to happen in circumstances in which high emotion could 
lead to relations becoming unbounded. There was clearly a function for all of those 
present in colluding in the ritualistic processes that were playing out. I describe this as 
a form of collusion because the way that people participate in the rituals has emerged 
over time without any planning or discussion that seems to me to be a way of 
covering over or containing the displays of emotion that might be difficult for others 
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to bear. I remember clearly my stepfather at the funeral of his mother getting very 
angry with his cousin. The cousin had chosen to wear a coloured shirt and a tie with 
piano keys on it rather than the white shirt and black tie worn by everyone else. My 
stepfather took his cousin’s choice of clothes (a clear step outside of the expected 
ritual) as a sign of disrespect. This seems to me a clear example of how we end up 
disciplining each other in the maintenance of ritual. Of course, such rituals differ in 
content depending on context and culture but I would argue that they are likely to be 
socially maintained in the same way in terms of process. In taking up the idea that 
collusion can involve an absence of reflection, use of evasive language and ritualistic 
performances, I went on to say that becoming aware of such collusive behaviours by 
others and oneself leaves one with choices about how to improvise one’s actions to 
maintain the collusion or to attempt to change it by doing something that is out of step 
with what others may expect one to do. 
 
In trying to further understand the disciplining social processes involved in collusion I 
found Bourdieu (2000) helpful in his description of how we embody the habitus in the 
sense that our demeanour, dress, conversation and way of thinking are all imprinted 
by the habitus in which we find ourselves. He makes an argument for how implicit 
collusion is the ongoing ratification and rectification of our actions through our 
relating with others. This description of implicit collusion seems to me to be a good 
explanation for how the anticipated discomfort of bodily felt processes of relating – 
interpreted as emotions such as shame – constrain our actions. Our sense of identity is 
formed through such processes and we are disciplined through this experience, which 
is paradoxically both individual and social at the same time.  
 
The events I described in the narrative in project four involved a lot of uncomfortable 
emotions for me. As I described in project three, in contrast to other organisational 
scholars, such as Derous et al (2016) who seeks to separate emotions from decision 
making, I had come to see that emotions are inevitably involved in processes of 
relating at work, and that one cannot choose whether to involve one’s emotions in 
how one decides what to do. Damasio (1994) is helpful in understanding the 
physicality of how decision-making involves both emotional experience and rational 
choices. But I would agree with Burkitt (2014, pp78-99) that reason and emotion 
cannot be separated in the way Damasio claims and that felt experience interpreted as 
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emotion is context dependent. By this I mean that in different contexts similar bodily 
experience will represent different emotions. Feelings of shame involve a raised heart 
rate, bodily shaking and sweating for me, but so does the anticipation of a thrilling 
fairground ride.  Through this emotional experience, as we interact with others over 
time, we are disciplined into behaving according to the patterns of relating in the 
habitus that we find ourselves in. To avoid the discomfort of emotions such as shame 
and guilt we collude with such patterns in the maintenance of the social object. In 
project three I colluded, more or less, with the interview panel as to the performance 
they expected of me. I avoided any feelings of shame and successfully got the job I 
wanted. My proposition in project three that there could be uncomfortable 
consequences of choosing not to collude, and giving an unexpected performance as 
described by Goffman (1959), seems to be borne out by my research in project four. 
 
So, in project four I found myself excluded and feeling sorry for myself, having 
attempted not to collude with the group with which I was working by challenging the 
familiar patterns of relating. Upon sharing my work to that point with my learning set 
and supervisors the social nature of my research on the DMan came into sharp focus. 
My learning set, including my first supervisor, had been suggesting that my project 
four, having been through a number of iterations was approaching the point where it 
might be good enough for me to move onto writing my synopsis. The usual 
expectation then was to share my work with a second supervisor. I understand that 
one of the intentions behind having a second supervisor not participating in the 
learning set, and only intermittently reviewing students’ work, is to enable them to 
take a more detached view. Chris, my second supervisor, responded to my work in 
what felt like quite sharp terms. He argued that I had gone about my attempt not to 
collude without properly preparing the political ground, and with poor practical 
judgement, and that it was this that had resulted in my exclusion. Whilst I recognise 
that he was inviting me to think about the politics of the situation I was describing, it 
felt like I was being reprimanded by him.  
 
Reflecting on this exchange between Chris and me has deepened my understanding of 
what Mead (1938, pp42-51) was writing about in his description of emergent social 
process. Mead argues that the meaning of one’s gesture is in the response of the other. 
By that I take him to mean that one is perpetually making sense of one’s own gestures 
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in relation to another’s who are themselves responding to your gesture in an ongoing 
social process. As each of us emerge as individuals through our different historical 
experience we may all subtly, or even not so subtly, respond differently to the 
gestures of others through our differing perspective of a generalized other. I think this 
is what Burkitt (2004, p118) meant when he said that people may subtly refract and 
deflect social values. Whilst someone may anticipate a particular response to their 
gesture, the meaning of it gets shaped by the response of the other in a continuous 
process of relating.  
 
My second supervisor may well have intended to provoke my reflexive inquiry into 
how I had participated in my own exclusion in my narrative in project four. However, 
because of my experience of being shamed and criticised by male authority figures in 
the habitus of my early years, I am particularly sensitive to the potential for shame 
and I interpreted his gesture as a rebuke. I remember when I first read his email to me. 
I was standing in a park in London and as I read his message I could feel my stomach 
and throat tightening. In that moment I wanted to run away and hide, I wanted to stop 
doing this doctoral programme. My response was to feel disappointed, hurt and 
ashamed. In his email Chris anticipated that he was taking a risk and that his response 
to my work may be disappointing for me. I fought with myself in my response: I 
wanted to get angry with him, to push him away. However, at the same time, I was 
able to recognise his reflexive practical judgement in trying to anticipate my response 
in the forming of his message to me. There was something in the way he expressed it 
which encouraged me to notice my own reaction. I was feeling disappointed, hurt and 
ashamed and I did want to run away but I was also able to be curious as to why I felt 
that way.  
 
My exchange with Chris and my learning set prompted me to return to a further 
exploration of practical judgement and ethics. In our learning set we had settled into a 
pattern of relating in which my set and my first supervisor were supportive of me 
moving on to writing my synopsis. It may also be relevant that my learning set and 
first supervisor were all women at this point (subsequently another male student 
joined the group). My historical experience of women authority figures has been 
almost exclusively supportive and nurturing. So, whilst the responses of my first 
supervisor to previous iterations on project four may well have been similar in their 
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content to those of Chris, as a man, the meaning of his gesture to me was experienced 
as much more of a shock. The incident I described in project two when I became 
aware of the infantilizing processes I used in my facilitation practice also involved a 
response to my work from a male second supervisor. I am sensitive to how I might be 
judged by such men as a result of having stern and critical male parental figures in my 
early life. In my research, this sensitivity has been emotionally painful whilst also 
useful in both enabling me to achieve a movement in my thinking as well as a fuller 
and more reflexive understanding of that movement.  
 
I think what was going on in my learning set was a form of the functional collusion 
that I have been pointing to in my research in that a familiar pattern of relating was 
emerging, undiscussed, in how we were working together. I’m not suggesting that 
anyone was deliberately avoiding shame but that seems to me to be what was 
happening.  There is, however, an important difference between my experience of the 
learning set and my experience at work. In the learning set, and between first and 
second supervisors, we were able to have conversations about what had happened that 
allowed us all to understand more about the collusion that may have been emerging. 
Having discussed a number of iterations of this synopsis with my first supervisor I 
can also see that my focus on the responses of my two male supervisors has resulted 
in the potential for the role of my female first supervisor to seem diminished in my 
account of what was going on. One can see that this could be an echo of my early 
habitus in which the role of supportive women in my life fades into the background 
against stern and disciplining male figures. The realization of this has saddened, and 
perhaps even shamed, me in that the ongoing support and challenge from my first 
supervisor has been crucial in completing my thesis. 
 
In project four I took issue with a view of ethics that seeks to separate the present and 
the future in which one can deliberately create a future through planning and acting in 
the present. This is a systemic way of thinking about ethics that represents the 
dominant discourse in organisations, according to Stacey (2007, pp350-352). As an 
example, from the perspective of management studies, Hian and El’fred (2004) take 
up the issue of organisational ethics in response to corporate scandals in the USA. 
These authors typify a stance in which the organisation is reified and actions can be 
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taken by managers and leaders to fold policies and processes into organisations that 
can predict the actions and even the values of employees, 
 
As ethical values may vary from one person to another, it may be necessary 
for leaders in organisations to adopt certain measures to inculcate certain 
ethical values among employees in order to manage organisational outcomes 
(ibid, p678). 
 
 As I describe at the end of project one, these kinds of assumptions were also made by 
people working in my organisation, as illustrated in the production of a set of 
organisational values by a small group of people that are intended to be somehow 
embedded in the organisation. There seemed to be an assumption that it is desirable 
and possible to set out the values of the organisation to which people could submit 
and align themselves, as described by Senge (1990, pp224-225). 
 
Instead, in agreement with Griffin (2002, pp169-170), I would argue for a view of 
ethics that takes seriously the idea of the living present in which the future is 
perpetually emerging from the gestures and responses between people in local 
contexts. In thinking about ethics in this way I think it is important to recognise that 
future global patterns of relating are dependent on what emerges from many 
interactions between people locally. We cannot separate the global ends we are 
seeking from the local means we use to achieve them. In project four I was trying to 
introduce a local change to patterns of relating by acting differently. However, in my 
judgement about how to act I wasn’t paying attention to the patterns of relating that 
prevailed in the situation I found myself in.  
 
In retrospect, project four could be described as an exercise in exploring the 
plausibility of what I had been proposing in previous projects. I had previously argued 
that people collude with each other to avoid feelings of shame and here I was, in my 
attempt not to collude, experiencing the shame and exclusion that it seemed to me that 
others were avoiding. In attempting to get the trustees and directors to explore their 
own patterns of power relating I became isolated and excluded from the group. I felt 
ashamed and deemed myself to be incompetent. In sharing my work with my learning 
set and my supervisors I came to understand that my feelings of incompetence were 
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not only the result of the disciplining social process in avoidance of change but also 
my own lack of discernment, or practical judgement, in when I could call what was 
going on into question and when I couldn’t. Since writing project four Barbara has 
resigned and I have been working with the other directors to make sense of how we 
will go on together, both in the interim period when we will be without a chief 
executive, and in the anticipation of a new one. In our meetings together we have 
been able to talk about our feelings of anger and anxiety about what seems like an 
increasingly uncertain future. These discussions serve to give us some detachment in 
our engagement with each other and an opportunity to reflect together about what is 
going on between us. 
 
As I was writing this synopsis, over twelve months had passed since the events I 
described in my narrative in project four. The work with my director colleagues and 
the board of trustees in forming a global partnership has continued. The model that 
Barbara drew up (described in project four) has become part of new planning and 
budgeting processes and the board of trustees have agreed to form a working group to 
look at what governance changes may be necessary in the future. The directors are 
also forming a transition management team, bringing in some senior managers from 
our offices in Africa, Asia and Latin America to help think about what changes might 
be necessary in management processes. I could not have foreseen the emergence of 
these groups as I was working with directors and trustees over a year ago but it is 
clear to me that the theme of creating a global partnership in the organisation is 
increasingly being taken up as part of the discourse as people relate to each other in 
their local contexts. In response, global patterns of relating are changing. I have 
brought in this update on what has happened since writing project four because I think 
it is an example of how patterns of relating change over time as a result of many 
people interacting with each other. I offer this not as any form of a resolution or final 
result. Only that patterns of relating are changing and they may or may not continue 






In this section I have set out three arguments that I have formed during my research. 
As they have emerged from my reflexive exploration of my experience at work in an 
International NGO, any generalizability beyond that habitus would need to be 
proposed with some circumspection.  
 
However, outside of this organisational context I have shared and discussed my 
research with organisational development practitioners working in other employment 
sectors (as I describe in the contribution to knowledge section below), and in these 
conversations some have expressed recognition of my description of working with 
functional collusion. This could indicate that my research may be generalizable to 
people working in that broader community. In addition, much as I describe in my 
contribution section later, my arguments can only be offered with warranted 
assertability, (Dewey, 1938, p7) given that human knowledge is ever evolving and 
moving. In the idea of warranted assertability, Dewey argues that considering 
something to be true can only be enough to enable us to take the next steps. Dewey 
was more interested in the process of coming to know as a continuous process of 
inquiry rather than in conclusive knowledge that he saw as an end to inquiry. Within 
this process what we thought was true may be found to be false,  
 
By ‘knowing’ Dewey means inquiry in a world that is not static. He means 
inquiry into things ‘lived’ by people. He means experimenting with solving 
problems such that the action entailed in the solving of problems is inquiry 
itself and warranted in the assertions made about the solved problem when it is 
solved (Boyles, 2006, p9). 
 
 
Argument One: People often collude with each other in the maintenance of the 
prevailing habitus in avoidance of shame. Anyone attempting to explore the 
collusive patterns of relating in groups risks triggering this shame and exclusion. 
 
In projects two and three I developed the argument that patterns of relating often 
emerge undiscussed between people over time and are maintained to give a sense of 
predictability in their social relationships. This has the function of limiting the 
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potential for uncomfortable processes such as shame to arise. Central to this argument 
is the concept of habitus.  To be explicit about how I am taking up habitus I will 
further reflect on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias.  
 
Bourdieu (1977) argued that an individual is the embodiment of their habitus and in 
his later work he recognized how he had changed in response to how his own habitus 
had been ruptured as a consequence of his social ascension through education (Reed-
Danahay, 2005). I understand this to mean that one changes in response to 
experiencing a change to the habitus without being able to lose the effect of one’s 
early experience. I grew up in a working class town and partly experienced that 
habitus as an expectation that to be a man one had to be tough and strong. The ability 
to physically dominate others was revered and respected. Although physically bigger 
and taller than others, I was less imposing than my two brothers, and consequently I 
thought of myself as lesser than them in the family hierarchy. I was able to do 
relatively well at school but that was less well respected socially. In contrast there was 
a belief that the best one could do was to find a job with good prospects and a 
pension. I took on these beliefs and did find a job with a pension but was never 
wholly satisfied with it, and although I had wanted to go to university, I didn’t feel 
able to do so. I have lived away from my hometown for a long time and since leaving 
have lived subsequently in different groups with different outlooks on the world in 
which the need to be tough was less present and educational ability was valued. 
During the time I have lived away from where I grew up I have completed a Masters 
and I am now doing this DMan programme. Now, when I return to visit family I feel 
ill at ease, as if I don’t quite belong. At a recent family funeral my mother told my 
aunt and uncle that I was doing a doctorate. Their response was to ask what that 
meant and what it taught me to do. I found that a difficult question to answer in a way 
that I thought would satisfy them. In the end I said something about how it was good 
for my career to have a doctorate (although I don’t think that is necessarily true). In 
response they nodded and agreed. As a consequence, I could feel the tension of trying 
to answer their inquiry ebbing away. I think this is an example of me colluding with 
the expectations of my family. Their understanding of education is in terms of other 
family members having become nurses. It seemed to me that their comprehension of 
the value of me doing a doctorate could only be understood in a very skills-based and 
instrumental way in which one seeks to better oneself and improve the family’s 
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prospects. As I was at a family funeral I didn’t feel that was the time and place to 
have a long conversation about the value of doing a doctoral programme. I think I was 
making compromises in the way I communicated because I wanted to be able to give 
them an answer that suited them and didn’t risk embarrassing or patronizing them. 
 
When reflexively responding to my work on the DMan I found the concept of habitus 
helpful in understanding what was going on. In project one my description of working 
in the immigration department of the UK government with the top down management 
of targets represents an example of how cybernetic systems assumptions were taken 
up and applied by everyone involved; in project two I felt disciplined by Barbara into 
using the MBTI psychometric tool and found myself engaging in infantilizing 
facilitation practices that were expected by the directors in the social object of their 
awayday. In these examples I recognise the physicality of habitus as described by 
Bourdieu (2000), by which I mean that we are formed by our habitus and it shows up 
in everything we do and say. Bourdieu’s habitus gives us an explanation for why we 
experience the social as a stable phenomenon as it is reproduced in each of us as we in 
turn reproduce and maintain and potentially change it in our ongoing interactions. My 
argument for functional collusion involves the processes of relating that continuously 
maintain the habitus. This is partly influenced by the avoidance of the anxiety and 
potential shame that could ensue as a consequence of not knowing what to do and the 
identity threat that may ensue. 
 
Elias (1998) also takes up the notion of habitus and for him, in common with 
Bourdieu, individuals are formed through an ongoing social process into which we are 
born. Elias uses the idea to describe how things change over time as what he calls the 
civilizing process takes place. Elias makes an important point about how the civilizing 
process is not the result of any deliberate planning but instead a form of order arises 
out of the complexity of relating between interdependent people, 
 
It is simple enough: plans and actions, the emotional and rational impulses of 
individual people, constantly interweave in a friendly or hostile way. This 
basic tissue resulting from many single plans and actions of people can give 
rise to changes and patterns that no individual person has planned or created. 
From this interdependence of people arises an order sui generis, an order 
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more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of the individual 
people composing it. It is this order of interweaving human impulses and 
strivings, this social order, which determines the course of historical change; it 
underlies the civilizing process (Elias, 1998, p50).  
 
For Elias, from these complex interactions between many people both stability and 
change arise at the same time. Mowles (2015, p103) takes up this idea in thinking 
about organisational change and argues that the dynamics of continuity and change 
are ever present in organisations and always have been and that a manager’s job is to 
work as creatively as possible with them. In project three I point to how the rules of 
HR practice have evolved over time with individualistic and systemic assumptions. I 
am proposing that such assumptions and rules have emerged without anyone planning 
them that then form part of the habitus of the UK public and third sector. As I 
described in project three, as I applied for and was interviewed for a promotion, to 
appear competent; I felt the need to more or less collude with these assumptions. 
 
So, Bourdieu and Elias contribute to the argument that we are thoroughly social 
selves, born into the habitus that forms us through emotional and discursive 
involvement with other people. We then reproduce this habitus as we constrain and 
enable each other in our ongoing relating. It is an aspect of this reproduction of the 
habitus in the context of organisational change that I have been describing as 
functional collusion, a reproduction that goes on in the context of discussions about 
the practice of organisational development. This is evident in my description in 
project one of working with the Burke Litwin model (Burke and Litwin, 1992). 
However, in agreement with Burkitt (2014, p118), I also found that the body does not 
always reproduce the habitus. Reflective individuals relating with other reflective 
individuals may subtly refract and reinterpret social values. Such small local changes 
in how people relate to each other may escalate into larger scale changes to global 
patterns of relating although such escalation is unpredictable.  
 
Present in the work of both Bourdieu and Elias is the idea of the internalization of 
social control (Reed-Denahay, 2005, pp60-61). My experience, as described in my 
research in project two and three, demonstrates how in a number of contexts (like the 
facilitated team event and a job interview process), I experienced the requirement to 
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perform in a particular way to be taken seriously. In project two my attempts to 
explore the patterns of relating that had emerged in a group were met with periods of 
silence that I experienced and interpreted as the anticipation of shame and anxiety. In 
project three I described how the processes of relating in the job interview situation 
have become formalized and ritualized. This formalisation manifested in rules and 
regulations as to how interviews should be conducted makes the interview process 
much more predictable and such predictability limits the potential for shame and 
anxiety. 
 
Anyone not performing as expected in what I have learned to think of as a social 
object, after Mead, would risk feelings of shame and exclusion. In project four my 
experience of attempting not to collude with the expected patterns of relating resulted 
in me feeling incompetent, ashamed and excluded. 
 
Argument Two: Reflexive inquiry offers a way of exploring collusive patterns of 
relating in groups. In addition, an exploration of emotions is an important part of 
any reflexive inquiry. 
 
As collusive patterns of relating tend to emerge undiscussed between people, finding 
ways to uncover and discuss them through inquiring into what we are doing together 
seems important if we are to find new ways of relating together, or at least become 
more aware of what we are doing. Such an inquiry would involve us reflecting upon 
and being reflexive about what we are doing. I will explain what I mean by both 
reflection and reflexivity. 
 
 John Dewey (2012/1910) identified reflection as a form of thinking that was 
important to learning from experience. He argued that reflection could be prompted 
by the experience of doubt or puzzlement related to what was being experienced. For 
Dewey reflection could stimulate purposeful inquiry and problem solving. He further 
suggested that thinking reflectively held the potential for people to notice and move 
away from what had become routine or habitual and instead move towards what he 
called reflective action, which involved critical deliberation on what had been taken 
for granted in one’s experience. So, for Dewey, reflection is rooted in experience and 
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practice, and he recognizes the potential for discomfort in being reflective but also 
cautions against unreflective inquiry;  
 
To turn the thing over in mind, to reflect, means to hunt for additional 
evidence, for new data, that will develop the suggestion, and will either, 
as we say, bear it out or else make obvious its absurdity and 
irrelevance…the easiest way is to accept any suggestion that seems 
plausible and thereby bring to an end the condition of mental 
uneasiness. Reflective thinking is always more or less troublesome 
because it involves overcoming the inertia that inclines one to accept 
suggestions at their face value; it involves willingness to endure a 
condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective thinking, in short, 
means judgment suspended during further inquiry; and suspended 
conclusion, and in mastering the various methods of searching for new 
materials to corroborate or to refute the first suggestions that occur. To 
maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted 
inquiry – these are the essentials of thinking (Dewey, 2012/1910, p13). 
 
More recently Donald Schon, an influential writer on organisations, in his book, The 
Reflective Practitioner (1983) argues for a form of reflective practice in which,  
 
The practitioner allows himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or 
confusion in a situation which he finds uncertain or unique. He reflects on the 
phenomenon before him, and on the prior understandings which have been 
implicit in his behaviour. He carries out an experiment which serves to 
generate both a new understanding of the phenomenon and a change in the 
situation (Schon, 1983, p68). 
 
In this work Schon differentiated between reflection-on-action, which involves 
reflection on what has occurred after the fact, and reflection-in-action, which involves 
the practitioner being able to think about what he or she is doing while they are doing 
it. He argued that reflection-in-action was at the centre of what he described as 
‘professional artistry’. Echoes of this reflection-in action can also be seen in Senge’s 
(1990) description of ‘personal mastery’ in which “people with a high level of 
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personal mastery live in a continual learning mode” (ibid, p142). In their descriptions 
of reflection and learning Schon and Senge take the idea of organisations and people 
as systems for granted. This leads them to individualise and decontextualize what it 
means to be reflective. Instead I am attempting to stay with the idea of the emergence 
of identity as a social process in which reflection can only take place in specific 
contexts in the living present. I would contend that reflection is action and there can 
be no separation between reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action as suggested by 
Schon.  
 
Mowles (2015) argues that reflection and reflexivity are different but connected 
activities. He suggests that reflection occurs as a first order action when one is able to 
detach oneself from one’s involvement. He goes on to contend that reflexivity is a 
second order action in which we think about how we are thinking about what we are 
doing, 
 
In reflecting we will be thinking and feeling deeply about something, 
possibly our own experience, while in becoming reflexive we are 
bringing that reflection back to ourselves and may be changed by it 
(Mowles 2015, p9). 
 
For Mowles then, reflexivity is a process that has the potential for the transformation 
of the researcher. It is a process through which the researcher recognizes that they are 
likely to have only a provisional view of what is going on in the situations they are 
researching due to limitations of their own bias and that in bringing reflection back to 
themselves they may be transformed. To make the claim that one is describing the 
world from more than one’s own perspective, one has to get into discussion with 
others. To work towards objectivity, one has to consider multiple subjectivities. This 
is less in terms of seeing subjectivity and objectivity as somehow separate and 
working to balance them (as I described it in project one), rather it is in terms of 
finding objectivity in the exploration of many subjective viewpoints as an ongoing 
process. One can pay attention to the biases that are present and taken for granted by 
the people with which one is interacting, described by Holland (1999) as paradigms or 
thought styles (after Fleck 1979), that limit awareness and movement of thought. 
These biases, paradigms or thought styles that show up in the patterns of relating 
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going on around us affect what people feel that they can and cannot say. They act as 
enabling constraints and may be different for individuals depending on the unique 
nature of their formative experience. I agree with sociologist Matthew Adams (2006) 
who recognizes that reflexivity is important if one is to explore one’s habitus.  
 
In project four I experienced what can happen when one acts outside of the expected 
patterns in that I was shamed and excluded. Later in project four, having been 
excluded, I had to find a way to continue participating in my ongoing work with 
colleagues. In doing so I found a way to share how I was feeling with other directors. 
This then seemed to prompt them to share their own feelings of vulnerability and the 
way in which we have been able to work with each other since has changed, perhaps 
partly as a result. In the sharing of my feelings, and encouraging the articulation of 
different responses from others, there is some evidence that patterns of relating are 
changing as we work together. I would argue that this is supportive of the idea that 
our everyday interaction with others creates us, just as we create others.  
 
In the maintenance of how we relate together I have argued that emotions are crucial 
and therefore recognition of emotions is important in the reflexive inquiry into our 
social experience. Given my experience that the avoidance of uncomfortable 
emotions, such as shame, plays an important part in collusive patterns of relating I 
would argue that emotion is an inevitable part of our experience. Therefore 
an exploration of our experience of emotions is a vital part of any social inquiry and 
an important aspect of reflexive practical judgement. 
 
The circumstances I described in project three in which I was able to successfully 
navigate the interview process and get myself promoted demonstrated how I could 
exercise practical judgment in giving an acceptable performance as an interviewee 
(something I have done many times). However, my performance in facilitating the 
board of trustees in project four demonstrated how my performance, because it 
differed from what was expected, interrupted the group’s ability to maintain the social 
object of the board meeting with the result of my exclusion and feelings of shame. 
This demonstrates the importance of context in exercising reflexive practical 
judgement, which is the ethical and political choice-making we do in the living 
present as we participate in ongoing social interactions (Mowles, 2015, p169).   
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Whilst I am arguing that reflexive inquiry may be a way of bringing to our attention 
the ways in which patterns of collusion are emerging in groups, I don’t think there are 
any guarantees that it will. As I have argued earlier, interactions between people in 
the living present can be unpredictable. Additionally, as I have found in my research, 
reflexive inquiry that calls into question our assumptions can challenge our sense of 
who we are and can lead to the discomfort of emotions such as shame. Attempts at 
reflexive inquiry in groups can lead to people feeling defensive, just as Neil expressed 
in project two. My experience of organisational life is that reflexive inquiry is not 
common, nor is being open to a state of doubt. Should reflexivity become over-used 
we could find ourselves constantly challenging everything, leading to people feeling 
inhibited in their participation (Solso, 2016, p176). And so, the appropriate invocation 
or encouragement of others to engage in reflexive inquiry also requires practical 
judgement in the contexts in which one finds oneself. 
 
Argument Three: Ethical judgements emerge and are contested in local situations 
in the living present rather than arising from the application of universal rules. 
 
If we are to attempt to inquire into our functional collusion with others we will 
inevitably find ourselves navigating ethical dilemmas as to how much to play the 
game and how much to call it into question. I am arguing that such ethical dilemmas 
cannot be adequately solved through the application of universal rules. 
 
Throughout my research I have drawn on the theories of George Herbert Mead and 
Norbert Elias to understand concepts of how, paradoxically, we become 
individualized through our social experience whilst we contribute to the maintenance 
of patterns of relating. Stacey and Griffin (2008) take up these authors in describing 
the theory of complex responsive processes of relating.  As I’ve described in project 
four, the future is perpetually being constructed in the living present (Griffin, 2002) in 
which our understanding of the past and our anticipation of the future constrains and 
enables our moment-to-moment interactions with others. The multiple interactions 
between people in the living present makes the future unknowable and therefore we 
cannot guarantee that our actions will be good in advance of carrying them out. 
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However, one can see attempts being made to predict what good future actions would 
be in lists of values or desirable behaviours set out in organisational polices and 
processes.  
 
In project one I described how I struggled with the ethical dilemma of whether to 
follow the organisational policy on the use of equipment or not. This was problematic 
because the policy did not seem to offer me any way of acting in a way that seemed 
ethically appropriate in the situation I was in. This resulted in me experiencing a 
double bind, an experience that Mowles (2015, p14) argues is common in 
organisations where people are encouraged to align themselves with organisational 
values and vision statements and yet at the same time to be themselves and to speak 
out when they have doubts. Such policies and rules often ignore the fact that life often 
presents contradictions and double binds. As an example, I would point to my 
experience of working with competency frameworks that I described in project two 
when facilitating the directors’ away-day. On the one hand we were discussing how 
we all might appreciate our individual diversity and yet on the other hand we were 
measuring each other on how well we had demonstrated a narrow set of pre-defined 
behaviours set out in the competency framework as universally desirable. As a result, 
managers often find themselves having to navigate such requests for unity and 
alignment in their everyday experience. In this thesis I have discussed ethics at length 
and I have argued that there is no system outside of our local relating and as such one 
can only take up such prescriptions as enabling constraints in how we relate together. 
These constraints pattern our conversations and, what is ethical, “…depends on who 
is involved, the context, the history and the relationships of power” (ibid, p16). 
 
As I said in project four thinking about ethics in this way involves practical 
judgement or phronesis which is a way of knowing that is action oriented, context 
dependent and pragmatic. It was originally differentiated, by Aristotle, from episteme, 
(which is functionalised by phronesis) a way of knowing in which truth is an external 
and universal constant and techne, which is a mode of knowledge that comes about 
through the incremental process of learning such as in developing a craft or art. As 
such, techne is context free and manifests as rules, principles and propositions. 
Phronetic knowledge cannot be taught through rules or principles because of its 
context dependence (Stacey, 2012, pp56-57; Hager, 2000; Doddington, 2013). In 
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framing ethics in this way, I am arguing that it is rooted in our ongoing actions in 
relationship to others. Gadamer (2004) argues that phronesis is the process through 
which, 
 
…one distinguishes what should be done from what should not, it is not 
simply practical shrewdness and general cleverness. The distinction between 
what should and should not be done includes the distinction between the 
proper and the improper and thus presupposes a moral attitude, which it 
continues to develop (ibid, p21).  
 
Ethical judgements in context are key to ongoing choices about whether to collude or 
not with the patterns of relating, which may include exploring the assumptions about 
what is proper or improper, that arise in the groups in which we find ourselves. 
 
My Research Ethics 
 
Zygmunt Bauman (1993) suggests that, as a consequence of modernity, consideration 
of ethics has moved from being the responsibility of individuals to an expectation that 
organisations can be held ethically accountable to society. He argues that this has 
resulted in attempts to develop universal ethical codes that seek to foresee and 
prescribe in rules, policies and procedures what is the right thing to do. Whilst my 
ethical agreement with the University of Hertfordshire is helpful, in that it clarifies the 
expectations of the university ethics committee, it has not negated the need for me to 
pay attention to how I recognise my ethical responsibilities to those who I encounter 
in my research in the particular situations that arise.  I have set out in my thesis and 
my arguments how I see ethics arising in practical judgements in the living present 
and I take issue with the view that ethics can be managed entirely through the 
application of policies and the completion of forms. Mead (1934) describes ethics in 
social terms,  
 
The sense which the individual self has of his dependence upon the organized 
society or social community to which he belongs is the basis and origin, in 
short, of his sense of duty (and in general of his ethical consciousness); and 
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ethical and unethical behaviour can be defined essentially in social terms: the 
former as behaviour which is socially beneficial or conducive to the well-
being of society, the latter as behaviour which is socially harmful or conducive 
to the disruption of society (ibid, pp320-321).  
 
Norbert Elias (2000) also sees ethical judgement as emerging from social processes 
and argues that the judgments of society of what is right and wrong are emerging and 
shifting over time. It follows then that what may be beneficial or harmful to 
individuals and society must also be shifting, albeit slowly. Therefore, “the ethics of 
what one does as a researcher, as with what one does in all other situations, is 
contingent upon the situation and the emerging and ongoing negotiations with those 
with which one is negotiating” (Stacey and Griffin, 2005, p26). That’s not to say that 
there is no right and wrong, rather that the judgements that persist are those that have 
emerged over time and that are continually being contested as people relate with each 
other.  
 
To give an example, at a recent residential of the DMan we negotiated which learning 
sets new students would join. Just before that session I discussed with a member of 
the faculty how similar processes in recent residentials had become more managed by 
the faculty. I offered the view that as the interactions had become more managed we 
had lost some opportunities for students to experience and learn from the anxiety that 
can come from allowing the process to emerge from the activity of students trying to 
form learning sets without assistance. I was asked and agreed to help facilitate the 
next set formation session. During the session we formed a circle of chairs as a 
fishbowl, with a smaller circle of chairs within a larger circle. We asked the new 
students to sit in the smaller circle of chairs and begin to discuss their experience so 
far and their preferences for which set they may wish to join. Two chairs were left 
empty for those who were observing the discussion to join it if they so wished. On 
discussing this process later one of the new students expressed how they had felt that 
arranging the conversation in this way had made them feel exposed and singled out as 
a group. Another student agreed and the focus seemed to shift to me as the one who 
had decided to arrange the process that way. I felt an increased sense of responsibility 
and I tried to explain how I thought that it was important that we left enough 
ambiguity for processes to emerge in the group so that we could learn from them. 
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This second student expressed how he felt that this wasn’t nice. I then asked him what 
he meant by the word ‘nice’. I could sense that we were contesting what it meant to 
act ethically in the group in terms of what it might mean to be nice. On the one hand it 
might be nice to offer a process that attempts to contain any possibility of anxiety by 
simply having faculty decide which groups people were placed in, and on the other 
hand it might be considered nice to give students the opportunity to express their 
preferences and influence the decision as well as learn from a more unplanned 
experience. What I’m trying to point to is that we often become aware of multiple 
views about what is the right thing to do in a group as we negotiate and contest them, 
not by adherence to a set of rules that are set for us elsewhere, at another time. 
 
My ethics agreement with the University of Hertfordshire ethics committee, reached 
through the submission of a completed form EC1 and further clarificatory emails, 
requires that I maintain the anonymity and respect the confidentiality, of those I write 
about and that if there was a need to identify any individual, I would document their 
consent. However, I would argue that it’s not only important to respect people’s 
anonymity in my research, but also to properly represent and recognise them. Again, 
the judgments about how to do that are contingent on the situation. Colleagues with 
whom I work know that I have been engaged in the DMan programme and that my 
research has been conducted through reflecting on my work experience. As my 
research has emerged from my practice it wasn’t possible to know in advance which 
events were relevant. As a consequence, it wasn’t possible to get informed consent 
from the people involved in advance. Where I refer to other people I routinely use 
pseudonyms. In a conversation with Barbara as I was nearing the end of my research 
she asked how it was going. I said that it was going well and I explained, as I had 
done on a number of other occasions, that my experiences at work continued to show 
up as narratives in my research. She asked me directly if she was included. I said that 
as my manager she did indeed show up as a character in those narrative as well as 
other directors and colleagues. In that conversation I got no sense that Barbara was 
concerned about how she had been represented in my research nor did she ask to read 
it. I have at other times discussed my research with others at work and shared my 
emerging ideas. Whilst they have also shown interest, they have not shown any 
concern. I haven’t actively sought to share my research with my colleagues as I have 
gone along. This is because whilst I recognise that I am writing about my 
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relationships, which inevitable means that other people appear in my narratives, I 
have not sought to engage others as active participants as one might if one was 
conducting research in the form of action research.  
 
Ferdinand et al (2007) looking at ethics from an ethnographical perspective suggest 
that “researchers are often deliberately vague or choose not to divulge important 
information about the aims of their research in an attempt to avoid any effect this may 
have on participants’ behaviour” (ibid, p533). There are times in my research, such as 
in the conversations I describe above, where I have found myself becoming aware of 
walking that ethical tightrope as I have responded to questions about my research 
from Barbara and the other directors. Whilst my ethical contracting with the 
University of Hertfordshire focused on ensuring the consent of participants, I would 
argue that it is much more important to recognise that ethical questions arise all of the 
time in both work and research. In project two I describe how I felt shame about the 
idea that I had been infantilizing people in my facilitation practice. There were a 
number of times in my research when I found the patterns of power relating between 
me and others troubling. In project two, I felt somewhat coerced by Barbara about the 
use of MBTI instrument and I felt shame at the realization of how infantilizing 
patterns of relating had emerged between me and the directors. Additionally, in 
project four I experienced shame and exclusion as a result of my attempt not to 
collude with the board of trustees. These are examples of how ethics have shown up 
in my research, just as they inevitably arise in everyday life, and considering ethical 
choices is integral to making practical judgements. Mowles (2015, p169) argues that 
attempting to impose abstract standards to cover future ethical dilemmas risks 
creating totalitarian conditions, by which I take him to mean that people find 
themselves obeying rules set by others under threat of being penalized if they don’t. 
Hannah Arendt as a German Jew and political theorist, having survived WWII and the 
horrors of the holocaust, was particularly interested in totalitarianism. Arendt covered 
the trial of Eichman as a writer for the New York Times and as a result she wrote her 
book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Arendt, 1963). Arendt 
was particularly interested in how Eichmann attempted to explain his actions as 
having just been obeying orders and the law in doing his job (ibid). Arendt contended 
that totalitarianism arises when people unthinkingly perform their duties and she goes 
on to argue that, 
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… the essence of totalitarian government, and perhaps the nature of every 
bureaucracy, is to make functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative 
machinery out of men, and thus to dehumanize them. And one can debate long 
and profitably on the rule of Nobody, which is what the political form known 
as bureaucracy truly is….we have become very much accustomed by modern 
psychology and sociology, not to speak of modern bureaucracy, to explaining 
away the responsibility of the doer for his deed in terms of this or that kind of 
determinism (ibid, pp289-290). 
 
This description of bureaucracy and the struggle of deciding what to do in that face of 
pre-determined rules echoes my description in project one when I was faced with the 
dilemma of whether to use equipment to help identify dead bodies. I would argue that 
the future is unknowable and any abstract decontextualized rules can never fully 
cover all the ethical challenges one will experience. Thinking in this way then leads 
us to understand practice as the making of practical judgements in how to work with 
such rules in local contexts rather than simply complying with them. In deciding to 
disobey the policy I found myself having to make ethical and moral judgments about 
what to do in the living present, which included my experience of working in that 
organisation in the past and my anticipation of what might happen in the future. 
Recently, an Irish colleague was travelling with his Sri Lankan wife to Ireland via a 
London Airport. Because of changes to UK law, people of Sri Lankan nationality are 
required to have a visa even to transit the UK. My colleague’s wife did not have a 
visa for the UK and was refused boarding onto the aircraft by the airline and had to 
find another route to travel to Ireland that did not involve transiting through the UK. 
However, once in Ireland, because there are no immigration controls between Britain 
and Ireland, my friend’s wife was free to travel back and forth to the UK as much as 
she wanted to. What I am trying to illustrate with this example is how complicated 
laws, policies and rules emerge from attempts to predict answers to future situations 
that can result in unintentional harm to people when they struggle to apply those rules 






The methodology I used in my research was partly dictated by the requirements of the 
DMan programme and partly developed by me to address the specific questions that 
arose from my experience at work. The DMan programme is founded on the 
perspective of complex responsive processes of relating (Stacey and Griffin, 2005) 
and as a participant on the programme one is required to take that perspective 
seriously.  
 
Another part of the requirements of the DMan programme is the participation in four 
residential weekends per year. These residentials involved working with learning sets 
and engaging in input sessions from faculty members. They also involved working in 
groups, drawing on an understanding of group analysis (Foulkes, 1975). In 
developing the practice of group analysis, Foulkes was influenced by Norbert Elias in 
understanding the interdependent nature of the individual and the group. Stacey 
(2003), who was in turn influenced by Foulkes, explains, “The group analytical 
situation enables observation in a social setting (including self observation)” (ibid, 
p311). In these group sessions the community is able to explore how patterns of 
relating emerge over time and in which “students are encouraged to make a 
contribution to practice from their practice, the crucible of the experiential group 
offers important material for them to reflect on and make links with their everyday 
practice and become reflexive about it” (Mowles, 2017, p11). As my research calls 
for me to pay attention reflexively to how I am forming and being formed by my 
experience in social settings, developing an understanding of group analysis through 
these residentials has clear relevance. In my thesis I have explicitly written about how 
my research has been influenced by my work in the learning set including my 
supervisors, and the wider community of researchers engaged in the DMan 
programme, including my interactions with my supervisors.  
 
If I take seriously one of the paradoxes at the heart of complex responsive processes 
theory, that the individual and the social are the singular and plural of one ongoing 
process (Griffin, 2002), then any method that seeks a separation between my research 
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and me is clearly unsuitable. This would rule out any form of positivist research 
approach that seeks to eliminate the researcher’s bias from the process. In addition, if 
I also accept the argument that I cannot fully know the outcome of my actions before 
I take them, setting out an outcome of my research in advance in the shape of a 
hypothesis would also seem contradictory. In my research I am not reaching for a 
form of generalizability that comes from decontextualised replication. Instead I am 
suggesting that a systematic rigorous argument that elicits resonance from the reader 
in terms of recognition in their own experience represents generalizability in terms of 
my research (Mowles, 2015, p13).  
 
As an example, I shared my description of how I came to understand my facilitation 
practice as infantilizing and the shame that ensued for me in project two with the 
wider DMan community at one of our residential meetings. In the discussion that 
followed there was much recognition from the group, especially my description of my 
experience of being trained in and implementing MBTI sessions. In a more recent 
residential some newer students have also shown an interest in my description of 
functional collusion and have expressed how it has helped them reflexively respond to 
their own experience. This resonance with my work from others is also supported by 
my locating my experience in academic literature as I turned to Aram (2001) to help 
me understand shame, to Damasio (1994) and Burkitt (2014) in developing my 
understanding of emotions, and to Bourdieu (2000) and Elias (2000) in understanding 
habitus. So, the approach I have taken has been formed through an attempt to 
demonstrate how my themes and arguments have emerged from a reflexive 
exploration of my practice in relation to relevant literature.  
 
The consequence of taking this approach is that my thesis hasn’t followed the 
structure commonly found in other PhDs whereby one would set a hypothesis, 
complete a literature review, identify a gap in knowledge and seek to fill it as a 
contribution to knowledge. Alvesson & Sandberg (2011) point out that gap-spotting 
as an approach to forming a research question for qualitative research depends on one 
taking a position that there is a reality which already exists. Instead they propose 
problematisation as a way to conduct research that seeks to challenge current 
assumptions. My thesis has emerged through the process of my research into my 
experience of working with others at times when I have found myself disturbed, 
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puzzled or challenged by what is going on around me. I am drawing from a pragmatic 
philosophical position the idea that we can make, “productive use of doubt by 
converting it into operations of definite inquiry” (Dewey, 1929, p228). Each project in 
this thesis started with a dramatic narrative drawn from my experience at work that I 
then shared with the learning set. In turn they each give a response to my narrative 
that started the reflexive process of me trying to understand what was going on and 
how I was thinking. Through a process of further iterations and drawing in relevant 
literature, I went on exploring the narrative until I had a sufficient explanation of what 
had occurred to enable me to move on in my research. In consecutive projects I 
improved my thinking about how I was thinking. 
 
Martella, who also takes up the work of Dewey describes well what I was reaching 
for,  
 
Thus, in scientific inquiry one starts from a situation in need of explanation: 
Given one’s current understanding, there is something surprising or 
disturbing; something one wants to understand better or is unable to 
accomplish. This starts off an iterative exploration where one examines one’s 
current conceptions, the experiences one has had, and perhaps gathers some 
new experiences, in order to find a way to look at the situation that resolves 
the tensions and shows a way forward (2015, p54). 
 
The structure of my thesis is an attempt to demonstrate my reflexive consideration of 
problematic situations I have experienced as they have arisen through four projects 
and culminating in a synopsis which is intended as a further reflexive turn on all four 
preceding projects, taken as a body of work from which my arguments and my 
contribution to both practice and knowledge has emerged. The requirements of the 
DMan programme encourage students not to change the four projects after they have 
been written. As I said earlier, this is because the four projects, presented in the order 
they were written, should show one’s movement of thought and growing powers of 
analysis. 
 
Complex responsive processes of relating as a perspective comes partly from 
interpretations of the work of writers such as John Dewey (1958) and George Herbert 
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Mead (1934), who are representative of the pragmatic school of philosophy. The 
method is to engage with one’s experience, which in Dewey’s terms (1958) is the 
object and the experience of the object both at the same time. My research method has 
much in common with existential hermeneutics where, 
  
…we are irrevocably merged with our world before any conscious reflection, 
and the polarisation between a thinking subject and an object is a dubious 
secondary construction…Hence what really matters is to study our place in the 
world. We are continually and without our consent, thrown, as it were, into an 
existence in a world where we have to find our way (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 
2000, pp80-81). 
 
Brinkmann (2012, p35) points out that the social world in which we all live always 
consists of experience, discourse and objects and suggests that we can begin from any 
one of these three perspectives but we must remember to take all three into account. 
Whilst I find the separation of experience and discourse problematic, my reading of 
Brinkman is that he separates them to further our understanding but then emphasises 
that they are always present. An example from my research would be the conversation 
with directors in which Barbara drew up the prototype model. The experience was 
one of anxiety and then diminishing anxiety that I experienced. The social process 
involved the systemic discourse of the idea that we can use abstract models to plan 
our activity and the drawing of these models involved the use of objects. Objects such 
as marker pens and flipchart boards, which are so ubiquitous in my experience of 
organisational life (and not really anywhere else except perhaps at school), and which 
serve to mediate so many of my organisational conversations.  
 
My research is taken from my own experience and as such represents a case study that 
is specific and singular in context. A number of authors have developed interest in the 
potential of investigating individual case studies (Thomas, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2001; 
Mowles, 2015; Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).  Thomas points to the limitations of 
this form of research in that case studies can be seen as less valid. He suggests the 
reason for this is that generalisation is thought of in relation to induction rather than 
abduction. Thomas (2010) claims that, 
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It seems to me that any argument about the weakness of case study that 
rests on its lack of generalisability fails to recognise the limits of 
induction in social science generally and fails simultaneously to 
acknowledge the significance of abduction. It fails, in other words, to 
recognise the offer that can be made in local circumstances by particular 
kinds of looser generalisation, whatever one calls these (ibid, p577). 
 
 In my research my claim to validity for the stances I have taken should be tested by 
their ability to provide plausible answers to my research questions through the process 
of abductive rather than inductive reasoning. This is a form of reasoning that we 
employ in situations where we are uncertain, and that allows us to make sense of our 
experience. To differentiate abduction from induction and deduction: when using 
induction as part of one’s method, one is able to generalise through observing a 
number of instances of a given phenomenon and therefore the quantity of cases is 
important. With regards to deduction, one engages in a process through which one 
would attempt to falsify general theories by deducing testable hypotheses. These 
forms of reasoning clearly have a place in scientific inquiry but in terms of my case 
specific social inquiry it seems to me that abduction is a more appropriate way for me 
to express my arguments given that abduction is closely linked to and emerged from 
pragmatist philosophy (Peirce, 1903). Brinkman (2012) given this explanation for the 
process of abductive reasoning, 
 
Abduction is a form of reasoning that we employ in situations of uncertainty; 
when we need an understanding or explanation of some effect. It can be 
formalised as follows; (1)  we observe X, (2) X is unexpected and breaks with 
our normal understanding, (3) but if Y is the case, then X makes sense, (4) 
therefore we are allowed to claim Y,  at least provisionally (ibid, p46). 
 
To take an example from my research, in project two I observed that there were 
pauses in conversation when I asked questions of the directors that were intended to 
inquire into how we were relating with each other. In exploring literature on, and my 
experience of, shame as a response to not knowing I conjectured that these pauses 
were in response to the felt potential for shame to arise in the group.  
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In taking a first-person perspective with an abductive method it is arguable that a lack 
of generalisability is a limitation of my research in that it is risky to generalise too far 
from the local interactions that I have described. As a consequence, my claims as to 
the generalisability of this work are limited to the community of organisational 
development practitioners working in UK non governmental organisations.  
 
This pragmatic approach to research is also in contrast to constructivist methods that 
would argue that reality is entirely socially constructed. Martela (2015) is helpful in 
his description of pragmatism as an alternative to positivist/constructivist approach to 
inquiry, 
 
Instead of a choice between starting either from the ‘real world’ or from 
‘discourses’, pragmatism sees that inquiry starts from, and is always 
embedded within, our ongoing daily experience. Scientific inquiry, as well as 
any other inquiry, should accordingly start from the problematic situations we 
face in our lives, and this already gives it an inescapably normative character: 
scientific contributions are ultimately judged by their capacity to settle the 
problems we face as human beings, their capacity to widen our understanding 
of what is possible, and their capacity to guide us towards our aspirations  
(ibid, p558). 
 
It is my assumption that rather than practice and theory being separate, they are 
entangled. This means that my practice and my theorising are emerging together as I 
progress. For example, during project two, whilst reflecting on my experience of 
facilitating a team away-day, I unexpectedly came upon the importance of shame in 
learning experiences which then led me to theorize that in avoiding shame we may 
collude together to avoid significant learning and to maintain current patterns of 
relating. This then caused me to think about the implications for my facilitation 
practice, to think of my practice as a form of temporary leadership. Also, in project 
four, when I responded to the critique from my second supervisor I was able to take 
that project into a deeper exploration of practical judgement. His response also 
brought to my awareness, and that of my learning set, as to how we might have been 
colluding with each other in avoidance of having difficult conversations. This then 




Torbert (1991) suggests that we need to look at our everyday experience and 
describes it as primary data. Brinkman (2012, p17) defines everyday life as what 
mediates the researchers’ activities and experiences where everyday objects are those 
that the researcher appropriates and uses, and situations and events are those that the 
researcher experiences such as conversations, parties, work and rituals. In my 
research, because I am interested in understanding my practice, the practice of others 
and the relationship between the two, I have attempted to explore these everyday 
experiences we may all take for granted as being part of organisational life, such as 
team building events, job interviews, and board meetings. Rather than seeing these 
events as simplified interactions that happen according to the rules that have been set 
out for them in advance, an approach that Stacey (2007) would describe as being 
rooted in a formative causality, I have sought to reflect the complexity of what it 
means to participate with others. To that end I have adopted a reflexive, narrative 
methodology in which I have used narrative descriptions of my everyday experience 
of working in organisations. Using these narratives I explore the interaction between 
myself and others, including the abstract and propositional frameworks that are used 




The use of narrative as raw material for analysis from which themes and patterns 
emerge is a well-established research method (Czarniawska, 2004; Stacey and Griffin, 
2005, pp9-10; Andrews et al, 2013; Bruner ,1991). Stacey (2003) describes how 
human experience is formed by the sharing of stories in order for people to account 
for and to make sense of what they are doing,   
 
My proposition then is that all human relationships, including the 
communicative action of a body with itself, that is mind, and the 
communicative actions between bodies, that is the social, are story lines and 
propositions constructed by those relationships at the same time as those story 
lines and propositions construct the relationships. They are all complex 
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responsive processes of relating that can be thought of as themes and 
variations that recursively form themselves in bodily interaction (ibid, p78). 
 
By taking a narrative approach to my research I am trying to explore my own 
experience reflexively to understand how I am being formed by my communicative 
interaction with myself, which is my mind (this means that I am taking a particularly 
social view of how I understand the development of self-awareness for an individual) 
and my communicative interaction with others, which is my social experience and 
how those interactions form patterns of relating.  An example of this is how I describe 
in project one that I took up ideas of management from my experience of being 
managed and how, in completing a Master’s programme, I came to see myself as a 
developer of people and organisations and came to think of myself and others as 
systems in which I could intervene. The evidence I have used is the narratives I have 
drawn from my experience at work.  
 
Clandinin and Connelly (2000) take up the work of Clifford Geertz (1988) and Mary 
Catherine Bateson (1994) in considering anthropological inquiry when using 
narrative. From Bateson they argue that it is human to think in metaphors and to learn 
through stories and that ambiguity is in the nature of living life and not to be 
eliminated from inquiry. And in Geertz they find support for their suggestion that 
human stories are written from an ‘I’ perspective that emerges from relationships with 
others (as cited by Clandinin and Connelly 2000, p9). This sets out well what I have 
been doing in my research in exploring my relationships through writing and 
inquiring into narratives of my experience at work. In the flow of the thesis I have 
tried to show some of the messiness and the ambiguity that I have encountered as my 
research has progressed. This is exemplified by the way my research turned on 
responses of my second supervisors and interactions with my learning set in projects 
two and four and how I struggled to maintain a reflexive stance in the midst of my 
emotions. 
 
The narratives that form the data or raw material for my research are drawn from 
social situations at work in which I am a participant. My research has some of the 
characteristics one would expect in autoethnography, in that I am attempting to make 
some generalisations about people and organisations. Much as I have done, auto-
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ethnographers approach research through writing narratives drawn from their 
experience of participating in a particular culture or habitus. In using such particular 
and local experience there are clearly issues of generalisability. This is taken up 
through an argument of generalisability being achieved through the evocation of 
resonance from the reader of such research (Anderson, 2006). In my research this 
resonance is tested regularly through the responses in my learning set and from 
sharing my emerging work with other organisational practitioners.  
 
However, the social process characteristics of the method I have taken up moves me 
away somewhat from autoethnography in that autoethnographers will often work 
alone (or at least give that impression in their writing), whereas in writing my 
research I make it explicit how others are responding to it (such as those in my 
learning set and the wider DMan community) as an important part of the method. This 
gives my work some of the flavour of what Lapadat (2017) describes as collaborative 
autoethnography in that I have been explicitly working in collaboration with other 
researchers. However, there are differences. Lapadat describes a process in which 
researchers share stories and pool data whereas in my research it is only narratives 
drawn from my experience that I use as data and it is in my narratives of my own 
experience that the other researchers show up. 
 
Ralph Stacey and Doug Griffin explain that “Taking one’s experience seriously, 
through articulating the narrative themes organizing the experience of being together, 
is an essentially reflexive activity and in its fullest sense this is a simultaneously 
individual and social experience” (Stacey and Griffin, 2005, p23). I want to go on the 




What does it mean then to be reflexive? Holland (1999, p167) suggests that “an 
important function of reflexive analysis is to expose the underlying assumptions on 
which arguments and stances are built.” In taking a reflexive stance I recognize the 
impossibility of being in any way outside of my own experience. In being reflexive I 
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am seeking to not only notice and think about what is going on in my interactions 
with others, but also to think about the way I am thinking (Stacey, 2015, p112). 
 
I am being reflexive in my pursuit of understanding my actions and the responses and 
actions of others, including the stances and arguments that I, and others, use. I have 
sought to further my reflexivity through analysis of my own analysis as my research 
progressed through projects one to four and the final synopsis. Alvesson and 
Sköldberg (2009, pp271-280) suggest that wide reading is helpful in developing 
reflexivity and in responding to my narratives I have sought to explore a breadth of 
relevant literature across several disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, 
neuroscience, philosophy and organisational studies in pursuit of understanding of 
what is going on. Conversations with my learning set, my supervisors and the wider 
DMan community, in which I explore my work and my narratives, also served to 
deepen my reflexive thinking. It is in these conversations, where my narratives and 
explanations of my work encouraged critical responses from others that I have been 
enabled to work towards as rigorous an argument as possible.  
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
My theory about collusion offers a departure from common ways of thinking about 
why people choose to do what they do in social situations. People often try to 
understand the decisions people make through an exploration of particular moments 
of individual choice as exemplified by the famous experiments of Solomon Asch 
(1956). With regard to OD practice, authors such as Hannafin and Tolbert (2006) take 
up ideas of individual choice and offer techniques on how to exercise it to make 
change happen. In an attempt to further inquire into what I mean by collusion I will 
critically explore these author’s work and go on to discuss collusion in terms of what 
it means to be an organisational development practitioner.  
 
Solomon Asch conducted experiments with subjects drawn from white male 
university students. In these experiments subjects were placed in a situation where 
they were in a minority of one in responding to questions. They were asked to match 
the length of a given line—the standard—with one of three other lines. One of the 
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three comparison lines was equal to the standard; the other two lengths differed from 
the standard (and from each other) by considerable amounts. All but one of the group 
were in on the experiment and were told to respond on certain trials with wrong and 
unanimous answers. Into this group was placed an individual who was not aware that 
the group had been primed to answer a certain way. This person heard the majority 
respond unanimously with answers that clearly contradicted his own assessment, and 
that differed from the true length of the lines by amounts ranging from 3/4 to 1 3/4 
inches.  In these experiments the single individual was placed in the position of a 
minority of one against a wrong and unanimous majority. A significant proportion of 
the subjects placed in the minority of one position gave incorrect answers that were 
shared by the others in the group who were in on the experiment. In the experiments 
Asch used control groups and looked for statistical differences in how people 
responded.  There was a focus on answers given by individuals in groups at the 
specific time of the experiment and in interviews later, subjects were asked to give an 
account as to why they responded as they did.  
 
Of those that answered incorrectly, but in line with the group, they explained their 
actions in the following statements; “I felt the need to conform”, “It was more 
pleasant to agree than to disagree”, “I agreed less because they were right than 
because I wanted to agree with them”, “It takes a lot of nerve to go in opposition to 
them", and “It is hard to be in the minority”. Of those that answered correctly but out 
of line with the group they explained their actions thus; “if I were to be honest I'd 
have to say what I saw”, and “I was supposed to give the right answer” (Asch, 1956, 
p32). It seems to me then that there were at least two forms of collusion going on 
here. The majority of the subjects (those who were in on the experiment) had 
discussed their actions and were knowingly agreeing with each other to give wrong 
answers rather than the collusion that I have been describing (which arises without 
prior discussion). As I discussed in project four, I would argue that this form of 
collusion is the common way of thinking about it that shows up in most organisational 
literature on the subject (Marx, 2017; Harrington, 2016, Roux and Thoni, 2015; 
Porter, 2005). The second form of collusion is more in line with that which I am 
pointing to in my research. Individuals, on finding themselves in a minority in groups, 
in terms of what they see as true, find themselves going along with the majority. In 
everyday organisational terms this form of collusion emerges undiscussed, over time 
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and involves the whole group. I am arguing that such collusion serves the function of 
maintaining ongoing patterns of relating, existing power relations and the avoidance 
of uncomfortable emotions.  
 
In structuring experiments to observe individual responses to the actions of others in 
groups and generalising through statistical analysis of those responses, Asch (1956) 
takes the perspective of seeing groups as being made up of interacting but 
independent individuals. In contrast I am arguing for staying with the paradox of the 
individual and the social forming and being formed by each other that allows me to 
write about individuals and social patterns of relating. This relating takes place in the 
living present in which our identity emerges from our experience of the past and our 
anticipation of the future. In these terms the individual and the social are indivisible 
and the history of people’s relationships is key to understanding what is going on. In 
my view, Asch’s experiments, which focus on only a specific individual judgement at 
a specific time, lose the complexity of the narrative histories and future desires of the 
people involved and how such histories and desires shape ongoing interaction. With 
that in mind, I find it interesting that the unwitting participants in Asch’s experiments 
were recruited by peers who were known to them, and had already participated in 
previous experiments (ibid, p4). It seems to me that the nature of their relationships 
prior to taking part in the experiments would have had a significant bearing on what 
happened and yet it is barely discussed in Asch’s writing. It is the importance of 
history in the emergence of collusive patterns of relating that I am pointing to strongly 
in my research.  
 
My induction to the community of practice as an organisational development 
practitioner on completion of a Masters degree involved me taking up the humanistic 
and systemic perspectives of that community, which I would argue represents an 
example of a clear thought collective with a particular thought style. This thought 
collective and thought style has emerged unplanned over time since WWII, much as I 
described in project one. I will say more about this history of OD a little later in this 
section. However, first I want to set out an example of how researchers working in the 
OD tradition write about social phenomena. 
 
 176 
Rainey-Tolbert and Hanafin (2006, pp69-82) describe something they call the 
perceived weirdness index (PWI). They recognise a phenomenon in which people 
conform with expected behaviours in groups and they describe an index in which one 
can be absorbed into the group, or one can be rejected, or one can occupy what they 
describe as the ‘PWI sweet spot’. On the face of it they seem to be describing 
something similar to how I have experienced what I am calling functional collusion.  
However, they separate the individual and the social and consider the social to be a 
system into which individuals can be absorbed or from which they can be rejected. 
They also go on to assume the individual practitioner is an autonomous individual 
who can, through developing something they call ‘presence’, choose how weird they 
want to be in any given situation. If one is not weird enough one risks being absorbed. 
If one is too weird one risks being rejected. By doing this the authors seem to suggest 
that to be weird, or in my words not to collude, is some form of decontextualized 
strategic choice in that choosing to be weird is done with a foreknowledge of how 
others will respond to what might be a variety of actions and choosing which action is 
most appropriate.  
 
I argue strongly against that proposition. If one holds that the individual and the social 
are indivisible, and there is nothing beyond local relating, there is no autonomous 
individual self that can choose in the way they describe. Equally, there is no system 
into which one can be absorbed or from which one can be rejected. Instead I argue for 
wider patterns of power relating, understood as habitus, that emerge from people 
interacting with each other in which one finds one’s identity changing and being 
maintained in a paradoxical stable instability (Stacey, 2012, pp99-100). In such power 
relating one can find oneself being included or excluded as people struggle to 
maintain existing patterns of power relating (ibid, p29). I have found that people 
working in organisational development take for granted the idea of decontextualized 
strategic choice as if it was some kind of personal skill. As an example, in a recent 
conversation, a friend who also works as an organisational development practitioner, 
recounted some work he had been doing with a group of managers. He explained that 
the group had asked him to challenge them and so he took up that invitation and 
worked with them to try to uncover the patterns of relating that were present in this 
group and went undiscussed (I would argue that he tried not to collude with them). 
His account of what happened was that the group had become fractious and had 
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resisted his invitation to reflexively explore what was going on between them. He 
later found that the group had decided to discontinue the work they had been doing 
with him. I got a strong sense that my friend felt that he had misjudged the situation, 
as if he had somehow failed in his practice. Whilst I recognise this example is from 
someone else’s experience, the description of my friend feeling that he, individually, 
had somehow failed suggests that this could be an example of how someone can 
individualise and take to themselves notions of incompetence that can arise in a 
group. It seemed to me from how he was expressing himself that he was taking on, as 
the facilitator, the entire responsibility for what had happened. When we take up ideas 
of practice that separate the individual and the social and individualise skills and 
competencies in the way that Rainey-Tolbert and Hanafin (2006) do, if it goes wrong 
it can only be the result of the practice of the facilitator having not been good enough, 
as I described in project two. From the perspective of these authors the individual 
facilitator was either ‘too weird’ or had not developed sufficient ‘presence’. I am not 
arguing that the facilitator has no responsibility for what happens when working with 
such groups, instead I am suggesting that they are a participant in the unpredictably 
emerging patterns of relating in which one can find oneself included or excluded. 
 
In describing ‘presence’ Rainey-Tolbert and Hanafin (2006) argue that, 
Presence is use of self with intent. It requires the practitioner to be constantly 
aware of self and others, and to selectively use that awareness to advance the 
work with the client. Over time, intent becomes second nature. By noticing 
internal experience and paying attention to the reaction and response of others, 
the practitioner is on the path to expanded presence (ibid, p72). 
They further describe ‘presence’ in terms of time in that they suggest that past 
presence comes from one’s history and experience. They give the example of Nelson 
Mandela in suggesting his history of perseverance in the face of insurmountable odds 
affords him high regard from others in general. They describe ‘present power’ as how 
a practitioner looks, what they wear and how they talk as having influence in the 
present. They argue that one should “become self-aware and interested in the impact 
one has on others” (ibid, pp73-74). In terms of ‘future presence’ the authors suggest 
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that this is something of a lingering impression that the practitioner leaves with the 
client resulting in future engagements.  
It seems to me that Rainey-Tolbert and Hanafin echo how I have described symbolic 
power (after Bourdieu, 1991), reflexivity and relationships with others in their 
description of ‘presence’ but I find their description problematic. Because they 
collapse the paradox of how people are forming and being formed by each other, they 
position presence as being a skill that resides within an individual that can then be 
exercised in any context, something I have come to argue against in my research in 
that I have found context to be an important part of exercising practical judgement.   
Another example of authors writing about ‘presence’ from an organisational 
development perspective is Senge et al (2005). They take up the idea of presence and 
give it something of a spiritual turn and argue that “some theorists had even 
developed ways of thinking about this (presence) that transcended the dichotomy 
between individual and collective” (ibid, p14). These authors argue that organisations 
are living institutions and as such are self-organising systems. According to these 
authors, in these systems we are to see ourselves as both parts and wholes at the same 
time. What seems to me to be going on here is that while these authors may be 
perceiving the individual/social paradox that I have been discussing in this thesis, at 
the same time they see the individual and the collective as separate phenomenon, 
rather than as being paradoxically related as I have argued. They assume a Kantian 
form of dialectic in which the paradox is collapsed into a both/and proposition that, as 
I described in project four, is common in theories of organisational change (Griffin, 
2002, pp5-6). 
As I said in project one, I have identified myself as an organisational development 
practitioner since completing a Masters programme in 2009. Prior to my work on the 
DMan programme this meant that I also took up the systemic, individualistic and 
humanistic assumptions that are common in the literature on OD. I am arguing that I 
have been more or less unwittingly colluding, or one might even say I was disciplined 
into colluding (after Foucault, 1977) with such assumptions, and in the later stages on 
the DMan also colluding with them, at times, with some awareness. 
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As I have described in this thesis, thought collectives, which maintain ideas and 
assumptions, emerge unbidden from many people relating to each other. I think this is 
key to understanding how one can end up feeling the need to collude with them to 
feel competent as a member of such a thought collective. In project one I explored 
how organisational development as a practice had emerged from three major 
innovations; T-groups or sensitivity training, thinking of organisations in terms of 
sociotechnical systems, and the development of Likert scales in implementing 
organisational survey feedback. Having experienced WWII, the people who 
developed these ideas, were interested in developing democratic and humanistic 
practice. Others, following in that tradition, writing from an organisational 
development perspective, have taken up these ideas as principles or values in which 
practice is now rooted. People working in the field of organisational development are 
encouraged to see organisations as whole systems and the role of the practitioner is to 
develop and maintain the health of individuals and organisations. Taking a systemic, 
democratic and humanistic approach to organisational development assumes that one 
can stand outside (or inside) of an organisational system and act upon it with control 
over the people involved and the outcomes of their actions. Organisational 
development practice has until recently been characterised in a diagnostic form in 
which the practitioner diagnoses problems in an organisational system and sets out a 
process for solving them, thereby bringing the organisation to a healthy state 
(Cheung-Judge and Holbeche, 2011). Diagnosis is seen by some as a very important 
part of OD practice, 
 
Diagnosis is a highly desirable, if not essential, precursor for informed and 
effective organisation development…interventions (McCulloch & Cronshaw, 
2008, p89). 
 
The assumptions that support this diagnostic way of thinking are not only that an 
organisation is a system but also that one can act upon that system with predictable 
results. In the past colluding with these assumptions, has allowed me a sense of 
belonging to the OD community of practice. However, I now find myself reluctant to 
describe my work in diagnostic terms. It feels unethical to me to do so given that I 
don’t subscribe to that inherent idea of predictability. 
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More recently there has been a shift from diagnostic organisational development to 
what is termed as dialogic organisational development (Bushe and Marshak, 2015). 
The dialogic form is suggested as a move to recognise organisations,  
 
…not just as open systems interacting with an environment, but as dialogic 
systems in which people are continuously sense-making and meaning making, 
individually and in groups. What happens in organisations is influenced more 
by how people interact and make meaning than how presumably objective 
external factors and forces impact the system (ibid, p2).  
 
I find the dialogic perspective on OD more helpful to me in understanding how my 
practice has been changing in that I now find myself trying to get involved in 
conversations that invite individuals and groups to inquire into how we are making 
sense of our experience at work. According to Bushe and Marshak (2015), dialogic 
OD recognises the importance of narrative and the practitioner as a participant in what 
is going on. However, even when taking up the idea of participation these authors 
retain a systemic viewpoint on organisations. In contrast to this I am arguing that 
there is nothing outside of ongoing relating between interdependent people and from 
this perspective there is no system outside of local interaction. Consequently, rather 
than viewing organisations as systems, I view such thinking as taking up imaginative 
constructs that serve to constrain and enable ongoing conversations. Recognising, and 
where possible exploring, such imaginative constructs in conversation with others is 
increasingly how I see my practice. 
 
Given that to some extent I thought of myself as an OD practitioner looking to 
support people and organisations I started out on the DMan programme assuming that 
I wanted to understand organisational change better or perhaps even how to make 
change happen. However, what I became increasingly interested in was why things 
stayed the same. Why was it that, given the many possibilities, patterns of relating 
were so often familiar? As I progressed through the different projects that form this 
thesis I increasingly recognised a phenomenon that I have called functional collusion. 
I have come to understand that it happens when people interact together without 
former discussion and often without awareness to maintain familiar patterns of 
relating in avoidance of uncomfortable emotions such as shame or to cover over 
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conflicting power relations. In this thesis I have argued that it is both an individual 
and social process at the same time. I would argue that holding of the individual and 
social in mind at the same time, seeing them as being in an inextricable dialectical and 
paradoxical relationship with each other, is one of the things that sets my work apart 
from many other authors writing about organisational development.  
 
As I have described in this thesis, in the dominant literature on organisational 
development, it is common for authors to emphasise processes that seek to predict 
how change comes about, often offering models, tools and techniques to make it 
happen. These authors take for granted that such an endeavour is possible. A feature 
of conventional theories on change has been to reify organisations and to think of 
them in terms of systems with an emphasis on making changes to improve alignment 
between an organisation’s various parts. This leads to a discourse of exploring 
organisational change at some kind of macro level, which can only ever be a 
conceptual idea, rather than exploring the interactions between people that give rise to 
stability and change over time. I have argued that understanding the history of local 
processes of relating between people is vital to exploring the emergence and 
maintenance of the status quo and such literature tends to leave history relatively 
unexplored. In contrast, I am proposing a perspective on organisational stability and 
change that recognizes the paradoxical processes of the individual and the social 
forming and being formed by each other over time through which ongoing patterns of 
relating may be maintained or changed in what Tsoukas and Chia (2002) describe as 
the continuous "reweaving of actors' webs of beliefs and habits of action as a result of 
new experiences obtained through interactions" (ibid, p570). 
 
My research contributes to knowledge by giving an explication of what is emerging in 
organisational processes as part of everyday experience in which people collude with 
each other. I argue that people often do so without discussion and often without 
awareness in maintaining familiar patterns of interaction, and from which change 
emerges in the paradoxical stable instability of complex responsive processes of 
relating rather than as a result of planned interventions using tools and techniques. 
The lack of discussion is key to the emergence of such collusion given that a 
discussion of any collusion would disable the ability for it to continue without it 
becoming a conspiracy. Whilst we don’t talk about it, we can collude with each other 
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as if it isn’t happening. Thinking in those terms raises ethical questions about 
exercising practical judgement when becoming aware of such collusion, and whether 
or not to bring it into our conversation to make it explicit in an attempt to challenge 
manipulation.  
 
Taking up contextual reflexivity as practice offers a potentially new way of seeing 
one’s work as an organisational development practitioner. Thinking of OD practice in 
this way offers a move from thinking of oneself as an instrument (Cheung-Judge, 
2001; Seashore et al, 2004) to be applied to organisational systems, to thinking of 
oneself as a reflexive participant offering temporary leadership (Mowles, 2009, p291), 
encouraging alternative understanding about what is going on in the ongoing and 
emerging patterns of relating in organisational contexts. 
 
Using a method with narrative at its heart has given insight into my experience of 
everyday life in organisations. Such insight into seemingly ordinary shared 
experiences such as job interviews, team awaydays and board meetings can seem 
commonplace and therefore trivial but when looked at closely involve collusive 
processes that are generalisable. I have used the word collusion because in 
organisational literature it is mostly taken up as a negative aspect of people 
deliberately planning to gain an advantage (as discussed earlier in this synopsis and in 
projects three and four) and yet I have found it a good theme that has prompted my 
thinking. Rather than collusion being entirely negative I am pointing to it as an 
emergent process of relating that has a clear function of supporting people in being 
able to make assumptions about how they can go on together in groups. 
 
By inquiring into the specific interactions between people in particular contexts, I 
have provided an explanation for how it is that patterns of relating are maintained and 
an explanation for how change emerges in the face of the many complex possibilities 
that exist. Bourdieu (1977) puts forward the idea of doxa to explain how some things 
are taken for granted and for which there is no contradictory argument. He suggests 
that only when an unorthodox argument is made can doxa come to be understood to 
be orthodox. My argument is that organisational change theories and systemic 
thinking, rather than offering ways of predicting future outcomes, are instead themes 
that shape the power relating in the everyday practice of people working in 
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organisations. This thesis is intended as a contribution to unorthodox propositions that 
challenge the doxa of the dominant discourse on organisational development. I offer 
this contribution with the view that human knowledge is ever evolving and moving 
and my contribution, in common with my arguments, can really only be offered with 
a warranted assertability (Dewey, 1938, p7) as I discussed earlier. 
 
In project one I set out how I became a practitioner of organisational development and 
in doing so I took up humanistic and systemic assumptions. In project one and three I 
discuss how I used the Burke-Litwin model to win favour with a powerful group who 
also held those assumptions. I argued that practitioners of organisational development 
represent a thought collective with a particular thought style (after Fleck, 1979) 
through which those assumptions are sustained. It is to this thought collective of 
practitioners that I offer my contribution to knowledge.  
 
Whilst I’ve been working on the DMan programme I have had two opportunities to 
share my emerging arguments with two different sets of students doing a Master’s 
programme in organisational development.  In conversation with the first of these 
groups I explained what I had started to describe as functional collusion (this 
discussion would have been around the time I was writing project three) and I invited 
them to consider what might be necessary for them to collude with in the maintenance 
of the social object of their Masters programme. At that point the facilitator of the 
group, who had been the person to invite me to speak to his students, jokingly said 
that I hadn’t told him that I was going to ask that question. His comment was quickly 
followed by one of the students expressing relief that the director of the Masters 
programme wasn’t there to hear their conversation. There followed a period of what I 
experienced as nervous laughter. I relate this short narrative because for me it has 
strong echoes of the events I described in the narrative in project two when I 
facilitated the group of directors. In that experience on entering the room with a circle 
of chairs there was similar nervous laughter and joking comments. My interpretation 
of this is that in both instances the groups were anticipating a discussion that would 
involve a reflexive inquiry into the nature of how they were relating together and the 
potential for novelty that may have arisen in such an inquiry. This anticipation of 
novelty also raises the possibility for significant learning and the potential for shame 
or conflict to arise. My experience was that both groups were unconsciously working 
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together to maintain the familiarity of the patterns of relating they had become used 
to. 
 
In working with the second group of Masters students, having described my 
understanding of functional collusion from project four, we discussed examples from 
their own work experience. This conversation elicited, unprompted by me, a 
discussion of how people, in their experience of their organisations, unthinkingly and 
without discussion take up individualizing competency frameworks and psychometric 
instruments in seeking to align individual employees with organisational values. 
These examples indicate to me the potential for generalizing my research to a wider 
community of organisational development practitioners. 
 
Contribution to Practice 
 
There have been significant changes in my practice since I embarked on the DMan 
programme. Since completing project two, which changed the way I was thinking 
about my facilitation practice, I have become reluctant to use any psychometric 
instruments such as MBTI. I worry about the ethics of using such instruments in my 
practice in the way that I was trained to use them which denies anyone the 
opportunity to critically discuss and deconstruct them. However, I do occasionally use 
the language of some of those instruments to try to be understood in groups. As an 
example, in a recent meeting with my colleague directors we were discussing how to 
adapt the change programme that I have been leading. I noticed how some of the 
directors wanted to start by thinking about the people involved and others wanted to 
start with what the structure of the change team and the change process would be. 
This seemed to me to reflect some important differences in how we worked 
individually and as a group. I reflected on how some of those differences are 
discussed in MBTI language in an attempt to invite my colleagues to reflect on how 
our differences were affecting how we were relating as a group. I think this is an 
example of how I now find a way to compromise with the dominant ways of thinking 
in this group to be heard and understood. I want to be clear that when I’m using such 
language in examples like this I’m not simply making strategic choices about what to 
say as if I know the impact I’m going to have as a consequence. Rather, it seems to be 
 185 
a process in which I am making practical judgments about how I speak into the group 
with whatever seems appropriate to me at the time and paying attention to the 
ongoing processes of gesture and response that ensue. This includes noticing how I 
am responding reflexively to others and my own private conversations with myself. 
 
In the past, I might have set up special away-days or meetings and sought to facilitate 
them with tight agendas and planned outcomes and there are still many meetings in 
which I participate that match that description. However, in circumstances where I 
think I may be able to help I now seek to include myself in the ongoing conversations 
that people are having. I find myself offering my thoughts and insights when they 
occur and consequently I seem to be invited to support others in their conversations 
about how they are organizing themselves. It seems that a form of practice is 
emerging that is recognized by others. An example of this is how I have recently 
become involved in discussions with the Director of Corporate Services, the Head of 
Organisational Development and The Head of Human Resources as they have been 
discussing how they are delivering their services for the organisation. As I’m 
participating in these conversations I find myself acting similarly to how I have 
described above, that is, not with systemic models that seem to offer prescriptive 
solutions but with my reflexive thoughts and insights as they come to me about what 
we are doing together.  
 
As I’ve described earlier in this synopsis, I find the changes to my practice are often 
subtle and show up in how I relate to others in particular contexts. Versions of the 
conversation I described with Michael, about how I might support the development of 
his team, take place relatively often. How my thinking has changed is more or less 
demonstrated depending on who I am speaking to. In talking to Michael, I was trying 
to use everyday language in trying to explain how I saw change in individual and 
social terms. When I am talking to Alison the Head of OD in my organisation, given 
that she is in the final stages of the Masters programme that I completed in 2009, I am 
able to talk much more deeply about how our thinking is similar and different. We 
exchange articles and other suggestions for reading as we make sense of what is going 
on in our mutual and separate experiences of work. What I’m trying to convey here is 
that the contribution to practice from my research is that I find I am increasingly 
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thinking about how I am thinking and how such reflexive processes seem to be 
becoming more habitual for me. 
 
As another example of my contribution to practice, after my conversation with 
Michael about his new team I went on to facilitate a team meeting with him and his 
three managers, which included Andrew. I facilitated this day with the help of Alison, 
the Head of OD. In preparing for the day Alison and I discussed how we might form 
an agenda that would meet the expectations of Michael and his team. We agreed on a 
short agenda and Alison said she would share it with Michael and although she 
worried that it wouldn’t be detailed enough for him, he readily accepted it. As part of 
my facilitation Michael and Alison were keen to use a tool called FIRO-B that 
involves exploring the control, inclusion and affection needs of individuals. Usually, 
the use of this tool involves participants assessing their individual needs in numerical 
terms and the adding up of these numbers suggests how they may want others to 
relate to them. Whilst I have reservations about the individualistic and 
decontextualized nature of such tools I agreed to use this one because the participants 
were familiar with it and I thought it may offer a starting point for them talking about 
how they wanted to relate to each other as a new team. On the day of the meeting I 
explained the tool, and my reservations about it. In this thesis I’ve pointed to the 
significance of history in understanding habitus and so I wanted to move away from 
numerical measures when using this tool and towards narrative data to support our 
discussions. I wanted to draw out the histories of relating from the participants. I 
explained to the group about how I saw experience as being important in 
understanding ourselves and others and I invited the participants to discuss their needs 
in terms of narrative examples from their individual and group histories. Over the 
course of the meeting I found that the tool got mentioned less and less as people got 
caught up in discussing their individual and shared stories, their aspirations for the 
future and how they might work together. 
 
I’ve related this short narrative to try to demonstrate how my practice is changing as I 
attempt to exercise practical judgement in my work with others as an ongoing 
emergent process of colluding or not colluding.  
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The description of functional collusion in this thesis offers a critique to the way others 
working as Organisational Development Practitioners think about their practice, 
especially those working in the not-for-profit sector.  I think an article could be drawn 
from it that challenges the ways people tend to think about organisational 
development and change and could be published in a management/organisational 
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